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The Nurture of Nature: Biology, Psychology and Culture 
 
Beth Hannon 
 
Abstract 
In this thesis I explore what consequences taking development seriously in 
evolutionary considerations will have for how we understand the evolution of 
psychology and culture. I first explicate the relationship between development 
and evolution that informs a number of approaches to evolution, including neo-
Darwinian evolutionary biology and evolutionary developmental biology. I argue 
that, to a greater or lesser extent, developmental processes have been 
misconstrued in these accounts and that the full role of development, from an 
evolutionary point of view, has not always been acknowledged. Instead, I suggest 
that a better model of the relationship between development and evolution can be 
found in developmental systems theory.  
I explore the neo-Darwinian underpinnings of a number of accounts of the 
evolution of culture and psychology, including the branch of evolutionary 
psychology associated with the work of, among others, John Tooby and Leda 
Cosmides, and the gene-culture co-evolutionary account of Peter Richerson and 
Robert Boyd. I argue that as well as being vulnerable to the same sorts of 
problems that plague neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology, they face other 
difficulties. These accounts suppose an internalist model of the mind, and this 
model is neither justified nor useful. The extended mind hypothesis offers a 
different model of the mind whereby cognitive processes can be partially 
constituted by structures in the environment. I sketch an alternative account of 
what the evolution of human psychology and culture by combining a 
developmental systems approach to evolution and development with the 
extended mind hypothesis. This will result in a very different understanding of 
the relationship between biology, psychology and culture. 
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Part One  
 
Development and 
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Introduction 
 
 
My aim in this thesis is to explicate the relationship between development and 
evolution in a number of different evolutionary accounts, and to explore what a 
more developmentally-informed account of the evolution of psychology and 
culture would look like. In particular, I want to explore what an account of the 
evolution of psychology and culture would look like if we combine the extended 
mind hypothesis with a developmental systems perspective.  
The question of how biology, psychology and culture relate to one another 
has a long history. A good deal of work on this issue can be understood as sitting 
somewhere on a spectrum with biological determinism at one extreme and 
environmental determinism at the other. Although Darwinian evolutionary theory 
has been applied to this issue since Darwin first published On the Origin of 
Species (1859), no consensus has yet been reached on what light evolutionary 
considerations can shed on this matter. In this thesis, I take it that there is some 
insight to be gained from asking evolutionary questions about these matters. This 
is not, by any means, the claim that a complete account of human psychology 
and culture can be had by understanding the evolution of human psychology and 
culture; rather, it is the much smaller claim that an evolutionary perspective can 
make some contribution to an understanding of human psychology and culture. A 
theme that reappears throughout this thesis is the value of adopting a variety of 
approaches to any particular research question, and I will be critical of views that 
tend to obscure or a priori rule out alternative lines of inquiry.  
Granting that an evolutionary perspective can help us understand human 
psychology and culture, much will then hang on the particular account of 
evolution we adopt. By far the most widely accepted evolutionary account is 
neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology, and a variety of accounts of the evolution 
of psychology and culture have used this as a starting point for their own 
analyses. I will focus on one neo-Darwinian approach to evolutionary 
psychology associated with the work of, among others, John Tooby and Leda 
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Cosmides (e.g. Tooby & Cosmides 1992). Buller (2005) distinguishes 
Evolutionary Psychology from other evolutionary accounts of psychology by the 
use of the upper case, and I will follow this convention here. I will also examine 
gene-culture co-evolutionary accounts including meme theory and particularly 
the work of Richerson and Boyd (2005). Not all of these co-evolutionary 
accounts adopt a strict neo-Darwinian approach, but they are all part of a class of 
theories sometimes termed “interactionist” (e.g. Buss et al. 1999; Oyama 2000b, 
2000c). The interactionist maintains that biological and psychological traits 
emerge from the interaction between our biology and our environment. 
Proponents of this approach suggest that interactionism resolves the age old 
“nature versus nurture” debate. Rather than couching the issue in terms of nature 
versus nurture, the interactionist position adopts a “nature and nurture” stance 
(Robert 2003). However, interactionism does not mark any significant 
conceptual break from the older nature/nurture debates. Nature and nurture 
continue to be conceived of as two distinct causes; the interactionist‟s job is to 
detail how they interact with one another (Oyama 2000b, 2000c).  
Neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology has tended to marginalise 
development in evolutionary theory. Indeed, neo-Darwinian biologists will often 
assent to this, tending to view development as beside the point from the 
perspective of their own research interests. However, there has been a growing 
interest in exploring the role of development in an evolutionary context. The 
emergence of developmental systems theory and evolutionary developmental 
biology – two accounts dealt with in this thesis – testify to this. In particular, I 
am interested in developmental systems theory here; I will argue that other 
approaches to a more developmental evolutionary theory suffer from serious 
problems. Developmental systems theory rejects the claim that nature and 
nurture are two distinct causes of phenotypes. Rather, the developmental systems 
theorist maintains that nature is the outcome of nurture. As Oyama puts it, “in 
[developmental systems theory] „nature‟ is not a phantom reality standing behind 
the phenotype: the phenotype in its surrounds is all the nature there is, and this is 
plenty” (2000c: S341). Nothing about phenotypes is already given; there is no 
essential nature lurking beneath the noise generated by developmental processes. 
Rather, phenotypes are just the result of the complex interactions of often vast 
arrays of developmental resources.  
13 
 
The developmental systems perspective alters our conception of both the 
explanans and the explanandum of evolutionary theory. The explanans is now 
thought of as including developmental processes and outcomes. The 
explanandum shifts as well so that we are no longer are explaining the evolution 
of a skin-bound organism, or even an extended phenotype; rather, we must attend 
to developmental systems and the life cycles they produce. The developmental 
system can extend far beyond the skin of the organism, and can affect how we 
individuate life forms. Structures in the environment can partially constitute 
developmental processes and can form part of what secures heritable similarity. 
When such an approach is used to analyse the evolution of human psychology, it 
finds a good deal of resonance with an idea from the philosophy of mind termed 
the extended mind hypothesis. This hypothesis also suggests that boundaries 
created by our skin are less important than might be supposed, and argues that 
cognitive processes can be partially constituted by structures in the environment. 
I will sketch a picture of what an account of the evolution of psychology and 
culture might look like when we take developmental systems theory and the 
extended mind hypothesis together.  
 
This thesis is organised into two parts; the first deals with evolutionary biology, 
while the second focuses on the evolution of psychology and culture. In part one 
my aim is to explicate the relationship between development and evolution in a 
number of different evolutionary theories, and argue that developmental systems 
theory avoids the pitfalls inherent in other accounts of evolution.  
Chapter one will be largely expository, and thus only concerned with 
outlining neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology; criticisms of this position will 
arise in later chapters. I identify two key commitments of neo-Darwinism that lie 
behind its understanding of the relationship between development and evolution 
by natural selection: the adaptationist programme and the gene as the unit of 
inheritance. I also detail what evolution and natural selection require and entail in 
order that these ideas can be well understood as they arise throughout the rest of 
this thesis.  
In chapter two I will focus specifically on the relationship between 
development and evolution by natural selection in a number of different 
approaches to thinking about evolution. I will begin by returning to one of the 
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two key commitments of neo-Darwinism, the adaptationist programme, and 
discuss the role this commitment plays in marginalising the contribution of 
developmental processes in evolutionary processes. I will contrast two responses 
to the adaptationist programme: process structuralism and niche construction. 
Although process structuralism is in many ways quite different to neo-Darwinism, 
I argue that both share common ground in that they have adopted similar models 
of the relationship between development and evolution. The niche construction 
approach, on the other hand, takes a different view of natural selection than that 
implied by the adaptationist programme, and argues that organisms are not 
merely moulded to suit their environments as the adaptationist programme 
assumes, but that organisms can also mould their environments to suit their own 
needs. I will argue that the niche construction approach can easily be extended to 
include interactions between developmental processes and the wider environment. 
I will look at some criticisms of this approach that stem from Dawkins‟ (1999a) 
extended phenotype approach, and also from the work of Godfrey-Smith (1996). 
However, I will argue that these criticisms miss the mark and that the niche 
construction model offers a more realistic account of the relationship between 
development and evolution by natural selection than that offered by either 
process structuralism or neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology. 
Chapter three turns to evolutionary developmental biology and will put 
pressure on the second neo-Darwinian commitment that maintains the gene is the 
unit of inheritance. Because evolutionary developmental biology is a relatively 
new field, there are a wide variety of opinions that comprise it, so I will spend 
some time identifying different trends which fall under the evolutionary 
developmental biology umbrella. Evolutionary developmental biology makes a 
strong case for the importance of taking development seriously when trying to 
understand evolution. However, while the gene is not viewed as the sole unit of 
inheritance in evolutionary developmental biology, it is taken to underpin 
hereditary transmission. This is then taken to justify viewing the gene as distinct 
from other developmental resources in some important way. I will argue that the 
privileging of the gene in evolutionary developmental biology, though a less 
extreme version than is often found in neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology, is 
based on a circular argument, and given this, we can no longer accept the claim 
that it is genes that ultimately explain heritable similarity. 
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Having, in chapter two and three, undermined both the adaptationist 
programme and the idea that the gene is the only unit of inheritance, I will turn in 
chapter four to developmental systems theory. While neo-Darwinism begins with 
a picture of evolution, and builds a picture of development from that, 
developmental systems theory begins with development, and only then tries to 
understand how evolution might occur. The result is that developmental systems 
theory offers a very different kind of evolutionary account. I will argue that 
developmental systems theory does not fall prey to either of two styles of 
argument presented against it; it is neither threatened by the emergence of 
evolutionary developmental biology, not is it unworkably holistic. Both 
evolutionary developmental biology and developmental systems theory have the 
ability to enrich one another and developmental systems theorists are already 
addressing the shortcomings in evolutionary developmental biology being 
lamented by evolutionary developmental biologists themselves. This, in turn, 
demonstrates that developmental systems theory can be put to work by scientists 
as well as philosophers, and deflates concerns about an unworkable holism in the 
developmental systems approach.  
Part two turns to the evolution of psychology and culture and will deal with 
a variety of approaches to this issue. As well as demonstrating short-comings in a 
number of these approaches, my aim here is to sketch an account of what a 
developmental systems perspective can bring to the study of the evolution of 
culture and cognition. 
Chapter five deals with Evolutionary Psychology. Evolutionary 
Psychology in based on neo-Darwinian biology and thus is vulnerable to all the 
same criticisms levelled at neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory in part one. 
Nonetheless, I discuss Evolutionary Psychology here for two reasons. First, it 
makes stronger claims about evolutionary biology than can be supported by neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory, so that even if neo-Darwinism can be defended 
from the criticisms made in part one of this thesis, Evolutionary Psychology will 
continue to face difficulties. Second, even accepting Evolutionary Psychology‟s 
interpretation of neo-Darwinian biology, it faces problems specific to its research 
focus – human psychology and culture. The sorts of problems faced by 
Evolutionary Psychology here may need to be dealt with by other attempts to 
give evolutionary accounts of psychology and culture. Evolutionary Psychology 
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is currently caught in a dilemma between two different claims. On the one hand, 
Evolutionary Psychologists suggest that culture is largely generated by our 
evolved cognitive capacities. On the other hand, they claim modern humans 
living in industrialised cities are often maladapted. I will argue that these two 
claims cannot be made compatible, and Evolutionary Psychologists are forced to 
either accept that they have little to say about modern culture, or they must 
abandon their particular model of human psychology.  
In chapter six I will examine gene-culture co-evolutionary accounts, such 
as meme theory (Dawkins 1989; Blackmore 1999) and that developed by 
Richerson and Boyd (2005). One important criticism of these sorts of approaches 
concerns the nature of inheritance. Natural selection is often taken to require 
almost complete vertical transmission. Theories of cultural evolution, as well as 
developmental systems theory, allow both vertical and horizontal transmission, 
and this has been taken by critics to rule out the possibility of natural selection 
operating on cultural variants or on developmental systems. Boyd and 
Richardson have developed one way of dealing with this criticism, but it relies on 
a model of the mind that will be rejected in chapter seven. I will outline another 
way this criticism can be handled using ideas developed in chapter four on 
developmental systems theory. However, I will argue that evolutionary accounts 
that focus on humans will need to contend with a particular difficulty. Following 
Hacking (1996, 1999), I will argue that human kinds differ from natural kinds in 
their instability as a result of looping effects. This places important limitations on 
evolutionary accounts that focus on humans, limitations that are not a feature of 
accounts of the evolution of non-human animals. 
Finally, in chapter seven I turn to the evolution of cognition. The extended 
mind hypothesis – understood here as the idea that our cognitive processes may 
be constituted by resources beyond our brains – has been viewed as somewhat 
radical. However, if one accepts the account of development and evolution put 
forward by developmental systems theorists, this model of cognition seems a 
good deal more plausible. I will begin by outlining the extended mind hypothesis, 
and will counter some recent criticisms levelled at it. Both Rowlands (1999) and 
Menary (2007) have offered evolutionary justifications for the extended mind 
hypothesis but I will argue that neither offer convincing accounts of the evolution 
of extended cognitive processes; on the contrary, they undermine the extended 
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mind hypothesis when they adopt Dawkins‟ (1999a) extended phenotype 
approach. Instead, I will suggest that a developmental systems perspective 
provides an account of development and evolution that is sympathetic to the 
goals and methodology of those who argue for the extended mind hypothesis and 
more effectively allows us to deal with common worries about the extended mind 
hypothesis. Combining a developmental systems perspective with this extended 
mind hypothesis will result in a very different understanding of the relationship 
between biology, psychology and culture. 
Much of the science surveyed here is in its early stages, and specific 
revisions may have to be made. But what I hope to achieve here is to make the 
case for there being a role for development in the study of the evolution of 
cognition and culture, and that the developmental systems approach offers the 
best way to do this. My aim here is to indicate what such a developmental 
systems approach to human culture and psychology might look like, and the sorts 
of issues it might handle; how such a framework is put to work will require more 
investigation. 
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Chapter One 
Neo-Darwinism 
 
1. Introduction 
The Modern Evolutionary Synthesis that led to neo-Darwinism was, broadly, the 
coming together of large-scale evolutionary work – such as work on speciation, 
biogeography, and palaeontology – with the more experimental Mendelian 
genetics. Given the disparate disciplines involved, it should be no surprise that 
neo-Darwinism is a broad church. The specifics of the research programmes that 
are essential to the work of a palaeontologist may be less important – often 
irrelevant – to the day-to-day work of the population geneticist. This is, of course, 
unproblematic. Productive research can result from prioritising some theoretical 
issues while bracketing others. But given these different approaches, a 
straightforward and comprehensive description of neo-Darwinism is not an easy 
thing to arrive at. There are certain commitments which everyone working within 
the neo-Darwinist camp will assent to, but just how important any particular 
issue will be very much depends on what research question is being pursued. It is 
not always clear that there is agreement on the terms and concepts being used. 
For example, although the gene seems fundamental to the neo-Darwinian project, 
there appears to be no clear-cut agreement on what a gene is (Stotz et al. 2004). 
As a result, I cannot hope to give a comprehensive survey of neo-Darwinism and 
the range of opinions within this framework here. Instead I want to focus on the 
two key commitments of neo-Darwinism that motivate its characterisation of 
development in relation to evolution by natural selection. The first of these 
commitments is to the adaptationist programme which maintains that traits – or 
at least an important category of traits – are best explained in terms of problems 
posed by ancestral environments (Lewontin 1978, 2001b). What “best 
explanation” amounts to here will be discussed, with particular reference to 
Godfrey-Smith‟s (2001a) distinction between different forms of adaptationism. 
The second commitment is to the gene as the unit of inheritance. This is taken as 
the starting point for a justification of the privileged role of the gene in 
development and the subsequent marginalisation of development in evolutionary 
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considerations. My aim here is merely to detail these aspects of neo-Darwinism; 
I will deal with each commitment more critically in later chapters. 
One of the aims of the first part of this thesis is to explicate the relationship 
between development and evolution by natural selection as envisaged by a 
number of different approaches to evolution. The two commitments of neo-
Darwinism that I will explore here underpin the neo-Darwinian understanding of 
this relationship. This is uncontroversially the case with regards to the 
commitment to the gene as the unit of inheritance; neo-Darwinists justify their 
neglect of developmental mechanisms by taking this commitment as a starting 
point. Given this, I will explore the relationship between this commitment and 
the relationship between development and natural selection in detail in this 
chapter. The manner in which the commitment to the adaptationist programme 
leads to a neglect of development in evolutionary considerations is less 
straightforward, and results from a problem shared by other approaches to 
evolution. Thus, while I will outline what the adaptationist programme amounts 
to here, the way in which the adaptationist programme leads to a neglect of the 
full role of development in evolution by natural selection will be dealt with in 
chapter two. 
 
2. Natural Selection 
Although natural selection is not the only evolutionary process, within neo-
Darwinism it is taken as the most important. There are different ways of 
unpacking the claim that natural selection is the “most important” process, and I 
will discuss these in more detail below. For now I want to focus on natural 
selection itself. In its “classical” articulation, evolution by natural selection is 
thought to follow from three key points: variation, differential fitness, and 
heritability (Godfrey-Smith 2009). Within any population there is some degree of 
variation. Some differences that exist between individuals will lead to a tendency 
for some organisms to survive and reproduce with success than other members of 
the population. Because offspring more closely resemble their parents than 
strangers, those advantageous traits possessed by the parents that ensured their 
greater chances of survival and ability to reproduce may be inherited by the 
offspring so that they too possess this advantage. Taken together, these three 
points can lead to radical changes in the composition of the population over a 
20 
 
large number of generations as a result of natural selection. In each generation, 
those individuals without the advantageous trait will fail to reproduce, or at least 
reproduce at a reduced rate when compared to those individuals with the 
advantageous trait. The percentage of individuals in the population with the 
advantageous trait will increase as the percentage of individuals with the 
disadvantageous trait decreases. After sufficient time, the population may no 
longer include individuals with the disadvantageous trait and instead may be 
solely composed of those individuals who possess the advantageous trait.  
Godfrey-Smith (2007, 2009) has noted that it is sometimes assumed that 
evolution by natural selection must follow from variation, differential survival 
and heritability. However, this is mistaken; while these conditions will lead to 
natural selection, evolution by natural selection does not necessarily follow. 
Natural selection does not entail evolution, or change, in a population. Stabilizing 
selection, for example, involves both selection and an absence of change or 
evolution. In a hypothetical population, individuals either possess trait A or trait 
B. Trait A confers an advantage in some situations so that A-individuals are 
favoured over B-individuals. In other situations, however, it is B-individuals who 
are favoured over A-individuals. So there are two selection processes acting on 
the population. In this example, the processes are such that the composition of 
the population remains in a dynamic equilibrium around a certain point and thus 
there is no (significant) change in gene frequency. Nonetheless, there are 
selection processes at work favouring either trait A or B, and these traits continue 
to exist in the population because one or other of the selection processes favours 
them. 
Natural selection may also act to preserve the composition of a population 
against deleterious variants and drift. Drift, another cause of evolutionary change, 
results from “differences in survival and reproduction that merely reflect the 
operation of chance” (Godfrey-Smith 2009: 27). Some organisms will be less 
successful at escaping predators, finding food, attracting mates, and so on than 
competitors because they posses traits that make them less competent in these 
tasks than conspecifics. Those individuals who are able to avoid predators due to 
some trait will tend to survive, while those that lack this trait will tend to be 
eliminated. However, not all “eliminations” will occur because the organism 
possessed traits that were poorly suited to the environment, and not all organisms 
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will survive and reproduce at higher rates than conspecifics just because they 
possess traits more suited to their environment. Sometimes success or failure will 
occur because of random events. Drift is a problem felt more strongly when 
examining small populations. Chance events that remove particular organisms 
from the population will have a larger effect on the proportion of a given 
phenotype in a small population. Across larger populations, chance events tend 
to even out so that chance eliminations of one trait are compensated by chance 
eliminations of other traits, leaving the overall composition of the population 
largely unaffected. 
Evolution has sometimes been equated with change in gene frequencies.
1
 
In chapter four I will argue that not all cases of evolution need consist in changes 
in gene frequencies. However, this takes us beyond neo-Darwinism, the focus of 
this chapter. Here it is worth noting some points about defining evolution as a 
change in gene frequencies. Evolution occurs as a result of a number of different 
mechanisms, natural selection being only one. Drift, for instance, will account 
for some changes in frequency. So, not all cases of gene frequency change are 
cases of natural selection. Similarly, not all cases of natural selection are cases of 
gene frequency change. Stabilizing selection acts to resist change in gene 
frequency. This need not be a problem if our focus is on evolution by natural 
selection, but it is important to note that gene frequency change and natural 
selection cannot be equated with one another. Gene frequencies change for 
reasons other than natural selection, and natural selection does not necessitate 
gene frequency change. 
A further complication arises out of the neutral theory of molecular 
evolution. This suggests that a good deal of change at the genetic level is the 
result of mutations that have no phenotypic effects and thus are neutral with 
respect to natural selection (Kimura 1968). If evolution is defined as change in 
gene frequencies, changes at the genetic level that have no effect on the 
phenotype will nonetheless be considered evolutionary changes. This does not 
apply in the opposite direction, however; changes in the phenotype that are not 
correlated with changes at the genetic level are not typically considered to be 
                                                 
1
 See for example Merrell (1994: 16) and Silvertown and Charlesworth (2001: 53). 
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evolutionary changes.
2
 Thus there is an asymmetry here between the genetic and 
the phenotypic level. 
 
2.1 Adaptation 
An important concept in evolutionary biology is that of adaptation. I will explain 
shortly the role this concept can play in neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology, but 
first I want to discuss the concept itself. Any trait thought to be favoured by 
selection – a trait that ensures the individual it belongs to survives while 
competitors are eliminated, and which can be inherited by offspring – is called an 
adaptation. Within evolutionary biology, there tends to be a distinction drawn 
between a trait that is an adaptation and a trait that is adaptive. An adaptation 
need not be adaptive, and an adaptive trait need not be an adaptation (Sober 
1984). An adaptive trait is one that will tend to help the organism survive and 
reproduce. Calling a trait adaptive tells us nothing about whether or not that trait 
has been favoured by selection in the past; the term adaptive refers only to 
present utility. To become an adaptation, a trait must have been adaptive at one 
point. If adaptive traits are heritable, and the environmental conditions do not 
change over subsequent generations so drastically as to render the trait non-
adaptive, the adaptive trait may become an adaptation. An adaptation is only 
rightly so called when that trait was selected for in the past. However, at some 
later point, this adaptation may no longer aid survival and reproduction, perhaps 
due to changes in the environment of the lineage. The adaptation may now be 
neutral with respect to natural selection, or may even become maladaptive. But 
so long as the trait is not fatal to the organism, it may take some time for it to 
disappear from the population once it ceases to be adaptive.  
                                                 
2
 As an example of a phenotypic change that does not correspond to a genetic change, take 
female butterflies. Whatever leaves the female butterfly hatches on and eats in her very early life 
will tend to be chosen as the site for laying her own eggs (Jablonka & Lamb 2005: 240). Her 
female offspring will repeat the cycle. However, if this plant becomes rare and is no longer 
locally available. female butterflies will have to find another plant for their eggs. The female 
butterflies that hatch on these new leaves will now lay their eggs on this new plant, and their 
female offspring will follow suit. There has been a significant change in the behavior of these 
butterflies and a change that will be inherited by their female offspring, but it was not the result 
of any genetic mutation. Nonetheless, this would not count as an evolutionary change if 
evolutionary change must involve change in gene frequencies. This sort of phenomenon will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
23 
 
Williams (1966) suggested that when we talk about a trait that has been 
favoured by selection – that is, an adaptation – we use the term “function” to 
designate the role played by the trait that ensured it was favoured by selection, 
and we use the term “effect” to talk about any other roles that trait may have. So 
in the case of the heart, its function is to pump blood, while one of its effects is to 
make a distinctive noise as it pumps blood. 
A related distinction developed by Sober (1984) pertains to what it is that is 
“visible” to selection. When animal breeders select one animal over another for 
breeding, they do so because that animal possesses desirable properties, such as a 
passive manner, high milk yield or a fast running speed. In these cases, the 
breeders are selecting for properties. Similarly, natural selection selects for 
properties, not the bearers of those properties. However, while we can say that 
properties are selected for, there is selection of the bearers of those properties. 
“Selection for” pertains to those properties that ensured the organism survived 
and out-reproduced its conspecifics, whereas “selection of” refers to any trait that 
hitch-hiked along with the target of selection.
3
 So for example, the heart was 
selected for its ability to pump blood and so is an adaptation for this function. On 
the other hand, although the sound a heart makes may be adaptive (for instance, 
allowing for medical diagnosis), it is not considered to be an adaptation. In this 
case, there was selection of the sound of a heart beat: 
 
To say that there is selection for a given property means that having that 
property causes success in survival and reproduction. But to say that a 
given sort of object was selected is merely to say that the result of the 
selection process was to increase the representation of that kind of 
object. (Sober 1984: 100) 
 
So Williams‟ distinction picks out a special case of Sober‟s distinction That is, 
while Williams‟ distinction was between different sorts of properties, Sober‟s 
distinction is broader. Williams‟ account distinguishes only between properties, 
namely, the effects and functions of traits. Sober‟s distinction, however, applies 
                                                 
3
 For example, pleiotropy is the name given to the phenomenon whereby traits are 
developmentally linked. If selection favours the effects of one trait, the other trait will be 
propagated throughout the population too due to pleiotropy. 
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to the bearers of properties too; although there can only be selection for 
properties, there can be selection of both properties and bearers of properties. 
Taking Sober‟s and Williams‟ distinctions together we can say that there can 
only be selection for properties (functions), but that there can be selection of both 
properties (effects) and the bearers of properties. 
Gould and Vrba (1982) have highlighted another distinction they believe is 
important. A trait can have numerous effects that had hitherto been neither a 
detriment nor an advantage to the organism; due to a new environmental context, 
however, such effects may become adaptive. They argue that an adaptation that 
has an effect (rather than function) that becomes adaptive ought to be known as 
an exaptation for this effect: “We suggest that such characters, evolved for other 
usages (or for no function at all), and later „co-opted‟ for their current role, be 
called exaptations” (1998: 55). This approach appears to divide adaptive traits 
into two sorts: those that are adaptations (i.e. have a history of selection) and 
those that are exaptations (i.e. have no history of selection). To highlight this 
distinction, Gould and Vrba use the example of birds‟ feathers. Feathers are 
thought to have initially conferred an advantage due to the role they played in 
regulating body temperature; that is, they are thought to be adaptations for 
thermoregulation. Later they had an adaptive role to play in flight and so, in 
Gould and Vrba‟s terminology, became exaptations for flight. Once feathers 
became exaptations for flight, new selection pressures would have been felt that 
favoured certain properties of feathers over others, and these are considered to be 
secondary adaptations for flight:  
 
The evolutionary history of any complex feature will probably include a 
sequential mixture of adaptations, primary exaptations, and secondary 
adaptations… and co-opted structure (an exaptation) will probably not 
arise perfected for its new effect. It will therefore develop secondary 
adaptations for the new role. (Gould & Vrba 1998: 65) 
 
What this means is that in order to designate a trait as being an adaptation for a 
particular task, it is not enough to know that performing that task is adaptive. We 
must be able to show that it was the performance of this task that led to the 
propagation of the trait when it first appeared. We cannot talk of feathers having 
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the function of aiding flight; rather, they have the effect of aiding flight. Once 
feathers are used in flight, a host of secondary adaptations may arise due to the 
new selection pressures flight brings. New kinds of musculature and more 
aerodynamic shapes may be selected for the role they play in aiding flight.  
Buss et al. (1998) question the usefulness of the concept of exaptation. 
Exaptations are adaptive traits without a history of selection and, they argue, it is 
unclear what relevance current utility has to evolutionary considerations: 
 
All evolutionary explanations of the existence of species-wide 
mechanisms are to this extent explanations in terms of the past fitness 
effects of that kind of mechanism that led to the current existence of the 
mechanism in the species. The fact that a mechanism currently enhances 
fitness, by itself, cannot explain why the mechanism exists or how it is 
structured … There are good reasons to think that it is not scientifically 
illuminating to demonstrate a feature's current correlation with 
fitness … unless such correlations reveal longer term, past selective 
pressures. (1998: 540) 
 
In one sense this is correct. Designating a trait an exaptation tells us only that it is 
currently adaptive. It is an exaptation precisely because it is adaptive without 
being an adaptation, and so does not require an explanation in terms of natural 
selection. But the lack of a selection history for these traits does not make the 
concept irrelevant. There is an important distinction between not needing to 
explain the prevalence of a trait in terms of natural selection and that trait being 
irrelevant to evolutionary considerations. It is important for the evolutionary 
biologist to be able to discriminate those traits that are in need of an explanation 
in terms of natural selection from those that do not. Having some concept to 
designate traits that are not in need of such an explanation helps us to avoid the 
mistake of assuming it was an adaptation for this use. That is, it gives a name to 
the class of traits that are adaptive, but not adaptations. Given this, the concept is 
not useless. It may not, however, be very useful in practice. Separating out 
exaptations from secondary adaptations will be very difficult. If there exists 
heritable adaptive variation in feathers, presumably the feathers that aid better 
flight will be selected, thus giving them a history of selection, and making them 
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adaptations, not exaptations. So do feathers cease to be exaptations for flight 
once there is selection for their effect on flight? And if so, how do we identify 
the point where a trait stops being an exaptation and starts being an adaptation? 
Gould might argue that the feather as a whole remains an exaptation, while 
specific modifications of the feather might be taken as secondary adaptations. It 
is not clear that biological structures can be so easily carved up into adaptations 
and exaptations. If we do not have clear criteria for identifying exaptations, it is 
hard to see how it can be practically applied. 
 
2.2 Types of Adaptationism 
Neo-Darwinism is committed to an adaptationist programme. This entails 
thinking about anatomy, physiology and behaviour in terms of natural selection. 
The adaptationist tries to identify adaptations and find explanations for why the 
functions of these traits were selected for. Godfrey-Smith (2001a) identifies three 
ways one might motivate this adaptationist programme. The first, called 
empirical adaptationism, rests on the claim that all or most traits possessed by an 
organism are in fact adaptations. That is, the majority of biological form can be 
explained with reference to natural selection and this situates natural selection as 
the most powerful force in evolution: 
 
Natural selection is a powerful and ubiquitous force, and there are few 
constraints on the biological variation that fuels it. To a large degree, it 
is possible to predict and explain the outcome of evolutionary processes 
by attending only to the role played by selection. No other evolutionary 
factor has this degree of causal importance. (2001a: 336)  
 
This is the empirical adaptationist position stated in its strongest terms. It is 
possible to be slightly more moderate by introducing some constraints on 
variation and allowing some other evolutionary mechanisms. For instance, Mayr 
weakens this claim slightly when he says that “almost any feature of an organism 
can be and has been shown to be of selective significance” (2001: 172, italics 
added). Natural selection provides the explanation for the vast majority of 
biological form. This claim is one that can only be settled by empirical research.  
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The second form of adaptationism identified by Godfrey-Smith is 
explanatory adaptationism. This position makes no claims about what is 
responsible for the evolution of all, or even most, of an organism's traits. It is 
concerned primarily with a subsection of traits – complex adaptations – and 
maintains that natural selection is responsible for their evolution. Although the 
claim that complex adaptations are primarily the product of natural selection is 
uncontroversial, where explanatory adaptationism makes its unique claim is in its 
suggestion that complex adaptations are the most important set of traits and thus 
ought to be the main focus of any evolutionary theory: 
 
The apparent design of organisms, and the relations of adaptedness 
between organisms and their environments, are the big questions, the 
amazing facts in biology. Explaining these phenomena is the core 
intellectual mission of evolutionary theory. Natural selection is the key 
to solving these problems – selection is the big answer. Because it 
answers the biggest questions, selection has unique explanatory 
importance among evolutionary factors. (Godfrey-Smith 2001a: 336) 
 
The natural question to ask about this position is why the apparent design of the 
organism should be the most important issue in biology. It is certainly interesting 
and we might well be interested enough to seek an explanation, but as Godfrey-
Smith notes, this seems to be "just a fact about us" (2001a: 347). From this 
philosophical and historical standpoint, it is easy to see why natural selection 
should be viewed as important. Arguments from design played an important role 
in theological, philosophical and scientific thought. This context provided a 
spring board for scientific enquiry; the kinds of questions raised against this 
backdrop allowed natural philosophers, naturalists and scientists to ask fruitful 
questions and structure their research. However, this only justifies the focus on 
adaptations as a methodological approach (more on which shortly). Explanatory 
adaptationism is not a claim about what is useful for doing research, rather it is 
making a claim about the world: namely, adaptations are the most important 
features of the biological world and would be even if we were not here to witness 
them. Adaptations, then, demand explanation in a way other features of the 
biological world do not. But it is difficult to see what, besides our own aims and 
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interests, makes parts of the natural world more important than others in this way. 
Complex adaptations may be a distinct subset of traits that require an 
evolutionary explanation, but it is unclear why – beyond the historical reasons 
already mentioned, as well as perhaps current worries concerning creationism – 
complex adaptations should be prioritised so highly above other traits. Godfrey-
Smith argues that, unlike the empirical adaptationist, the explanatory 
adaptationist is not making a claim that can be empirically tested; it is as much a 
philosophical as it is a scientific position. 
The third and final form of adaptationism, according to Godfrey-Smith, is 
methodological adaptationism: 
 
The best way for scientists to approach biological systems is to look for 
features of adaptation and good design. Adaptation is a good 
“organizing concept” for evolutionary research. (2001: 337)  
 
The kinds of questions that are asked when we adopt the adaptationist 
programme, the methodological adaptationist argues, are productive – they lead 
to new knowledge about the biological world and they raise further issues for 
investigation. For example, Amundson (1994) points out that adaptationists have 
argued that thinking in terms of adaptations not only throws light on adaptations, 
but where we find less than optimal design, we may be able to identify 
developmental constraints. That is, if we find an organism that does not appear to 
be optimally adapted to its environment, one possible explanation for this is that 
there is something about the details of that organism‟s developmental processes 
that means it cannot develop in such a way so as to be optimally adapted. We can 
then investigate the development of that trait and establish the nature of the 
developmental constraint. Thus the methodological adaptationism approach is 
held to be illuminating not only with respect to evolutionary biology, but also 
with respect to developmental biology.
4
 Thinking about the biological world in 
terms of adaptations has been productive, but as Godfrey-Smith points out, the 
                                                 
4
 However, Amundson (1994) argues that methodological adaptationists are mistaken. They 
do not help developmental biologists identify developmental constraints because adaptationists 
and developmental biologists mean different things when they speak of developmental 
constraints, and given this, both are interested in identifying two distinct things. 
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case for methodological adaptationism rests on an inductive argument; the 
adaptationist programme may have been useful in the past, but that does not 
mean that it always will be. If it should turn out that a great many important 
issues are uncovered when we abandon the adaptationist programme, this would 
provide good evidence against it being considered the best way to organise 
research (though we may still retain a commitment to a more moderate 
adaptationism that views adaptation as just one of a selection of good concepts to 
organise research around, depending on our research interests). 
These different versions of adaptationism are by no means mutually 
exclusive, and it is possible to hold any combination of these views. One might 
maintain that the adaptationist programme is the best way to structure research 
because most traits are adaptations, for instance. I will return to the varieties of 
adaptationism later, in relation to some specific claims of gene selectionists such 
as Dawkins (1989, 1999a). Before I do so, I will first outline the role of the gene 
in neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
 
3. Genes 
Neo-Darwinism is committed to the idea that the gene is the only biological unit 
of inheritance.
5
 It is the gene that ensures offspring more closely resemble 
parents than strangers in ways that can be visible to natural selection. A parent 
and its offspring might come to possess a similar scar by coincidence, but this 
sort of similarity will not be inherited by future generations and so cannot have 
effects that selection can act on. The neo-Darwinist maintains that only traits 
underpinned by genes can persist in a lineage long enough for complex 
adaptations to arise. This legitimises the claim that genes play a uniquely 
important role in neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology. 
 In this section I want to examine in detail the role genes are thought to play 
in evolution and the consequences this has for thinking about development. I will 
first look at the issue of genetic determinism. Neo-Darwinists have been keen to 
stress that they are not committed to genetic determinism, despite criticisms to 
the contrary. Examining what the neo-Darwinist is denying in this debate will 
                                                 
5
 Cultural inheritance systems have also been proposed that are thought to work in parallel 
with genetic inheritance, and have their own units of inheritance (e.g. Dawkins 1989). I will 
discuss cultural inheritance in more detail in chapter six. 
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enable a clearer understanding of the role the genes are thought to play. Although 
neo-Darwinists are committed to the gene as the unit of inheritance, there exists 
disagreement over whether genes are the only, or one among many, units of 
selection. I will discuss what is at stake here and argue that whatever position the 
neo-Darwinist adopts, this does not affect the way in which development is 
mischaracterised within neo-Darwinism. Finally, I will discuss why a 
commitment to the gene as the only unit of biological inheritance allows the neo-
Darwinist to neglect development. 
 
 
 
3.1 Genetic Determinism  
Neo-Darwinists have been accused of genetic determinism. The following 
quotations certainly suggest critics have reason for their claims: 
 
But always, without exception, living things are designed to do things 
that enhance the chances of their genes or copies of their genes 
surviving and replicating… (Ridley 1997: 18) 
 
[Organisms‟] activities are governed by genetic programs containing 
historically acquired information… (Mayr 1997: 21) 
 
Now [replicators] swarm in huge colonies, safe inside gigantic 
lumbering robots, sealed off from the outside world, communicating 
with it by tortuous indirect routes, manipulating it by remote control. 
They are in you and me; they created us, body and mind; and their 
preservation is the ultimate rationale for our existence. They have come 
a long way, those replicators. Now they go by the name of genes, and 
we are their survival machines. (Dawkins 1989: 19-20) 
 
However, neo-Darwinists have vehemently denied any genetic determinism (e.g. 
Dawkins 1989: 270-271). Kaplan (2000) has identified three varieties of genetic 
determinism that will help us to assess what is going on here.  
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 The strongest form of genetic determinism has it that genes contain the 
“complete information” for the organism (Kaplan 2000: 11). If we have the DNA 
of the organism, then we have enough to build a perfect duplicate of that 
organism (or at least, we will have once the requisite technological 
breakthroughs have been made). This is more the stuff of science fiction than 
modern science and is not a claim supported by neo-Darwinists. A less stringent 
form of genetic determinism, what Kaplan calls “intervention is useless” 
determinism, acknowledges that the genes do not do all the work in building 
organisms. However, if a trait is discovered to be underpinned by a gene (if a 
gene is found “for” a trait) then the idea is that the trait will inevitably develop.6 
No amount of intervention will alter the appearance of this trait. Again, this 
position is rejected by most. For instance, Evolutionary Psychologists, who adopt 
a neo-Darwinian approach to evolution (see chapter five), cite as motivation for 
their research the desire to find ways to prevent bad, or at least undesirable, 
behaviour (e.g. Daly & Wilson 1988). Dawkins, too, argues that “anybody can 
see that, as a matter of fact, genes do not control their creations” (1989: 271). 
Note here that although he argues genes do not control organisms, organisms are 
the creation of the genes. I will return to this point shortly. 
 The weakest and most subtle form of determinism Kaplan admits is one 
that denies that genes are sufficient for the development of a trait but maintains: 
 
(a) the genetic is the natural place to look when attempting to explain, 
predict, and control traits with even partial genetic etiologies, and that (b) 
traits with partial genetic etiologies are best understood as primarily 
genetic, and it is only through directed intervention that the expression 
                                                 
6
 The locution “gene for X” here is taken to pick out the function of the gene (the property of 
the gene in virtue of which it was favoured by selection). There is a broader sense in which the 
“gene for” locution is also used. Knock-out experiments involve researchers mutating or 
otherwise dampening the causal role a gene is supposed to play in development. When this 
affects the development of some trait, the researchers may then talk about having found the gene 
for that trait. Clearly, they have identified a part of DNA that plays a causal role in the 
development of that trait, but they have not established whether there was selection for that gene 
in virtue of its having that effect. The sense of “gene for” discussed above is a subclass of this use 
of the phrase. In both instances, we might expect the removal of the gene in question to have 
some phenotypic effect, though note that there seems to be a high degree of redundancy in the 
genotype (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 128). But only where we have also provided adequate 
grounds to suppose that there has been selection for the gene can we talk of the gene embodying 
instructions for the development of that trait. 
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of these genes with partial genetic etiologies can be avoided or 
controlled. (2000: 12)  
 
This characterizes the neo-Darwinian approach to genes best. Genes are not 
considered to be sufficient for the appearance of any trait; other resources must 
also be present. An organism may require food, oxygen, perhaps some parental 
care or socialisation to develop in a species-typical way. The path from gene to 
trait is not straightforward. Development is highly complex and can be sensitive 
to the slightest changes in the timings of events. Further, the appearance of a trait 
can be prevented by means other than the mutation of the gene(s) in question. 
Thalidomide can severely disrupt the development of arms and legs despite the 
fact the individual may have copies of all the genes involved in normal arm and 
leg development. All of this is readily accepted by the neo-Darwinist.   
 Nonetheless, there is something important about the contribution made in 
development by the genes that sets them apart from other developmental 
resources. Unlike those other resources, genes are thought to create bodies in 
virtue of the fact that they contain or embody programmes for development. 
Whether or not we wish to consider this a form of determinism, it at least 
constitutes a commitment to the distinct ontological status of genes within 
development. Although development requires many non-genetic resources, and 
though genetically underpinned traits may be altered by directed intervention, 
genes are thought to play a more important role in development than any other 
resource. I will now turn to the justification for this commitment. 
 
3.2 The Gene as the Unit of Inheritance and Selection 
Variation and elimination will ensure that some individuals survive and 
reproduce, while others do not. However, without heritability whatever trait has 
been selected for in one generation may not appear in the next. Heritability 
increases the chances that whatever advantage in survival and reproduction an 
organism's parents had, that organism might also possess.
7
 The neo-Darwinist is 
                                                 
7
 There is never a guarantee that such an advantage will be inherited by offspring. First, 
offspring only resemble their parents, they are not exact duplicates. Second, whether or not a trait 
is advantageous may depend on the state of the environment. If the environment changes in some 
way from one generation to the next, what was an advantageous trait may become either neutral 
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committed to the idea that the only biological entity of note to be inherited from 
one generation by the next is the gene.
8
 More correctly, it is not any physical 
entity that persists between the generations, but rather copies of that entity that 
persist. Although errors in copying sometimes occur – introducing mutations – 
this copying procedure is considered to have a good degree of fidelity. This line 
of thought has led Dawkins to speak of the “potential near-immortality” of genes 
(Dawkins 1989: 35). Given this, the gene is considered to be the unit of 
inheritance. 
 Genes can be copied with a good degree of fidelity for many generations. 
Crick (1970) suggested that there is a one way line of influence, from the genes 
to the phenotype; this became known as the Central Dogma of molecular biology. 
That is, genes can impart information to proteins and thus bodies, but not vice 
versa. Genes, or at least the information they are thought to embody, are thought 
to be unaffected by events in the life of the organism they reside in, beyond 
whether or not that organism survives and reproduces. Whatever environmental 
interactions an organism engages in throughout its life, this will not change what 
its offspring can potentially inherit; there is no inheritance of characteristics 
acquired by an organism during its lifetime.
9
 Genes in one generation have two 
causal arrows pointing away from them: one points to the phenotype in that 
generation, the other points to the genes‟ copies in the next generation. This 
suggests genes are the unmoved mover in development. At the very least, they 
play a causal role in the development of the phenotype, but they are not thought 
to be altered by this fact.  
 A minimum requirement for a trait to propagate throughout the population 
as a result of natural selection is that the trait should reappear in subsequent 
generations. And as genes are the only biological entities that are thought to be 
                                                                                                                                    
or disadvantageous with respect to selection. That is, the offspring may inherit the trait, but not 
the advantage associated with it. 
 
8
 Because it is the genes that are inherited, neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory is committed to 
the process of inheritance taking place only between organisms and their descendants. However, 
models of natural selection do not require the link to be between parents and offspring. Both 
developmental systems theory, the topic of chapter four, and theories of cultural evolution, the 
topic of chapter six, do not assume heritable similarity applies only to parent-offspring 
relationships. 
 
9
 In chapter four, evidence which challenges this claim will be addressed, as well as the 
consequences of this for evolution and development. 
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capable of persisting over many generations, it is only those traits that are 
somehow underpinned by genes that can be subject to natural selection. 
Consequently, any trait thought to have been favoured by selection – an 
adaptation – must also be a trait underpinned by genes. One might also assume, 
on this line of thought, that most traits that showed heritable similarity might be 
underpinned by genes too.
10
 Recall that it is not only adaptive traits that can be 
propagated throughout a population as a result of selection. “Hitchhiker” traits, 
such as those developmentally linked to adaptations, may also spread throughout 
the population, although there will not have been selection for them. Stochastic 
events may also account for the spread of some traits. Given the commitment to 
the gene as the unit of inheritance, hitchhiker traits and traits that persist as a 
result of stochastic events must also be underpinned by genes. Thus, the class of 
traits that can be considered to be underpinned by genes is broader than just those 
traits that are adaptations.  
 It is one thing to say that the development of a trait involves genes – this 
much is uncontroversial – but quite another to suggest as Dawkins does that 
genes “manipulate” organisms for their own ends (1989: 20). Dawkins‟ claim 
here stems from his particular version of neo-Darwinism, gene selectionism. 
Gene selectionists maintain that the gene is the unit of selection and arrive at this 
conclusion by asking the question “what benefits from selection?” They conclude 
that what benefits is whatever persists through the numerous rounds of selection: 
 
Natural selection in its most general form means the differential survival 
of entities... and that some of the entities must be potentially capable of 
surviving – in the form of copies – for a significant period of 
evolutionary time. Small genetic units have these properties: individuals, 
groups and species do not. (Dawkins 1989: 33) 
 
The thought here is that for natural selection to produce adaptations, especially 
complex adaptations, there must be something that is capable of persisting from 
one generation to the next for a large number of generations. The gene 
                                                 
10
 Some exceptions might be made here. If the neo-Darwinist accepts a cultural inheritance 
system, such as memetics, then heritable similarity in behavioural traits may not have to rely 
exclusively on genes. See chapter six for more on this. 
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selectionist argues that what persists is the gene because the gene is the only 
biological entity that is replicated in each generation. Organisms do not replicate 
on this view, they merely reproduce. Offspring of sexually reproducing 
organisms are a mixture of both parents‟ traits (as well as unique developmental 
occurrences brought about by interactions with the environment). Asexually 
reproducing species are not considered to replicate either, on the grounds that 
their offspring do not inherit the characteristics acquired by their parents as a 
result of interactions with their environment.
11
 Dawkins argues that the replicator 
in natural selection is the largest section of DNA not to be “shuffled into 
oblivion” by crossing-over in sexual reproduction (1989: 35). Although 
organisms only last a generation, these sections of DNA – the genes – may 
persist through copies; they are the entities that differentially survive. They 
differentially survive as a result of the effects they have in the world, or at least 
this is one reason why they may persist; drift may result in the persistence of 
some genes too. Genes that play a role in the development of an organism such 
that the organism is better able to survive and reproduce will be more likely to be 
replicated. Those genes that have a deleterious effect on the development of the 
organism will not be replicated.  
 This is complicated somewhat by neo-Darwinian accounts of kin altruism. 
Relatives share a certain percentage of genes, and this means that there are two 
ways a gene may come to be replicated. First, a gene may have an effect such 
that it increases the chances of reproduction for the organism in which it resides, 
or second, it might increase the chances for reproduction in siblings, or other 
genetic relatives. This second scenario may involve some level of reproductive 
sacrifice on the part of the organism in question, but ultimately may better ensure 
the replication of the gene if the relative also possesses a copy.
12
 Thus, a gene 
which plays a role in development such that the organism or its kin are better 
able to hide from a predator, source food, attract mates, or any of the other things 
                                                 
11
 Note that this move is problematic. Although some acquired characteristics are not 
inherited, this is not always the case. Further, just as alterations to the phenotype are not all 
passed on, neither are alterations to the genetic material. Many mutations are removed by “proof-
reading” processes which are thought to have evolved to minimize the effects of harmful 
mutations (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 63-64). Thus, neither genetic material nor phenotypes are 
perfectly replicated. 
 
12
 See chapter five for further discussion of kin altruism. 
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an organism can do to ensure survival and reproduction for itself or its kin, will 
increase its chances of being replicated. That is, genes may be selected as a result 
of the effects they have in the world. And once such selection has taken place, 
these effects become, following Williams' (1966) terminology, the function of 
those genes. On this account, where we find an adaptation, we find a means by 
which genes have ensured they were replicated into future generations. And the 
more we suppose that organisms are the product of natural selection, the more we 
will be inclined to see organisms as a collection of traits that help to ensure the 
replication of the genes.  
 As well as coining “replicator” for genes and any other entity that displays 
the “longevity, fecundity and copying-fidelity” essential for a replicator, 
Dawkins suggests that organisms are “vehicles” for their genes (1989: 33). 
Vehicles are those things that interact with the environment with a greater or 
lesser rate of survival and reproduction. The organism is most commonly thought 
of as such a vehicle, although higher levels of biological organization might also 
be considered.
13
 The organism is, on this view, a way for genes to copy 
themselves into future generations. Adaptations are what successful genes 
created and which ensured they were replicated. The genes, as replicators, sit 
inside bodies or vehicles (or “survival machines” as Dawkins puts it) and it is the 
interactions of the vehicles with their broader environment that determines 
whether the genes are replicated or not. Hull (1980) clarified Dawkins‟ 
distinction between replicators and vehicles by invoking a slightly different 
distinction between replicators and interactors. Interactors, as the name suggests, 
are those things that interact with the environment and influence survival and 
reproduction in so doing. Hull argues that the replicator/vehicle distinction 
suggests that genes, as the paradigm example of replicators, only replicate. But 
on Dawkins' account the genes have two roles; they “produce copies of 
themselves and... influence their own survival and the survival of their copies” 
(Hull 1980: 318). That is, genes are both replicators and interactors. The gene, 
with its dual role as replicator and interactor, can help to ensure its own 
replication independently, as, for example, in the case of meiotic drive (Dawkins 
                                                 
13
 Dawkins (1999a) argues that the vehicle may not coincide with the skin-bound organism. 
His extended phenotype hypothesis will be discussed in chapter two. 
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1989: 235). Other interactors include organisms, and may include groups of 
organisms. Non-genic interactors are a means to an end for replicators; they help 
fix the chances of replication for genes. 
 Not all neo-Darwinists are gene selectionists, and there have been a number 
of different positions adopted on the issue of the unit of selection; however, the 
hierarchical model of selection appears to be the main alternative to gene 
selectionism in the current debate, and is a position that will feature in later 
chapters.
14
 The claim of the gene selectionist is that we can adequately explain 
evolution by natural selection by adopting a gene‟s eye view; adaptations are best 
explained by thinking about how those adaptations help ensure gene replication. 
Neo-Darwinists who reject gene selectionism do so because they maintain that 
the gene‟s eye view alone will not suffice to generate adequate explanations for 
evolution by natural selection, and instead they argue for a hierarchical model of 
selection. The idea here is that we must also attend to higher levels of biological 
organisation in order to understand differential survival and reproduction; 
selection does not just act at the level of the gene, but also at the level of the 
organism, populations and species (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 38-43). I will 
discuss in more detail the idea of selection acting at different levels of 
organisation in chapter three and six, but here I want to clarify what is not at 
stake. All sides of this debate accept that the gene is the only biological 
replicator.
15
 Further, all sides maintain that adaptations are underpinned by genes 
in some sense that makes the genes more significant than other developmental 
resources. Brandon‟s (1996: 58-65) distinction between units and levels of 
selection clarifies matters here. Those that maintain a hierarchical model of 
selection are concerned with the issue of the level or levels at which selection can 
work, rather than with what constitutes the unit of selection. That is, the debate 
concerns whether attending to the gene as interactor is sufficient, or whether 
interactors at higher levels of biological organisation must also be attended to in 
order to generate good explanations for differential reproduction and selection. 
Within neo-Darwinism at least, the current debate involves the level of selection. 
                                                 
14
 See Lloyd (2001) for a more detailed analysis of the units of selection debate and the 
various positions adopted within it. 
 
15
 Developmental systems theory, the topic of chapter four, rejects this position, but I am 
concerned here only with different points of view within the neo-Darwinian framework. 
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The unit of selection – at least as defined by Dawkins as that which persists 
through replication – is not in contention. 
 To return briefly to the discussion above concerning the varieties of 
adaptationism, Godfrey-Smith (2001a) argues that Dawkins is an explanatory, 
rather than empirical, adaptationist. Of course, as Godfrey-Smith points out, the 
different forms of adaptationism are not mutually exclusive. One can believe that 
adaptations are the most in need of explanation (explanatory adaptationism) and 
also believe that the organism is comprised primarily of adaptations (empirical 
adaptationism). So I am not claiming that Dawkins is not an explanatory 
adaptationist, but rather that he is also an empirical adaptationist of sorts. 
Godfrey-Smith bases his claim that Dawkins is not an empirical adaptationist on 
Dawkins‟ acceptance of the neutral theory of molecular evolution, discussed 
above, which maintains that a good deal of evolutionary change involves 
mutations at the level of DNA but which are neutral with respect to the 
phenotype (Dawkins 1986: 302-303). In accepting the neutral theory of 
molecular evolution, one accepts that a good deal of evolutionary change is not 
to be explained by selection, and so, prima facie, Dawkins does not appear to 
adopt empirical adaptationism. However, while Dawkins might happily accept 
that not all evolutionary change is the result of natural selection, there is a more 
limited case of evolutionary change where he does adopt something like an 
empirical adaptationist perspective. At the level of organisms especially (or 
perhaps extended phenotypes, to be discussed in chapter two), Dawkins‟ 
approach maintains that natural selection is the main driver of evolutionary 
change. The claim here is that interactors above the gene, in particular multi-
cellular organisms, are the result of natural selection. Bodies are, in fact, an 
adaptation for gene survival: 
 
An individual body is a large vehicle or “survival machine” built by a 
gene cooperative. They cooperate because they all stand to gain from 
the same outcome – the survival and reproduction of the communal 
body – and because they constitute an important part of the environment 
in which natural selection works on each other. (Dawkins 1986: 192) 
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This form of empirical adaptationism maintains that evolutionary change at 
higher levels of biological organisation is primarily the result of natural selection. 
Empirical adaptationism of this sort may seem to be inevitable if one accepts that 
complex organic structures can be produced only by generations of cumulative 
selection. Certainly, multi-cellular organisms are highly complex entities. For 
instance, the degree of co-ordination required between the different organs to 
maintain life is difficult to overestimate. Dawkins suggests that the organism 
itself seems to be a complex adaptation, and complex adaptations cry out for 
explanation more than anything else: “whatever we chose to call the quality of 
being statistically-improbable-in-a-direction-specified-without-hindsight, it is an 
important quality that needs a special effort of explanation” (1986: 15). For 
Dawkins, this explanation is in terms of natural selection. Thus, Dawkins has 
combined explanatory adaptationism with empirical adaptationism at higher 
levels of biological organisation.
16
 
 Even granting that the gene is the sole unit of inheritance, this is not 
enough to establish why the gene is thought to play a qualitatively different role 
in development. That is, we can acknowledge that the gene has a special 
ontological status making it distinct from other developmental resources in virtue 
of the fact it is the unit of inheritance or the replicator, but what is it about this 
distinct ontological status that means that the gene plays a radically different role 
in development? Conceivably, the gene could possess this distinction marking it 
out from other developmental resources, and yet this might not affect its role in 
development. The following section will discuss the justification for moving 
from a commitment to the gene as unit of inheritance to the idea of genetic 
programmes. 
 
3.3 Genetic Information 
Genes are often spoken about in informational terms within neo-Darwinism. 
Genes are thought to contain or embody information: 
 
                                                 
16
 Note, however, that Dawkins‟ is not the strongest form of empirical adaptationism, even at 
these higher levels of biological organisation. Dawkins is willing to accept that drift may play a 
role in phenotypic evolutionary change too. I will discuss the role drift is thought to play in this 
context in more detail in chapter two. 
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It is raining DNA outside. On the bank of the Oxford canal at the 
bottom of my garden is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy 
seeds into the air… Not just any DNA, but DNA whose coded 
characters spell out specific instructions for building willow trees that 
will shed a new generation of downy seeds. Those fluffy specks are, 
literally, spreading instructions for making themselves… It is raining 
instructions out there; it is raining tree-growing, fluff-spreading 
algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth. It couldn‟t be 
any plainer if it were raining floppy discs… What lies at the heart of 
every living thing is not a fire, not warm breath, not a “spark of life.” It 
is information, words, instructions. (Dawkins 1986: 111-112) 
 
Developmental biology can be seen as the study of how information in 
the genome is translated into adult structure, and evolutionary biology 
of how the information came to be there in the first place. (Szathmáry & 
Maynard Smith 1995: 231) 
 
Genes are not mere chemicals, they are instructions for building new vehicles to 
ensure their own replication. Genes form programmes, recipes, or plans for 
organisms. They may not strongly determine development, in the sense discussed 
above, but they play a role in development unlike any other developmental 
resource: “[the genome] is a set of instructions which, if faithfully obeyed in the 
right order and under the right conditions, will result in a body” (Dawkins 1999a: 
175). But what exactly do Maynard Smith and Dawkins mean when they speak 
of “information” and “instructions” in this context? There are at least two ways 
in which we might understand this. The first relies on the causal theory of 
information, and the second relies on the teleosemantic theory of information. I 
will discuss each in turn. 
 
 
 
3.3.1 The Causal Theory of Information 
Dretske (1981) develops one way to think about the concept of information. He 
first distinguishes information from meaning. Information is “an objective 
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commodity, something whose generation, transmission, and reception do not 
require or in any way presuppose interpretive processes” (1981: vii). That is, 
information exists in the world regardless of the existence of intelligent agents. 
Meaning, on the other hand, is wholly dependent on intelligent agents to interpret, 
understand and so on. Dretske illustrates the difference between meaning and 
information with the example “I have a toothache” (1981: 43-44). This always 
has the same meaning whether or not I have a toothache. However, the utterance 
of the sentence only conveys information about the condition of my tooth when I 
do in fact have a toothache. When I do not, the utterance of the sentence contains 
no information whatsoever (that is, it contains no information about my tooth, 
though it may contain information about the fact that I am lying and so on). 
Often, meaning and information coincide, for the obvious reason that this allows 
us to communicate effectively; however, this is a contingent fact. When I deceive 
you, as when I say I have a toothache when I do not, my aim is for meaning and 
information not to coincide. Information is closely associated with truth. 
Something can only be information if it reliably reflects the world as it actually is. 
Dretske argues that the terms “false information” and “misinformation” are part 
of a colloquial understanding, but his “nuclear sense” of information would 
disallow such usage: “information is what is capable of yielding knowledge, and 
since knowledge requires truth, information requires it also” (1981: 45).  
Dretske uses much of the terminology of communication theory, a 
mathematical theory of information developed by C. E. Shannon. This approach 
to information is concerned with the average quantities of transmitted 
information, rather than information content. The event or state of affairs to 
which the information pertains is known as the source. Information is conveyed 
via the signal. The person or thing that intercepts the information is known as the 
receiver. The channel of communication is defined as being the set of 
background conditions that generate only irrelevant or redundant information 
from the receiver‟s point of view (1981: 114-115). So, for example, the 
temperature may be the source and a thermometer may be the receiver. A drop in 
the temperature will cause a drop in the level of mercury in the thermometer. The 
channel conditions for this will be such things as the chemical properties of 
mercury, the conductivity of the thermometer‟s glass bulb, the atmospheric 
pressure, and so on. However, it is easy to see how the channel conditions, the 
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source and the receiver may all play each others‟ roles. Just as the thermometer 
gives us information about the temperature, the temperature can give us 
information about the thermometer. Similarly, the channel conditions might 
become the object of interest to us. The glass bulb of the thermometer may be 
subjected to various temperatures in order to determine the properties of the 
mercury inside – for example, to determine the rate of expansion of mercury as a 
function of temperature. Thus the relationships in this account are symmetrical 
and there is no privileged source of information. It is important to note the 
difference between an information-link and a direct causal one. If A contains 
information about B, it is not necessary for B to have caused A, but there must be 
some form of systematic dependency between the two. For example, the images 
on my television screen give me information about the images on your television 
screen when we are tuned to the same channel, even though the images on my 
television screen did not cause the images on your screen, but rather they are 
effects of a common cause. 
Is this, then, the sense of information that biologists have in mind when 
they discuss genes? On Dretske‟s account, the genotype would be the source, 
development would be the signal, the phenotype the receiver, and all other non-
genetic resources involved in development would be the channel conditions. If 
the channel conditions were held constant and the genotype varied, then the 
receiver – the phenotype – would co-vary with it. But in Dretske‟s account the 
roles of source, receiver and channel conditions may all be reversed. Anything 
that has a systematic dependency (co-varies reliably) with anything else may be 
considered a source of information about that thing. So, on this view of things, 
both the genotype and the environment are sources of information about the 
phenotype.   
This does not seem to match up with how neo-Darwinists use the concept 
of information. To begin with, they do not speak of the environment as a source 
of information; the environment is treated quite differently from genes. As 
Maynard Smith states: 
 
Biologists draw a distinction between two types of causal chain, genetic 
and environmental… the nature-nurture divide has become fundamental 
in biology (2000: 189). 
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Dretske‟s account of information creates a parity in terms of information 
between all factors involved in development. But this is exactly what neo-
Darwinists deny. Speaking of the gene as an “informational unit” was intended to 
call attention to its distinct and privileged position in development.  
A further problem for this account is that it cannot ground the idea that 
genetic information can be “misread” or “misrepresented” (Godfrey-Smith 1989, 
2008). Neo-Darwinians talk about the phenotype misinterpreting messages from 
the genes, for example, when an individual born without fully developed limbs as 
a result of exposure to thalidomide is nonetheless said still to possess the genes 
for the full development of limbs. The environmental perturbation (thalidomide) 
is said to interfere with the genetic information being realised in the phenotype. 
This would mean that the information exists even when the receiver does not 
pick it up. But on the causal theory, information is just reliable covariation; if 
there is no covariation, there is no information. Thus, Dretske‟s causal theory of 
information fails to ground the sense of information employed by neo-
Darwinians in two ways: first, it does not provide any justification for privileging 
the gene as a source of information, and second, it cannot account for 
misrepresentation. If a concept of information applicable only to the genetic (at 
least in the biological realm) is to be made respectable, it requires a theory that 
can do both these things. 
 
3.3.2 The Teleosemantic Theory of Information 
Maynard Smith (2000) has argued that the teleosemantic theory of information 
provides justification for the particular sense of information employed by neo-
Darwinians in relation to genes. This theory of information relies on the concept 
of intentionality. Intentional mental states are a common example used to 
illustrate this. Such states are aimed at, or about, something else – to believe that, 
to hope that, etc. Intentional states do not need to represent the world as it 
actually is; I can believe that the sky is green. This belief is mistaken, but it is 
nonetheless an intentional state directed at something. Intentional states carry 
intentional or semantic information; my belief that the sky is green carries this 
sort of information even though it is not true of the world (Sterelny & Griffiths 
2001: 104). Maps similarly contain this sort of information. A map of London 
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contains information about something, even if it happens to contain some 
spurious street names. Indeed, a map of an entirely fictional city has semantic 
information. In the biological context, intentionality is grounded in the idea that a 
biological entity might come to have a particular effect as a result of natural 
selection. We can say a gene contains information about a particular 
developmental outcome if ancestral copies of that gene were replicated in virtue 
of the fact that they ensured that developmental outcome. That is, genes contain 
intentional information about particular developmental outcomes. The function 
of the gene is what the gene contains semantic information about.  
Maynard Smith (2000) asks us to contrast two scenarios. In the first, a 
programmer designs a programme based on the game “Fox and Geese” in which 
four geese try to corner the fox, while the fox tries to evade capture. In this 
instance, we have no difficulty assigning intentional information or instructions 
to those bits of code that determine the behaviour of the geese. In the second 
scenario, different random codes determine the behaviour of the geese. Those 
bits of code that lead to the geese cornering the fox are preserved, while those 
that fail to do this are discarded. The successful bits of code are mutated and the 
process repeats itself so that, through trial and error, the geese become adept at 
cornering the fox. Maynard Smith argues that the code directly programmed by a 
programmer ought to be considered equivalent, in terms of its semantic 
information content, as the code arrived at by this trial and error process. Armed 
with this new definition of information, Maynard Smith argues he can now 
justify talk of the gene carrying instructions for the development of the 
phenotype:  
 
The DNA and proteins carry instructions, or a program, for the 
development of the organism; that natural selection of organisms alters 
the information in the genome; and finally, that genomic information is 
“meaningful” in that it generates an organism able to survive in the 
environment in which selection has acted. (2000: 190) 
 
To talk of a gene's role in this way is to make a normative claim – it is what the 
organism ought to be doing. When it is failing to perform this role, something 
has gone wrong. It can now be said, for instance, that the purpose of a particular 
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set of genes is to ensure the full development of the limbs; however, 
environmental influences may force the phenotype to misinterpret these genes. 
This allows us to resolve the two issues that arose with the causal theory of 
information: the concept of information needed to be applicable only to genes, 
and the concept of information needed to allow us to talk of “misinformation” or 
“misrepresentation.” First, because the gene is the sole biological unit of 
inheritance for neo-Darwinists, it is the only developmental resource that can be 
selected for, and thus the only resource that can be a source of information or 
instruction for development. This concept of information justifies the privileged 
position of genes in development. Second, semantic information need not map 
onto anything in the world to contain information about something. This allows 
us to talk about developmental outcomes that never occur. So we can say an 
organism contains genes with instructions to build some adult trait, even if that 
trait is never actually realised, as for instance when an organism does not survive 
into adulthood. The teleosemantic theory of information, then, is taken to justify 
the use of terms such as information, instructions and programmes in biology in 
such a way that it only applies to genes and, thus, sets them apart from other 
developmental resources in development.  
 As Griffiths (2001) notes, this account hinges crucially on the claim that 
genes are the sole (biological) unit of inheritance. Should it be the case that more 
than genes are inherited, this account can no longer be used to justify the 
privileging of the gene. In chapter four I will argue, in line with Griffiths and 
others, that a great deal more than genes are inherited. 
 
4. Development 
Viewing genes as containing or embodying instructions for development has the 
consequence that the specific details of development can be ignored when 
thinking in terms of evolution. There are two sets of entities to attend to: 
replicators and interactors. Interactors engage with the world in such a way that 
there is differential survival and replication of replicators. Genes, organisms, and 
perhaps groups or species, have been considered interactors, while genes alone 
are the biological replicators. The details of how the instructions in the genes are 
realised in non-genetic interactors are irrelevant for thinking about selection. We 
do not need to know how the genetic instructions are followed; it is enough to 
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know that they are followed. All we need focus on is the instructions themselves 
(what is replicated), and the final product of these instructions (what interacts), 
usually the organism.  
 This allows us to think of evolution by natural selection as a change in 
gene frequency (with an acknowledgment that natural selection is not the only 
process that may cause such a change in gene frequencies). Neutral mutations 
aside, to track gene changes is to track phenotypic changes. The gene is three 
things: replicator; interactor in its own right; and, in virtue of the fact that genes 
represent at least the evolutionarily relevant aspects of phenotypes, a good proxy 
measure of interactors at higher levels of biological organisation.  
 Of course, there may still be work to be done at these higher levels of 
organisation in terms of, for instance, establishing the specific selection pressures 
that a population might be exposed to. But for more abstract disciplines such as 
population genetics, the gene is understood as a very powerful entity that allows 
the researcher to ignore both development and even the phenotype itself. And for 
those who do work at the level of the whole organism and attempt to identify 
adaptations and selection pressures, the details of development can also be 
neglected. It is enough to think about selection pressures and how they might 
impact on genetic replication. 
 Bracketing developmental concerns, or indeed any particular concerns, can 
be an entirely legitimate way for a scientist (or anyone else) to make a problem 
more tractable. However, the issue here is not merely one of neglect; as I shall be 
arguing in coming chapters, it is also one of misrepresenting the nature of 
development and, as a result, misrepresenting the relationship between 
development and evolution. West-Eberhard has suggested that “among the 
consequences of neglect of [developmental] mechanisms in modern evolutionary 
biology are the problems that arise when the black box of mechanism is filled 
with imaginary devices” (2003: 11). Genetic programmes are the imaginary 
devices West-Eberhard has in mind.  
 Despite objections to the contrary (e.g. Dawkins 1989: 271), there is a 
sense of genetic control being invoked whenever we talk of genetic programmes 
or instructions for development. It may not be the strongest sense of control 
which suggests that the outcome of development is inevitable, but it does suggest 
that genes play a more important role in development than other resources. And 
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because of the normative status of genetic information, even when genetic 
instructions are not followed, we are justified in saying those instructions were 
for an outcome that ought to have occurred. Genes are “in charge” in a way that 
nothing else is. We may say a teacher is in charge of a class, even if the children 
do not always do as they are told. It is the role of the teacher to be in control, just 
as it is the role of the gene to be in control of a certain developmental outcome. 
This is not genetic determinism in its strongest sense, but it does imbue genes 
with some guiding force in development that marks them out as qualitatively 
distinct from other developmental resources.  
 There are a number of ways of handling the fact that, on the one hand, 
genes have this instructive role in development, whilst on the other, development 
is not insensitive to environmental conditions. The genetic programme is 
sometimes understood as containing conditional rules for development: if in 
environment A, then develop trait X; if in environment B, then develop trait Y… 
and so on. Environments are not static, and an organism that could not respond to, 
for instance, changes in temperature or light conditions would not survive. 
Homeostatic mechanisms in the body can often compensate for such short-term 
fluctuations (sweating in response to high temperatures, the expansion of the 
pupil in response to decreased visibility, etc.). Environments can fluctuate over 
longer periods of time too. Food might be plentiful in one generation but scarce 
in the next. An organism that could develop in one way in a food-rich 
environment and another in a food-poor environment, such that it was adaptive in 
both, would have an advantage over an organism that was adaptive in only one of 
these environments. Thus we might suppose that we would, where they were to 
occur, see selection for genes that were sensitive to environmental conditions 
during development. Note that even though disjunctive genetic programmes 
allow for environmental input, there remains a sharp difference between 
environmental inputs and genes. The genes continue to embody instructions and 
they determine which inputs play a role in normal development, and what role 
they should play. To extend the programming metaphor, environmental inputs 
act as raw data for the programme to operate on. Dawkins has suggested that the 
idea of a genetic programme is less useful than that of a genetic recipe (e.g. 
Dawkins 1981: 567). This move was motivated by his desire to emphasise the 
fact that the gene selectionist is not advocating a return to the one gene-one trait 
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concept. Rather, genes are thought to have to work together to produce any 
complex adaptation or to create whole organisms. The relationship between a 
cake and a recipe is thought to be akin to the relationship between the phenotype 
and the genes. There is no one-to-one mapping of the final product to the set of 
instructions for its creation. The phenotype, like the cake, is characterised by 
emergent properties. This metaphor nicely illustrates the difference between the 
genes and other developmental resources. While the genes act as the recipe, other 
developmental resources act as the raw ingredients for the final product. 
 But although genes-as-recipes allows for the possibility of emergent effects, 
Dawkins does not abandon the genes-as-programmes idea either. Rather, he 
suggests that these programmes are not metaphorical. He suggests that his 
assertion that we are “survival machines – robot machines blindly programmed 
to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes” (1989: xxi) should be taken as 
literally true (1981: 572). So although the gene-centric neo-Darwinist does not 
appear to argue for a strong sense of genetic determinism, and allows both 
environmental inputs to development and emergent properties to appear 
throughout development, nonetheless genes are given a distinct ontological status 
among developmental resources. Non-genetic developmental resources are the 
raw material of development, while genes set the ground rules for how such raw 
material should contribute. The genetic recipe in no way contradicts the idea that 
“genes do indirectly control the manufacture of bodies” (Dawkins 1989: 23).  
 Genes are the “master molecules,” the unmoved mover directing 
development. Development is merely the realisation of the instructions embodied 
in the genes. Certainly, this does not have to lead to one and only one outcome 
and can be sensitive to the organism's environment; the phenotype will not be 
predictable from the genotype. But development, from an evolutionary point of 
view, is considered nothing more than the realisation of the genetic instructions 
such that an interactor can be created. Development is taken as the output of 
evolution and it does not tend to feedback into the evolutionary process. The 
result of this is that development can be neglected or black boxed.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I identified two commitments of neo-Darwinian evolutionary 
theory; the first was to the adaptationist programme, while the second was to the 
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gene as the unit of inheritance. I discussed why this latter commitment leads to 
development being viewed, from an evolutionary point of view at least, as little 
more than the realisation of genetic instructions and, given this, why the details 
of developmental processes can be neglected. This commitment, and the view of 
development from an evolutionary perspective that is thought to follow from it, 
will be challenged in chapters three and four. 
 The neo-Darwinist might argue that development is not entirely ignored in 
the neo-Darwinian approach. Developmental constraints can be thought to 
constrain evolution by natural selection such that optimal adaptations do not 
emerge, and these can be of interest to the neo-Darwinian pursuing the 
adaptationist programme. Despite the apparent attention to development in this 
context, I will argue in the following chapter that the adaptationist programme is 
based on a flawed model of the relationship between development and natural 
selection and, as a result, it leads to a neglect of the full role of development in 
natural selection. 
 
50 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Development and Natural Selection 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will focus on various characterisations of the relationship between 
development and evolution by natural selection. In the first part of this chapter I 
will outline the relationship between natural selection and developmental 
constraints advanced by proponents of two different approaches: neo-Darwinism 
and process structuralism. In chapter one I detailed two key commitments of neo-
Darwinism. The first is to the adaptationist programme and the second is to the 
idea of the gene as “master molecule” in development. I will deal with the latter 
commitment in chapters three and four, but here I want to focus on the 
adaptationist programme. Although development tends to be neglected in neo-
Darwinism, where it is likely to feature at all is in terms of developmental 
constraints on natural selection. The process structuralists also focus on 
developmental constraints. They argue that organisms are tightly interwoven 
systems that cannot be understood primarily as the products of natural selection. 
Instead, we must attend to the details of development to discover what regulates 
organic form. I will argue that despite many differences, neo-Darwinism and 
process structuralism share in common a model of the relationship between 
development and natural selection. Further, I will argue that this model is based 
on a false dichotomy whereby development and natural selection are viewed as 
opposing processes. 
 In the second part of this chapter I will discuss one way in which natural 
selection and development can be seen to work in tandem. I will do this by first 
discussing the role of the organism in its environment. Both Dawkins‟ (1999a) 
extended phenotype hypothesis and Lewontin‟s (1978, 2001) niche 
constructivism share in common an acknowledgement of the fact that organisms 
alter their environments, but these approaches make very different uses of this 
fact. The extended phenotype approach extends the “reach” of the gene so that it 
not only programmes for traits of the skin-bound organism, but also programmes 
for better dams, nests and so on. The basic adaptationist model remains intact on 
this account. The niche constructivist account, on the other hand, allows the 
51 
 
organism to play a role in the generation of selection pressures so that the 
adaptationist model no longer holds. I will argue that Lewontin offers the better 
account and will demonstrate how this approach can be extended such that 
developmental processes can also be seen to generate selection pressures. This 
allows development to play a contributing role to natural selection rather than 
being either the output of, or an opposing force to, natural selection. 
 
2. Developmental Constraints 
 
2.1 The Adaptationist Programme 
Although neo-Darwinism is not particularly concerned with how genotypes are 
supposed to be realised as phenotypes, there is one context in which development 
does tend to be mentioned, and that is in its role as a limiting factor in evolution 
by natural selection. It is only the extreme empirical adaptationist (if such a 
person exists) who believes that there are no constraints on variation. Less 
extreme views acknowledge a more circumscribed space within which natural 
selection can work.  
Dawkins (1999a) outlines the role he sees development playing in 
evolution and outlines the various ways in which natural selection may be 
thought to have been prevented from producing organisms that are perfectly 
suited to their environment. An important factor constraining natural selection 
for maximum fitness is that of historical constraints. Natural selection cannot just 
put a well-designed wing where an arm once was. Instead, that arm must be 
slowly modified over time until it becomes a wing. Natural selection does not 
begin with a blank slate every time a new adaptation is required, but must work 
with the organism as it currently exists. And importantly, every step along the 
way should tend to leave the organism better off than before. This will severely 
circumscribe the path than can be taken (if such a path can be taken at all) from 
arm to wing. Dawkins remarks that with such constraints, “far from expecting 
animals to be perfect we may wonder that anything about them works at all” 
(1999a: 39).  
 However, although Dawkins acknowledges such historical constraints, he 
argues they do not necessarily establish the boundaries of natural selection. 
Instead, he invokes drift as a means of escaping local optima, an idea first 
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developed by Wright (1932). Wright imagined an “adaptive landscape” in which 
the peaks represent phenotypes that are adapted to their environments. The 
higher the peak, the greater the fit between organism and environment. The 
valleys represent highly unsuitable, and even unviable, phenotypes. Wright 
suggested that organisms could end up stranded on smaller peaks – local optima 
– unable to “cross” this adaptive landscape through the valleys to the higher 
peaks. This is because every step in the cumulative selection process must 
produce a more adaptive phenotype than the one which came before. A lineage 
may evolve a sub-optimal trait, but be unable to evolve a more adaptive trait 
without having to first sacrifice some degree of adaptiveness. However, Wright 
argued that this fate could be avoided if drift was able to play a big enough 
role.
17
 Changes brought about by drift do not need to be adaptive and so this 
would allow lineages to break free from local optima and move towards more 
adaptive peaks. Dawkins suggests drift may explain why we tend to find 
organisms that appear to be well-designed despite historical constraints: 
 
... animals ought to be risible monstrosities of lashed-up improvisation, 
top-heavy with grotesque relics of patched-over antiquity. How can we 
reconcile this reasonable expectation with the formidable grace of the 
hunting cheetah, the aerodynamic beauty of the swift, the scrupulous 
attention to deceptive detail of the leaf insect?... I have emphasized drift 
in this role. (1999a: 40) 
 
Dawkins argues that drift may resolve this “real paradox” of apparent 
adaptiveness with the limitations imposed by historical constraints. On this 
account, although historical, developmental constraints apply, natural selection – 
with a little help from genetic drift – will tend to ensure adaptive traits emerge 
and will ameliorate any oddities that arise as a result of the details of 
evolutionary trajectories. Developmental constraints are understood as working 
in opposition to natural selection; where natural selection tends towards 
innovation and the production of optimal phenotypes, development acts to 
conserve already established phenotypes.  
                                                 
17
 The effects of drift are thought to be negligible in larger populations, but it can have a more 
noticeable effect on smaller populations. See chapter one for a more detailed discussion of drift.  
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Another factor that may limit a lineage achieving maximum fitness 
concerns cost constraints. This may reduce the fit between organism and 
environment because although one adaptation might ease a given problem faced 
by an organism, it may create new problems such that the organism is worse off 
overall. For instance, a greater wing span might be more effective at scaring 
predators and competitors; however, the cost of maintaining such a wing span in 
terms of energy consumption might make such an innovation ultimately 
detrimental. For example, whatever extra food resources are gained by such a 
wing span may not adequately compensate for the extra energy required to 
develop and maintain such wings. Dawkins argues that “any view of biological 
optimization that denies the existence of costs and trade-offs is doomed” (1999a: 
47). We cannot assume when we see a trait that it is the optimal design for the 
problem it was selected for. An organism has a finite supply of energy to devote 
to developing and maintaining traits and it may be that it is just the best solution 
that could be managed given the other traits that need to be maintained. Thus, the 
costs of other traits place a limit on the optimal design of a given trait. 
Note that although the best trait for a given environment is not assumed to 
evolve on this account, the approach is nonetheless highly adaptationist in 
orientation. The presumption is that some traits may be sub-optimal because the 
overall adaptedness of the organism is the result of natural selection. Evolution 
by natural selection is thought to produce highly adapted organisms for a given 
environmental context. Gould and Lewontin (1979) raised this point in their 
critique of the adaptationist programme: where a trait appears less than optimally 
adaptive, the assumption is that this is the result of natural selection for an 
adaptive organism. That is, where one adaptationist explanation fails (a given 
trait is not as adaptive as we might expect), another adaptationist explanation is 
offered in its place (the organism must be as adaptive as we would expect). They 
argue that where a trait does not appear optimally adaptive, the possibility that 
some evolutionary processes other than natural selection might be invoked is not 
entertained on the adaptationist programme.
18
  
                                                 
18
 Dawkins' discussion of escaping from local optima does appear to allow an evolutionary 
process other than natural selection to operate (drift). Though, arguably, while drift is invoked in 
this instance to escape a problem for natural selection from development, it is not taken as 
seriously in other contexts. The assertion that complex adaptations can only arise through 
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In sum, the previous state of the lineage and the various costs of traits act 
to constrain natural selection to a greater or lesser extent. Of course, development 
is essential for the realisation of the genotype; however, this aspect of 
development is generally taken for granted. Where development features in 
evolutionary considerations, it is understood as a conservative force in evolution 
constraining natural selection. 
 
2.2 Process Structuralism 
If all extant phenotypes were mapped onto a multi-dimensional graph 
representing the different traits of organisms – morphospace – we would find that 
organisms tend to cluster around particular points, while other areas of the graph 
stand quite empty. There are (at least) two questions we can ask about such a 
graph, and these two questions exemplify the difference between the process 
structuralist and the adaptationist. The adaptationist asks why phenotypes are 
pushed into these clusters. The adaptationist programme suggests that some 
phenotypes will be unsuccessful in given environments, and thus will be 
eliminated by natural selection. According to this account, the empty spaces on 
the graph represent those phenotypes unsuited to their local environment. The 
adaptationist programme is concerned with the push factors that explain this 
clustering pattern – the reasons why phenotypes tend away from these empty 
spaces.  
 The process structuralist asks a different question, namely, why are 
phenotypes pulled to these points on the graph? According to this approach, not 
all phenotypic forms we can imagine will in fact be possible largely due to facts 
about development. These “pull” factors make it difficult, if not impossible, for 
actual phenotypes to occupy those empty regions of the graph. It is these pull 
factors that are of interest to the process structuralists. The adaptationist and the 
process structuralist make different bets about what would happen to the spread 
of phenotypes in morphospace in the absence of selection (Amundson 1994). The 
adaptationist assumes the spread of phenotypes will tend to even out across 
morphospace. Without selection, phenotypes in what was the empty region will 
                                                                                                                                    
cumulative natural selection is surely mistaken if drift is, at least some of the time, required to 
escape from local optima. Complex adaptations may, given this, be the result of both natural 
selection and drift. 
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not be eliminated; there will be nothing to sieve out all but the most lethal of 
mutations. Process structuralists, on the other hand, assume that in the absence of 
selection, the spread of phenotypes in morphospace will remain largely 
unchanged. Organic form is so tightly constrained by facts about development 
that selection has little variation to work with.
19
 
 Motivation for the process structuralist's position, as Griffiths (1996b) 
points out, stems from considerations of phylogenetic inertia; that is, the 
persistence of certain traits in a lineage long after selection pressures are 
considered to have been removed. The pentadactyl limb of tetrapods is 
considered an example of phylogenetic inertia (Griffiths 1996b: S2). This is a 
homologous structure (i.e. inherited from a common ancestor) in which the basic 
relationship between the bones that comprise it has remained largely the same. 
This limb is found in all amphibians and mammals. Because this limb features in 
such different contexts (a bat's wing and a frog's leg), it seems to be the case that 
the original selection pressures that produced the limb must no longer be present: 
“highly conserved traits are not obviously conserved by some universal selective 
advantage which they confer and which leads to stabilizing selection” (Griffiths 
1996b: S2). This sort of consideration would seem to support the process 
structuralist's claim that, should selection pressures cease, the distribution of 
phenotypes in morphospace will not be significantly altered. 
 Given this then, the process structuralist maintains that, before we concern 
ourselves with evolution by natural selection, we ought to attend to the details of 
generation of form: 
 
The fundamental assumption of the new paradigm is that form and 
variation are neither random nor arbitrary, and that much of evolution 
can be understood, not in terms of the maximisation of fitness, but 
                                                 
19
 Depending on how big a role developmental constraints are thought to play, the 
adaptationist might not expect a completely even spread of phenotypes in morphospace in the 
absence of natural selection. Similarly, the process structuralist may allow more or less of a role 
for natural selection. Those that allow a bigger role for natural selection will expect to see a 
slightly broader spread of phenotypes in morphospace in the absence of selection. Nonetheless, 
even with these more moderate positions, the spread of phenotypes as envisaged by the 
adaptationist will look quite different to that envisaged by the process structuralist. 
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through the processes which generate form and variation at every level 
before natural selection could be said to act. (Ho 1988: 13) 
 
Development is thus prior to natural selection. Development is not an infinitely 
plastic process, allowing any kind of variation to arise and be subjected to natural 
selection. Rather, development proceeds by quite stringent guidelines (what 
Webster and Goodwin (1982) call “generative laws”) such that natural selection 
will be seriously circumscribed by them. Understanding how organic form is 
generated becomes the pressing concern and natural selection the afterthought.  
 According to Webster and Goodwin, “the general aim of structuralist 
theory is to make the order of a unified system intelligible” (1982: 41). This 
order arises, they argue, from the combination of three ideas first discussed by 
Piaget: wholeness, transformation and self-regulation. The principle of 
wholeness is designed to refute the reductionism and atomism believed by 
Webster and Goodwin to characterise what they term the “evolutionary 
paradigm” (neo-Darwinian biology). Wholeness refers to two aspects of 
organisms. First, structures (organisms) are wholes that, while their component 
elements might change, nonetheless maintain themselves. Given this, if we want 
to understand the whole, it is not enough to understand its parts. Second, the 
structure is thought to “control” the parts insofar as certain properties of those 
parts arise as a result of their relation to the whole structure. That is, the parts 
have important relational properties. This too means that we cannot understand 
the structure, or organism, by examining its parts in isolation. These 
considerations are thought to forbid the reduction of a structure to its component 
parts. However, parts of structures are thought to have intrinsic as well as 
relational properties, thus “the structure is not 'all-powerful'” (1982: 40). Webster 
and Goodwin argue that, given this relationship between biological structures 
and their parts, structures “are not reducible to the sum of their parts,” and 
“cannot be understood atomistically” (1982: 40).  
Any structure is thought to be a member of a set of transformations. This 
concept is similar to that of morphospace; there exists a range of morphologies 
that are physically possible, and also a range that are physically impossible for a 
given structure. Not all structures will share the same transformation set. Equally, 
however, the transformation sets may overlap at certain points so that lineages 
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may sometimes move into a new area of morphospace at a crucial point. The 
clusters in morphospace represent transformation sets, while the empty spaces 
represent structures that are not “coherent” (Webster & Goodwin 1982: 41). 
Evolutionary change is then understood as a change in structure in line with 
those allowed by the system of transformations to which the structure belongs. 
This means that evolutionary change cannot be changed from any one form to 
any other form. That is, there are strict limitations on possible forms: 
 
A “random” change in any of these [developmental] factors will not 
result in a “random” change of structure, but in an orderly change to 
another possibility, another member of the system of transformations, 
and typical form will be conserved. (Webster & Goodwin 1982: 43) 
 
The final principle outlined by Webster and Goodwin is that of self-
regulation. This refers to the fact that structures can often maintain their integrity 
despite exposure to perturbations.
20
 This is in keeping with their claim that “there 
is not a unique relationship between composition and form” (1982: 34). The idea 
here is that a similar trait can be developed by organisms with different 
genotypes, for example. Taking these three principles together should lead us to 
conclude that organisms, as structures, are “law-governed, self-organizing 
totalities in which the parts are in some way mutually constitutive” (1982: 40).  
If we want to understand why organisms have the form they do, we need to 
understand what it is that creates the available forms. According to the process 
structuralist, the answer to this question will be found in the details of 
development. Once the laws governing development are known, it is argued, it 
will become clear what forms are allowed and what forms are forbidden, and 
importantly, why this is the case: 
 
The biological domain is, therefore, conceivable as a domain which 
creates itself and within which general and systematic generative 
processes are at work. It is in terms of these law-governed processes, 
                                                 
20
 This is similar to the idea of canalization, though canalization is usually taken to be the 
result of natural selection. 
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supposing that they exist and can be theoretically formulated, that the 
production of the diversity of forms must be understood. (Webster & 
Goodwin 1982: 26) 
 
The process structuralist is interested in explaining the generation of form and 
how this constrains future transformations. Nothing in this account rejects natural 
selection. After all, all natural selection requires is a population with heritable 
variations. How variations come about is entirely irrelevant so long as some of 
these variations can continue to appear in later generations. Nonetheless, the 
process structuralist account does place very strong limitations on the power of 
natural selection in evolution. Process structuralism, if correct, undermines the 
explanatory relevance of natural selection. The adaptationist assumes that 
thinking in terms of natural selection offers the best explanation for the anatomy, 
physiology and behaviour of organisms, or at least the best explanation for the 
most important aspects of anatomy, physiology and behaviour.
21
 Against this, the 
process structuralist would argue that given the starting point (the initial structure 
of the organism), there are only some transformations open to it, governed by 
“generative laws.” Out of that set of transformations, natural selection may be the 
reason one form was adopted over another. However, it is the laws governing 
structure that create the space in which natural selection can work, and these laws 
significantly limit the scope for change through natural selection. If we want to 
explain biological form, we must first map out what structures are possible and 
explain why. Only then can we concern ourselves with the details that thinking 
about natural selection can add. On this view, the “push” factor of natural 
selection is less explanatorily useful than the “pull” factor of developmental 
constraints: 
 
... an analysis of [the] dynamic stability of life cycles can never be 
complete without an understanding of the generative dynamics that 
produces organisms of particular forms, because their intrinsic stability 
may play a dominant role in determining their abundance and their 
persistence. (Goodwin 2001: 132) 
                                                 
21
 See chapter one for a more detailed discussion of the different types of adaptationism. 
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Natural selection might have a role to play in microevolutionary processes, 
explaining small shifts within populations, but it is not thought to be the cause of 
macroevolutionary trends in the history of life. The mistake adaptationists have 
made, according to the process structuralist is, as Sterelny puts it, to assume 
“macroevolution is microevolution repeatedly re-summed” (2000b: S372).  
 We are presented with a choice then. If we suspect that development plays 
an important causal role in evolutionary trends and that it does a good deal of 
work in explaining organic form, we may be forced to downsize the explanatory 
relevance of natural selection.
22
 If, on the other hand, we suspect that natural 
selection is responsible for most details of organic form, then the explanatory 
significance of developmental concerns may be undermined. A moderate stance 
between these two poles leaves us with a situation where some traits are marked 
off as best explained in terms of developmental constraint, while others require 
explanation in terms of natural selection, creating non-overlapping magisteria of 
development and natural selection.  
 
2.3 The False Dichotomy 
The debate between adaptationists and process structuralist is one that pitches 
development against natural selection. What natural selection attempts to change, 
development seeks to constrain. Although there may be instances of such a direct 
conflict between development and natural selection, this basic characterisation of 
development and evolution creates a false dichotomy (Griffiths 1996a, 1996b; 
Oyama 2000b; Schwenk & Wagner 2004). 
 The dichotomy is false because development need not be a conservative 
force, and natural selection need not be a force for change. As discussed in 
chapter one, selection can account for stability of form. Natural selection will 
tend to prevent the spread, for instance, of a deleterious mutation that arises in 
the population. Stabilising selection can act so as to tend a population towards a 
certain distribution of different phenotypic traits, or to preserve just one 
                                                 
22
 Though note that this will not undermine the explanatory adaptationist who is not 
concerned with the extent to which organic form generally can be explained by natural selection, 
but rather views complex traits, however few there may be, as the most in need of explanation. 
See chapter one for a more detailed discussion. 
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phenotypic trait. Natural selection does not entail change and, given this, 
phylogenetic inertia alone does not demonstrate the existence of developmental 
constraints on natural selection. Although pentadactyl limbs are put to different 
uses in bats and frogs, for instance, this does not rule out the possibility that 
selection is acting to conserve them. It may be the case that new selection 
pressures are acting in each case. As Griffiths (1996a, 1996b) notes, there is just 
insufficient evidence for the claim that phylogenetic inertia is the result of 
developmental constraints. 
 Further, this spread of phenotypes in morphospace – actual phenotypic 
variation – may not represent all developmentally possible phenotypes. Selection 
acting early enough in development will ensure developmentally possible 
phenotypic variants never actually develop. Schwenk and Wagner worry that this 
means “development devolves to another case of selection,” and this means that 
developmentalist accounts such as the process structuralist's have “little to 
contribute to our understanding of phenotypic evolution” (2004: 392). However, 
the fact that selection can operate at all stages in development does not establish 
that it actually does significantly affect the range of phenotypic variation 
available. Rather, the fact that we cannot tell whether the phenotypic variation 
available is the effect of developmental constraints also implies that we cannot 
tell whether the variation available is the effect of selection. The adaptationist 
suffers from the same paucity of evidence. 
 Schwenk and Wagner (2004) argue that accounts of developmental 
constraints work on the assumption that developmental constraints are given 
first, and only after this does selection operate. This would imply that selection 
only acts on adult phenotypes, which is clearly not the case: 
 
... selection acts on the phenotype seamlessly throughout its ontogeny. It 
is therefore not possible to separate mechanistically the generation of 
phenotypic variation during development from the action of selection 
because the very failure of a developmental system to produce variant 
phenotypes might itself be due to selection. (Schwenk & Wagner 2004: 
392) 
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And developmental structures that may, in a particular instance, prevent the 
appearance of an optimally adapted trait, might themselves be the result of 
natural selection.  
 Just as natural selection can act to promote stability, development can 
enable evolutionary change. I will say a good more about this point below, but 
the basic idea here is that development does not just limit evolutionary change, it 
also makes it possible. A constraint is both enabling and limiting: “if the 
developmental regularities manifest in an organism... reflect 'constraints' then the 
main thing the organism has been constrained from is chaos” (Griffiths & Stotz 
2000: 32). Development and evolution can act in tandem to bring about 
evolutionary change, or to preserve a given form. Developmental constraints and 
natural selection are not so easily separable.  
 Both process structuralism and neo-Darwinism assume a common model of 
the relationship between development and natural selection which envisages 
them as opposing forces in the history of life. We are presented with the 
predicament of deciding whether it is developmental factors or natural selection 
that best explains the form of organisms. This dichotomy is a false one. 
Development and natural selection are neither antagonistic forces nor are they 
separate domains that can be considered in isolation. The remainder of this 
chapter, as well as chapters three and four, will explore the ways in which 
development and natural selection may be integrated. 
 
3. Organisms and Environments 
In order to present another way in which the relationship between development 
and evolution by natural selection can be understood, I want to first explore 
attempts to understand the evolutionary consequences of the activity of 
organisms in their environments. Dawkins (1999a) and Lewontin (1978, 2001) 
have developed quite different approaches to incorporating the observation that 
organisms are not in fact passive in their environments, but often alter the 
environment in important ways. I will argue here that Lewontin's approach is the 
better of the two. Dawkins (1999a) extended phenotype hypothesis, while 
acknowledging the impact of the organism on the environment, fails to 
incorporate this point into broader considerations about natural selection. 
Lewontin, on the other hand, follows through on these ideas and develops a 
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different understanding of the process of natural selection. Although the niche 
contructivism approach originated by Lewontin has tended to focus on the 
behaviour of organisms, I will demonstrate why developmental considerations 
are also important here. Such an account changes the relationship between 
development and natural selection so that, instead of being wholly opposed 
processes, development may enable evolution by natural selection. Finally, I will 
turn to some criticisms of Lewontin developed by Godfrey-Smith (1996). While 
Godfrey-Smith makes clearer some distinctions in Lewontin's work, I will argue 
that this does not undermine Lewontin's central point. 
 
3.1 The Extended Phenotype 
Lewontin argues that the adaptationist programme is based on a model in which 
the organism is shaped to better fit its environment: “the organisms themselves 
being nothing but the passive medium through which we see the shape of the 
world” (Lewontin 2000: 44). In this analysis, neo-Darwinism assumes an 
autonomous environment against which the organism is judged (Lewontin 1978; 
2001). If the organism better fits its environment than any of its conspecifics, it 
will tend to outlive and out-reproduce those conspecifics. On the other hand, if 
the organism is found wanting, it (and its genes) will die out. The organism is 
thought to be “honed” or “moulded” to match its environment by the process of 
natural selection. Those particular traits that ensure a competitive advantage for 
an organism over its conspecifics, and which can be inherited by offspring, are 
selected for and become adaptations. The environment, on this line of thought, is 
considered to pose problems that adaptations solve. Lewontin uses the metaphor 
of a lock and key – the environment is the lock and the organism, as key, must be 
filed to fit this lock. Ultimately, the organism is the product of its environment: 
 
... information from the environment is present in the organism. In a few 
cases this is vividly literal – a frog carries a picture of its environment 
around on its back. Such information is usually carried by an animal in 
the less literal sense that a trained observer, dissecting a new animal, can 
reconstruct many details of its natural environment. (Dawkins 1998: 21) 
 
63 
 
There is a one-way line of influence; the autonomous environment exerts 
pressure onto the organism. If the organism is to survive, it must evolve to 
possess the correct set of adaptations. The anatomy, physiology and behaviour of 
the organism (or at least those aspects of anatomy, physiology and behaviour 
considered important by the explanatory adaptationist) are then to be explained 
primarily in terms of solving problems posed by ancestral environments. 
However, it is trivially true that organisms affect their environments. Beavers 
build dams that dramatically alter the landscape. Termites construct highly 
complex mounds that can alter the landscape, sometimes for thousands of years 
(Turner 2004: 345). This appears to pose a problem for anyone who relies on the 
adaptationist programme and its assumption of an autonomous environment.  
 One way the neo-Darwinist may respond to at least some of these issues is 
to employ Dawkins' notion of the extended phenotype. If we accept that 
organisms are just the genes‟ method of ensuring their own replication, Dawkins 
asks why we should assume that the effects of genes stop at the skin of the 
organism. Perhaps structures in the environment too might be considered part of 
what genes create to further their chances of replication. He imagines two 
beavers, each of which has genes which underpin their abilities to build and 
maintain a dam (Dawkins 1999a: 233-234). One beaver has a slightly different 
set of alleles which enable the building of a slightly better dam. Perhaps that 
beaver is stronger and can gather more wood, or perhaps that beaver is biased 
towards building dams at more advantageous points along a river. However it 
happens, one beaver is more adaptive than its conspecifics in virtue of building a 
more effective dam, and the genes which ensure this is the case have a greater 
chance of being replicated. The traditional neo-Darwinian way of explaining this 
would be to see the beaver's phenotype – its greater strength, say – as that which 
ensured the replication of the genes. Instead, the extended phenotype approach 
claims that it is the superior dam, rather than the strength of the beaver that built 
the dam per se, that ensures the genes are replicated. The beaver's strength, and 
the building activities that result in the better dam, are viewed as being akin to 
developmental processes. On the traditional neo-Darwinian view, development is 
usually seen as the means to the end of adaptation. Building the dam is just a 
continuation of the developmental trajectory on the extended phenotype 
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approach. It is not the greater strength of the beaver that is the adaptation, it is the 
dam: 
 
Nobody has any trouble understanding the idea of genetic control of 
morphological differences. Nowadays few people have trouble 
understanding that there is, in principle, no difference between genetic 
control of morphology and genetic control of behaviour... The extra step 
from behaviour to extended phenotype... is as conceptually negligible as 
the step from morphology to behaviour... an animal artefact like any 
other phenotypic product whose variation is influenced by the gene, can 
be regarded as a phenotypic tool by which the gene could potentially 
lever itself into the next generation. (Dawkins 1999a: 199) 
 
Dawkins argues that the only obvious objection to the extended phenotype 
approach would seem to be an arbitrary commitment to the skin of the organism 
as a barrier to the effects of genes. If we can say that possession of gene A fixes 
the chance that an organism will develop a particular physiological trait – that is, 
A is the gene for this trait – then we should also be able to talk about a gene B 
that fixes the chance that an organism will have a certain impact on its 
environment – that is, B is the gene for a particular environmental effect. These 
alterations to the environment of the organism by the organism do not threaten 
the adaptationist programme; they are merely further examples of adaptations. 
Just as selection sorts genes that affect physiology, it can also sort genes that 
affect the organism‟s environment. The organism has been moulded by natural 
selection, via its genes, to manipulate its environment just as the organism has 
been moulded by natural selection, via its genes, to develop a particular bodily 
trait. So, rather than weakening the adaptationist programme, the extended 
phenotype in fact strengthens the adaptationist programme by extending its 
explanatory reach.
23
 However, while this approach acknowledges the important 
impact organisms have on the world around them, it only tells half the story.  
                                                 
23
 A consequence of adopting an extended phenotype view might be, if we take Dawkins‟ 
replicator/vehicle ontology seriously, a further diminution of the status of the organism. The 
vehicle, perhaps commonly thought to coincide with the boundaries laid down by the skin of the 
organism, might in fact include such things as beaver dams and bowers. This would further 
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3.2 Niche Construction 
Lewontin argues that a basic error in the neo-Darwinian model of evolution by 
natural selection arises in that it must assume the pre-existence of niches. A niche 
consists of that subset of the environment that has some impact on an organism – 
food, predators, habitats, mates, and so on: 
 
The ecological niche is a multidimensional description of the total 
environment and way of life of an organism. Its description includes 
physical factors, such as temperature and moisture: biological factors, 
such as the nature and quantity of food sources and of predators, and 
factors of the behaviour of the organism itself, such as its social 
organisation, its pattern of movement and its daily and seasonal activity 
cycles. (Lewontin 1978: 159) 
 
Not every aspect of the external world exerts selective pressure on all organisms. 
Land-based mammals, for instance, do not typically experience selection 
pressure for the ability to breathe under water, and no one supposes otherwise. 
The adaptationist model acknowledges that different organisms, or groups of 
organisms, experience different sorts of selection pressures. The selection 
pressures a population is exposed to are created by the niche those organisms 
occupy. But why should some selection pressures apply to one group of 
organisms and not another which may be living in close proximity? The 
adaptationist, according to Lewontin, offers no explanation for why a population 
experiences a certain set of selection pressures and instead assumes that such 
pressures are just given: “the history of life is then the history of the coming into 
being of new forms that fit more and more closely into these preexistent niches” 
(2001: 63). But, argues Lewontin, the environment is not divided up into sets of 
selection pressures. The niches that exist for land-based organisms did not exist 
                                                                                                                                    
undermine the kind of approach taken by Lewontin (see below) who argues for a greater role for 
the organism as actor in evolution. In chapter four, the status of the organism as a result of this 
view, as well as the kind of account developed by developmental systems theory, will be 
addressed. 
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prior to the evolution of land-based organisms. Niches are not given, rather they 
are created by the organisms that occupy them.  
As mentioned above, organisms continuously interact with their 
environment and alter the environment in the process. It is in these activities that 
the organism creates its niche. Often, though not necessarily, such alterations 
make the environment more suitable for the organism. This suggests that when 
we see an organism well-suited to its environment, we are not at liberty to 
suppose that this is because the organism has been moulded to the environment. 
Rather, it may have been the environment that was moulded to the organism, or 
more likely, some complex two-way accommodation was reached between 
organism and environment. 
Lewontin (2001) distinguishes four ways organisms can engage in niche 
construction. First, organisms make certain aspects of the environment relevant 
and others irrelevant. Wind currents are not particularly relevant to an organism 
that lives on a river bed. Cliff faces may be of little relevance to birds that nest in 
trees but provide vital nesting sites to other birds. Gravity may be an important 
aspect of the world for macro-organisms (particularly land-dwelling larger 
macro-organisms), but Brownian motion has far more relevance for bacteria 
(Lewontin 2001: 65). Different organisms can live in close proximity but have 
very different relationships with the world around them: “it is the life activities... 
that determine which parts of the world, physically accessible to all of them, are 
actually parts of their environments [niche]” (2001: 64).  
Second, organisms alter the world around them as they make it part of their 
niche. Organisms can create their own resources. They may disperse the seeds of 
the fruit they consume, ensuring an ongoing supply of food for themselves and 
their offspring. Macrotermitines, a species of termite, gain the required nutrition 
from the wood they consume by cultivating fungi which partially digest the wood 
for them (Turner 2004). More mundanely, organisms use up resources around 
them and produce waste. Turner (2004) anticipates an objection to this point that 
he terms the “fly-in-the-soup” problem.24 The objection rests on the idea that 
although an organism may, for instance, use oxygen and produce carbon dioxide, 
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 The name of this objection is inspired by the joke:  
Diner: “Waiter, waiter, there's a fly in my soup!” 
Waiter: “Don't worry sir, he won't eat very much” (Turner 2004: 350). 
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such effects will be tiny and can be safely ignored: “the capacities of 
environmental sources and sinks are typically so vast that any physiological 
draw-downs or build-ups by organisms will affect these environments only 
negligibly” (2004: 331). But, argues Turner, this line of argument will not work. 
It is not always the case that the environment in question really can swamp the 
effects of the activity of an organism. To use Turner‟s example, the burrow of a 
rodent will be affected by that rodent's respiratory processes in a significant way. 
Further, even where the effects of a single organism on an environment may 
seem small, populations of such organisms can have much more significant 
effects. The contribution of a single tree to the percentage of oxygen in the 
atmosphere may be small, but the contribution of a rainforest is significant.  
Third, physical signals from the world are often converted by the organism 
into another form. Short day plants, such as rice, can convert sunlight into 
chemical signals. If there is an insufficient amount of this chemical in the plant's 
system, this triggers the flower to open up. Sound waves hitting our ear drums 
are converted into different types of signals. Signals from the environment are 
made relevant to the organism in ways dependent on their biology.  
Fourth, organisms “create a statistical pattern of environment different 
from the pattern in the external world” (Lewontin 2001: 64). A particular food 
source may fluctuate between being in plentiful supply to being scarce, but the 
organisms that consume this food stuff may occupy wide enough territories, 
seasonally migrate, or store food such that they do not experience fluctuations in 
food supply. Importantly, it is not the case that fluctuations in food supply have 
no effect on the organisms in question. Rather, the point here is that the organism 
is not subject to the same patterns of abundance and scarcity that characterises 
the external world. 
We can add a fifth way that an organism can make some aspects of the 
world relevant. This is in terms of development. Both developmental plasticity 
and canalization are important here. Developmental plasticity refers to the 
“modifiability of morphology during development... and environmentally 
sensitive behavior” (West-Eberhard 2003: 35). This phenomenon is commonly 
discussed in terms of the environment providing “cues” or “inputs” to 
development processes which helps determine the course of future 
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development.
25
 Plasticity is a “universal property of living matter” (West-
Eberhard 2003: 34). However, the environmental cue in no way wholly 
determines the final developmental outcome. What counts as an environmental 
cue, for instance, varies from one lineage to another, and may even vary within a 
population. Timing is a crucial factor in development. A particular 
developmental resource present at one time can have massive developmental 
repercussions, while at another time be largely irrelevant as seen, for example, in 
the differing effects of thalidomide on adults and embryos. Thus, environmental 
cues that play a role in developmental outcomes do not adequately explain those 
outcomes. The rest of the developmental system makes those cues more or less 
relevant. 
 Canalization refers to the degree to which the development of a trait is 
buffered from environmental perturbations and is related to developmental 
plasticity, in that this plasticity that may underpin canalization. Ariew suggests 
that “the degree to which a trait is canalized is the degree to which the 
developmental process is bound to produce a particular endstate despite 
environmental fluctuations both in the development's initial state and during the 
course of development” (1999: 117). Canalization can be achieved in two ways. 
First, a different developmental trajectory may be taken to the same phenotypic 
end which can involve utilising different developmental resources towards the 
same developmental end. In this way there is a degree of redundancy in 
developmental systems. Here it is developmental plasticity that ensures a stably 
reappearing adult phenotypic trait. Because the developmental trajectory is 
altered and involves a different aspect of the environment, new selection 
pressures may be experienced at this level. However, because the adult 
phenotypic trait is preserved, there may be continuity of selection pressures at 
this level. The details of an organism's development then make some aspects of 
the environment relevant and others less so.  
The second way a trait may be said to show (a degree of) canalization is if 
a particular aspect of the environment is entirely irrelevant to the organism. That 
feather development in birds is unaffected by the clothes on my washing line is 
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 See chapter four for an alternative way of framing how environmental factors interact with 
developing systems. 
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not particularly biologically interesting, but serves to make the point that 
developmental systems play a role in determining what parts of the external 
environment are relevant and thus might constitute a source of selection pressure.  
 Lewontin argues that because the adaptationist model of natural selection 
understands natural selection as the change in organisms (or, more correctly, 
populations of organisms) as a result of changes in environments, it misses out 
on an important causal relationship – the organism's effects on its niche. Instead, 
evolution by natural selection should be understood as the co-evolution of 
organisms and their environments.
26
 This is not to undermine the role 
environments may play in natural selection, but rather to augment the role of the 
environment with the activities of the organism in a two-way interaction. 
Organisms do not have a free-hand: 
 
The error is to suppose that because organisms construct their 
environments they can construct them arbitrarily in the manner of a 
science fiction writer constructing an imaginary world. The coupled 
equations of coevolution of organism and environment are not 
unconstrained. Some pathways through the organism-environment are 
more probable than others, precisely because there are real physical 
relations in the external world that constrain change. (Lewontin 2001: 
65) 
 
Lewontin's approach to niche construction demonstrates a way in which the idea 
of an active organism can be adopted while retaining natural selection. Selection 
pressures are still present in this approach, but rather than viewing them as 
autonomous pressures, they arise in part out of the activities and development of 
the organisms. This creates a coupled system and a different evolutionary 
dynamic than that envisaged by neo-Darwinism.  
                                                 
26
 Lewontin illustrates this point in the following way: the adaptationist model represents 
evolution by natural selection as dO/dt = f(O,E) and dE/dt = g(E), where O is the organism, t is 
time, and E is the environment. The organism or rather, as Olding-Smee et al. (2003) point out, a 
population of organisms changes over time as a function of the organism and the environment, 
while the environment changes over time as a function that acts solely on the environment. On 
Lewontin's model, the first differential equation remains the same, however the second becomes 
dE/dt = g(O,E). 
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 While Dawkins‟ extended phenotype account does make more space for 
the kind of organism-environment interactions discussed here, it does not 
ameliorate the larger point at the heart of Lewontin‟s critique of the adaptationist 
programme. The point is this: the traditional adaptationist approach tends to 
assume an environment in which the selective pressures generated by the 
environment stand distinct from the activity of the organism. While allowing the 
organism to alter its environment, the extended phenotype hypothesis maintains a 
very similar model of selection. Rather than the organism being tested against the 
autonomous environment, it is the extended phenotype that is tested. The 
boundary has been moved beyond the skin of the organism so that what was once 
considered the environment is now part of the extended phenotype, but this new 
boundary functions like the last. These altered aspects of the world – dams, nests, 
and so on – are part of the extended phenotype, just as cells, tissues, bones and so 
on are. Selection pressures now result from everything outside of the extended 
phenotype. This newly demarcated environment is largely independent of the 
extended phenotype, at least in evolutionary considerations. The boundary of the 
extended phenotype separates that which is moulded from that which provides 
the mould.  
 However, this does not adequately deal with the problem of presuming the 
pre-existence of niches. Even if we accept the extended phenotype hypothesis, 
we are still left with a confusion concerning why some aspects of the world 
external to the extended phenotype are relevant and so create selection pressures, 
while other aspects are not. That is, the extended phenotype will have its own 
niche, but the extended phenotype approach does not resolve the problem of the 
origin of niches; it merely redraws the boundary between phenotype and niche. 
 What Lewontin‟s account demonstrates is that the activities (and we can 
include developmental processes) of organisms – or even extended phenotypes – 
make certain features of the world relevant and, as a result, those organisms are 
implicated in the selective forces which act on them. The neo-Darwinian 
conception of natural selection, even on the kind of view extolled in The 
Extended Phenotype, maintains a two-stage process whereby (1) the environment 
hones a population via natural selection, after which (2) the population may go 
on to interact with the environment, forming extended phenotypes. The niche 
construction approach makes a third move: (3) those interactions with the 
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environment shape the selective forces acting on the population. This creates a 
feedback loop between the activity of the organism or extended phenotype and 
the selective forces the organism or extended phenotype is exposed to. The 
organism, or extended phenotype, becomes implicated in its own evolution. 
 If we take Lewontin‟s point then it seems as though the adaptationist 
programme not only overlooks important aspects of the relationship between 
organisms and environments, but is based on some conceptual confusion. Natural 
selection cannot be viewed as something that sits outside of the activity and 
development of organisms and their interactions with the environment. The 
environment cannot be thought to pose problems for the organism, or behave like 
a lock to which the organism must be filed to fit. The shape of the lock and key 
are determined by one another.  
 
3.3 Causal and Constitutive Construction 
Godfrey-Smith (1996) raises two arguments against Lewontin. The first is that 
Lewontin is too strong in his criticism of the adaptationist programme. The 
second concerns a worry for niche construction.  
 Godfrey-Smith distinguishes a number of different explanatory strategies 
that might be adopted to account for the relationship between organisms and 
environments. Asymmetric externalism is an explanatory strategy that explains 
the properties of organisms with reference to the properties of environments, but 
“explicitly or implicitly denies that these properties of the environment are to be 
explained in terms of other properties of the organic system” (1996: 132). This 
position is contrasted with externalism which focuses on the causal impact of the 
environment on the organism, but does not deny that there is a two-way causal 
interaction: 
 
I understood externalists as giving positive theories about how various 
organic properties depend on environment; externalists were not viewed 
as needing to take any particular stand on whether the state of the 
environment depends on the activities or properties of the organic 
system. (1996: 132) 
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Asymmetric externalism will shade into externalism. An explanatory strategy can 
very explicitly reject the idea that organisms can influence environment in any 
evolutionarily significant way; however, strategies that neglect the role of the 
organism and adopt an implicit asymmetrical externalism can look like those that 
acknowledge the role of the organism, but choose to focus attention elsewhere. 
Lewontin suggests that the adaptationist programme, through neglect of the 
effects of the organism on the environment, adopts an asymmetric externalist 
stance. Godfrey-Smith (1996) acknowledges that many paradigm cases of 
adaptationist explanations demonstrate complete neglect of the role of the 
organism, and suggest implicit asymmetrical externalism.
27
 However, he argues, 
there are other cases often dealt with by the adaptationist programme that 
explicitly accept an important role for the idea of co-evolution. These cases 
revolve around the idea of evolutionary arms races. Predators and their prey, as 
well as parasites and their hosts, are thought to be embroiled in such arms races. 
As the predator evolves to become more skilled at catching its prey, this creates 
selection pressures for the prey to out-manoeuvre the predator. If the prey does 
out-manoeuvre the predator, the prey has now created new selection pressures 
that will act on the predator, and so on. Given this, Godfrey-Smith argues that 
“for the most part, adaptationists can only be accused of neglecting rather than 
denying the influence of organic systems in their environments” (1996: 132). 
And although Lewontin argues that global neglect equates to something like 
Godfrey-Smith's implicit asymmetric externalism, the arms race examples 
demonstrate that in fact the neglect is not systematic. Rather, the adaptationist 
programme seems closer to externalism than asymmetric externalism. 
 One response to this might be to acknowledge the co-evolutionary model 
adopted in arms races, but maintain that this externalism applies only to a sub-
section of organism-environment interactions. While the interactions of predators 
and prey, or hosts and parasites, will certainly account for some of the selection 
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 The example Godfrey-Smith cites here is the effect of pollution on the colouration of moths 
(1996: 136). Pollution due to the Industrial Revolution in England led to the darkening of tree 
trunks. Peppered moths, which had tended to have a light colouration and had been well 
camouflaged on the undamaged tree trunks, became easy prey. Peppered moths that had a darker 
colouration were suddenly at an advantage – they were now far less easily spotted by predators. 
The darker moths became more common in the population as a result. Since the decline of 
industrial pollution of this sort, the numbers of lighter coloured peppered moths have risen again. 
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pressures felt by the organism, they will not be the only ones. The physical, non-
organic world will also exert pressures. A systematic neglect of how the 
organism affects the physical environment seems to characterise adaptationist 
explanations, thus it might be argued that in this domain – the non-organic 
environment – the adaptationist programme is implicitly asymmetrically 
externalist.  
 Godfrey-Smith also argues that not all the examples of activities by 
organisms count as genuine cases of construction, but rather that some of the 
cases that Lewontin picks out are in fact examples of externalism. Godfrey-Smith 
distinguishes between two senses of construction. The first is causal construction 
and this is exemplified by beavers building dams, termites their nests, and so on: 
“this is a matter of physical, causal intervention in the world, intervention which 
effects a change in external affairs” (1996: 145). The second involves the 
organism changing its relationship to the environment in some way, without 
altering any intrinsic features of the environment. This includes examples such as 
organisms which make aspects of the external environment relevant to them, 
which alter the physical signals they receive from their environment, and which 
transform the statistical patterns in their environment. Flowering plants that 
convert sunlight into chemicals, or birds that migrate do not, by these activities 
alone, alter any intrinsic property of the environment.
28
 Such activities alter the 
relationship between the organism and its environment, but these are not 
instances of construction according to Godfrey-Smith‟s approach. Rather, they 
are instances of the organism modifying itself to meet the demands of its 
environment, and this is an instance of externalism: 
 
There is a difference between organic actions that make changes to 
intrinsic properties of external things and organic actions that do not, 
and a useful theoretical framework should not obscure this difference. 
(Godfrey-Smith 1996: 147) 
 
                                                 
28
 A bird that migrates may go on to alter intrinsic properties of its new environment, through 
building nests, predation, and so on. However, it is not migration per se that has effected these 
changes, but rather the nest building, hunting, and so on. 
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Godfrey-Smith has identified a genuine distinction between the sorts of cases 
Lewontin discusses. However, he has not undermined Lewontin's argument. 
While it is the case that some of the instances Lewontin has cited (and the further 
developmental cases I raised) involve internal accommodation of external 
phenomena, this in itself is not problematic. Lewontin's claim was not that 
environmental properties have no role to play in explaining organic properties, 
but rather that there is a two-way interaction between organisms and 
environments. Internal accommodations are to be expected on this, more aptly 
titled, co-constructivist account. To refute the niche constructivist we would need 
to demonstrate not that internal accommodations do not happen, but that 
organisms do not, in their own behaviour and development, make some aspects 
of the world relevant and others irrelevant. In other words, we would need to 
demonstrate that niches are given rather than constructed. 
 Further, Godfrey-Smith‟s argument against niche construction hinges on a 
confusion between two senses of “environment” at play here. Brandon (1990) 
uses the term “external environment” to capture the broadest sense of 
“environment” – all aspects of the physical and organic world. This is the sense 
of environment employed by Godfrey-Smith. Lewontin, on the other hand, is 
concerned with a much narrower conception of the environment, the niche: “the 
sum of all the selection pressures to which the population is exposed” (Odling-
Smee et al. 2003: 419). There is a genuine difference between causal 
construction and constitutive construction but, from the point of view of 
Lewontin's account, Godfrey-Smith's conclusions are the wrong way around. For 
niche construction, it is not causal construction that should ultimately count as 
niche construction, but rather constitutive construction. This is not to say that 
causal construction is irrelevant, but rather causal construction matters in virtue 
of any relational changes that result from it. For example, an organism will emit 
infrared radiation, and this amounts to a causal change in its environment. Some 
property of the environment (the amount of infra-red radiation present) has been 
altered. However, it is conceivable that this has no impact on the kinds of 
selection pressures the organism faces; none of its predators or prey may be 
sensitive to radiation of this wavelength, and so on. On the other hand, a 
nocturnal creature may not causally construct its environment just in virtue of 
being active during the night; nonetheless it has a different sort of relationship 
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with its surroundings than a diurnal organism living in close proximity. The 
nocturnal organism is exposed to a different set of selection pressures than the 
diurnal organism as a result of its activities; they occupy different niches. For a 
niche construction account, causal construction matters only insofar as it alters 
selection pressures, and this depends on a change in the relationship between the 
organism and the environment rather than on a change in an intrinsic property of 
the environment per se. Niches are relational – they pick out only those aspects 
of the external environment that are relevant to the organism. Godfrey-Smith 
argues: 
 
There is a difference between dealing with the world by intervention 
with it, and dealing with the world by effecting an internal change; a 
difference between adapting to an irregular terrain by acquiring better 
balance and more nimble feet, and adapting to an irregular terrain by 
laying an acre of concrete on it. (1996: 146) 
 
We can agree that there is a difference between these cases, but argue that this is 
not a difference that matters for Lewontin's point. Developing more nimble feet, 
or laying concrete, will have the effect of altering selection pressures. Lewontin's 
argument is not undone by acknowledging that populations adapt to their 
environments, his is a co-evolutionary model. The point is to also acknowledge 
that as the population adapts to its environment, it alters its niche, and in doing 
this alters the selection pressures to which it is exposed. As the population 
changes in response to selection pressures, we have environmental properties 
explaining organic ones. But as the population evolves so too does the niche, and 
the new properties of this niche are explained in terms of the properties of the 
organisms inhabiting it. 
  Godfrey-Smith's distinction, though real enough, does not undermine 
Lewontin's argument. In essence, Lewontin's aim is to demonstrate that the niche 
– the source of selection pressures – cannot be understood in isolation from the 
organism and its activities. Both relational and causal construction (where the 
latter causes changes in the relationship between the organism and its 
environment) alter selection pressures, and thus both demonstrate the inadequacy 
of a purely externalist model of natural selection.  
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4. Conclusion 
Process structuralism and niche constructivism offer two quite different 
responses to the adaptationist programme. The process structuralist finds the 
adaptationist programme to be incompatible with developmental concerns and 
suggests that natural selection does not have a role to play in explaining much of 
organic form. But process structuralism and the adaptationist programme share a 
model of the relationship between development and natural selection such that 
developmental constraints and natural selection are considered to act in 
opposition to one another. Where natural selection tends towards change, 
developmental constraints tend towards conservatism. What is at stake in the 
argument between process structuralism and neo-Darwinism is whether it is 
natural selection or developmental constraints that are responsible for given 
traits, not the nature of the relationship between development and natural 
selection. However, I argued here that this model of the relationship between 
development and natural selection underlying both process structuralism and the 
adaptationist programme rests on a false dichotomy, and that natural selection 
and development need not act in opposition to one another. 
The niche constructivist also finds the adaptationist programme to be 
unrepresentative of the relationship between organisms and environments, 
notwithstanding the extended phenotype hypothesis, and rejects the adaptationist 
programme. However, niche construction distinguishes between the adaptationist 
programme and natural selection, so can retain the latter while abandoning the 
former. This means that, unlike the process structuralist, the niche constructivist 
does not need to view development and natural selection as opposing forces in 
evolution. Niche constructivism allows development and evolution to be viewed 
as deeply intertwined. Development does not constrain evolution, rather it makes 
evolution possible. Development, and the phenotypic traits it leads to, make 
some aspects of the environment relevant and act as sources of selection 
pressures. These selection pressures may then alter development and phenotypes 
such that new selection pressures are generated, and so on. Development and 
natural selection, far from being opposed to one another, are mutually reinforcing 
processes. Niche constructivism allows us to attend to development from an 
77 
 
evolutionary point of view without necessitating the abandonment of natural 
selection.  
Lewontin's approach points to one way development and natural selection 
may be understood as contributing to the larger process of evolution. 
Evolutionary developmental biologists are also interested in the integration of 
evolution and development, but approach the issue from a different angle. This 
will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
Evolutionary Developmental Biology 
 
1. Introduction 
In chapter one, I identified the two key commitments of gene-centric neo-
Darwinism: (1) that the adaptationist programme offers the best way to explain 
(at least the most interesting aspects of) organic form and change in organic form, 
and (2) that the gene is the unit of inheritance. In the previous chapter I discussed 
problems with the predominantly externalist explanatory strategy of the 
adaptationist programme. Here I want to put pressure on two related ideas: first, 
that it is enough to track trends in gene frequencies in order to identify 
evolutionary changes, and second, that development can be understood as the 
realisation of a genetic programme. Population genetics, which concerns itself 
with tracking changing gene frequencies, consciously neglects development and, 
as I will discuss later, this may be a mistake. However the problems run deeper 
than just neglect. If development is not investigated, it becomes easy to 
mischaracterise: “among the consequences of neglect of mechanisms in modern 
evolutionary biology are the problems that arise when the black box of 
mechanism is filled with imaginary devices” (West-Eberhard 2003: 11). In this 
chapter and the next the genetic programme will be seen to be such an imaginary 
device.   
Thinking in terms of genetic programmes is a way to bracket off questions 
about development in order to make other questions more tractable. It was 
assumed that if the black box of development was opened, the results would not 
impinge on evolutionary biology in any significant way. A complete theory 
would of course include these developmental details, but sidelining development 
was acceptable due to the assumption that phenotypes are importantly 
underpinned by genes. That is, developmental biology might flesh out how it is 
that the genotype is realised in the phenotype, but will not alter the fact that we 
can adequately understand evolution as a change in gene frequencies in a 
population and that development is the realisation of some representation of the 
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phenotype in the genotype.
29
 We might ask whether gene-centric neo-Darwinism 
is justified in assuming that, once the black box of development is opened, it will 
not disrupt the picture of evolution it presents. As the relationship between 
development and natural selection comes under closer scrutiny in various 
research disciplines, this assumption looks increasingly problematic. 
 Evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) is one such research 
discipline which attempts to open the black box of development and this has 
been to the detriment of some of the assumptions about development made by 
the neo-Darwinist. Evo-devo aims to create a new synthesis between 
evolutionary theory and developmental biology. Evo-devo features 
considerations brought to bear by both the process structuralist and the neo-
Darwinist but unlike either of these, both natural selection and development are 
thought to be necessary to explain biological systems and they are not construed 
as necessarily opposing processes. Indeed, evo-devo research attempts to 
understand how development makes evolution possible, and how evolution-
enabling development has itself evolved.  
 This chapter aims to do two things. The first is to continue a line of 
argument from the previous chapter. Namely, development and evolution are 
neither irrelevant to one another, nor are they in opposition. By detailing some of 
evo-devo's central research questions and the results they have generated, we will 
further undermine the false dichotomy of the process structuralists and the 
adaptationists, as well as making clear the relevance of development in 
evolutionary considerations.  
 The second aim of this chapter is to lay the ground for an argument I will 
make in chapter four. Gilbert (2003: 349) has suggested that developmental 
systems theory (the position I wish to defend in chapter four) faces its biggest 
threat from evo-devo. In this chapter I want to make clear the commitments of 
evo-devo, and point to some conceptual difficulties inherent in the theoretical 
underpinning of this discipline. This will allow me to show in the following 
chapter that evo-devo and developmental systems theory do not share the same 
theoretical commitments and that developmental systems theory avoids the 
conceptual problems identified with evo-devo. The role of the gene is at the 
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 See chapter one for a more detailed discussion of these points. 
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centre of this theoretical dispute; although evo-devo rejects the idea of genetic 
programmes, it retains a privileged position for the gene in development and 
evolution. Here I will argue that evolutionary developmental biologists have not 
provided adequate grounds for granting genes this role in development. 
 
2. Evolutionary Developmental Biology 
Evo-devo is a relatively recent discipline. Although interest in the relationship 
between development and evolution is as old as interest in evolution, evo-devo 
has largely been made possible by advances in technology that have allowed 
scientists greater access to biological phenomenon at the molecular level. 
Wagner, for instance, suggests that “the molecular genetic revolution in 
developmental biology is in some respects like the invention of the electron 
microscope,” because “a new level of biological organization has come within 
the grasp of science” (2000: 95). Understanding the phenomenon witnessed at 
this and other levels, and relating them to evolution, is at the core of evo-devo. 
However, perhaps due to its recent arrival, there is no consensus on what exactly 
counts as evo-devo.
30
 Different research programmes exist which relate 
development to evolution, but there is no agreement as to whether they are all 
research programmes within evo-devo, or whether some are better classified as 
something else (e.g. developmental evolution).  
 There are two general questions that can be asked about the relationship 
between development and evolution. The first concerns how evolution affects 
development. The second focuses on how development affects evolution. Some 
researchers work exclusively on answering one or other of these questions, 
though others view the two as interlinked (Robert 2002: 592). We can broadly 
distinguish between a number of forms of evo-devo. The first is conservative 
evo-devo and it is primarily concerned with the first question: providing 
evolutionary explanations for the new developmental processes and mechanisms 
that molecular genetics has identified. These mechanisms and processes “would 
not be different than any other character specific study of variation, like the 
evolution of DNA sequences or the evolution of morphological characters” 
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 For various taxonomies of the research programmes concerned with the relationship 
between evolution and development and that may or may not be classed as “evo-devo,” see Hall 
(2000), Gilbert (2003), and Sarkar & Robert (2003). 
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(Wagner 2000: 95). Offering evolutionary explanations for developmental 
mechanisms would extend the explanatory reach of neo-Darwinism, rather than 
challenge it in any way. However, even this approach forces development further 
into the picture than before. If we want to explain why one mechanism was 
favoured over another, we must at the very least attend to the role these 
mechanisms are playing in development.  
 A different version of evo-devo goes further than the last, and seeks to 
establish a new synthesis between developmental biology and neo-Darwinian 
evolutionary theory. Synthetic evo-devo is at least committed to the second 
question: how does development help explain evolution? This approach may also 
ask how evolution explains development. The aim of synthetic evo-devo is 
neither to abandon neo-Darwinian biology, nor to have development subsumed 
by it; rather, it seeks to form a genuine union between the two, creating 
something altogether different: “evo-devo is a synthesis of evolution and 
development with emergent properties not found from analysis of development 
or evolution alone” (Hall 2000: 177). Synthetic evo-devo is the moderate account 
of the relationship between evolution and development. Unlike conservative evo-
devo, it seeks to place development on a par with evolution as an explanans.  
 More radical versions of evo-devo also exist. One such approach 
challenges the distinct position the gene holds in development and evolution. 
This position shades into developmental systems theory which will be the topic 
of chapter four. Here I am largely interested in the moderate, synthetic version of 
evo-devo as this probably ought to be considered the mainstream stance within 
the field.
31
 I will attempt to lay out its key commitments, with a particular eye to 
highlighting the differences between synthetic evo-devo and developmental 
systems theory to better adjudicate on the claim by Gilbert that what I am calling 
synthetic evo-devo is a genuine threat to developmental systems theory. 
 
3. Synthetic Evo-Devo 
Synthetic evo-devo attempts to affect a synthesis between evolution and 
developmental biology. That is, rather than subsuming one discipline into the 
                                                 
31
 For example, two of the most well known evolutionary developmental biologists, Brian 
Hall (1992, 1999, 2000) and Scott Gilbert (2003), both defend this synthetic version. 
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other, evo-devo hopes that the two disciplines can merge to produce something 
new (e.g. Hall 2000). This is no easy task. Developmental biology and 
evolutionary biology have, for the most part, gone their separate ways since the 
Modern Synthesis. Each has their own distinctive research programme and 
language, and focuses on different aspects of the organic world. As well as 
establishing a coherent synthesis between such disparate disciplines, evo-devo 
must also make clear why paying attention to development is important for 
evolutionary considerations. To clarify, there are two ways evolution and 
development might come together. The first is merely additive. Evolutionary and 
developmental biology are made compatible such that the language and concepts 
used are consistent and both share the same broad research interests. One 
discipline picks up just where the other left off so that a coherent account of both 
evolution and development is created. The relationship between evolution and 
development imagined by the neo-Darwinist is of this sort. Evolutionary theory 
would provide all the ultimate explanations for organic form and change of form, 
while developmental biology would provide the proximate explanations. This 
scenario is not what evolutionary developmental biologists have in mind. Rather, 
when evolutionary theory and developmental biology combine, the hope is that 
the product is something unlike either of the two contributing disciplines. Neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory is not held to be wrong, on this approach, but 
incomplete. And in completing it, the research questions are altered such that 
evolutionary considerations are also developmental considerations. Godfrey-
Smith (2001a) and Sterelny (2000) note the change in focus evo-devo motivates. 
For neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology the “$64k question” was “why are 
organisms adapted?” (Sterelny 2000: 376). For evo-devo, that question becomes 
“how is adaptation possible?” And though Sterelny argues that developmental 
considerations do not pose a threat to the neo-Darwinian project, like Robert 
(2002) I will argue that such a change in the focus of evolutionary research 
constitutes a significant break with neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory.  
 A key focus of evo-devo research is the generation of variation. Neo-
Darwinian evolutionary biology assumes variation is the result of genetic 
mutation. For cumulative selection leading to complex adaptations, such genetic 
mutations need to be translated into phenotypic variation. Although this process 
may be complex, neo-Darwinian theory nevertheless assumes it can be 
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adequately understood, from an evolutionary point of view, as the result of this 
mutation (perhaps in conjunction with other genes). That is, if a phenotypic 
variant arises in the population, it is enough to track any genetic variants that 
coincide with it. These genetic variants are assumed to underpin the trait in 
question and, from an evolutionary point of view at least, adequately account for 
its appearance. The picture of evolution emerging from evo-devo, however, 
challenges this assumption. That is, phenotypic novelty is not adequately 
understood as the result of genetic mutation. Indeed, phenotypic novelty may 
precede genetic novelty. Thus, the variation required for selection is not, on the 
evo-devo account, primarily the result of genetic mutation (though this will be 
involved) but rather the result of the reorganisation of developmental processes.  
 Phenotypic and developmental plasticity are phenomena that are thought to 
produce phenotypic variation. These forms of plasticity may be the result of 
selection. Selection can sometimes favour developmental mechanisms or traits 
that produce a range of responses appropriate to the organism's context. This, for 
example, is an idea often relied on by Evolutionary Psychologists. Putative 
psychological modules receive an input from the environment, and produce an 
adaptive response.
32
 Also, coral reef fish can undergo a female-to-male sex 
change in certain environments (Lutnesky 1994), and numerous organisms 
hibernate or migrate as seasons change and may undergo physiological changes 
such as extra coat growth. Canalization, discussed in chapter two, may ensure a 
degree of robustness in a particular trait as a result of the selection for plastic 
developmental mechanisms. These responses are thought to be adaptations; 
selection favoured mechanisms that produced plastic responses over mechanisms 
that produced “one size fits all” responses. 
 The environmentally contingent production of such adaptive responses, 
however, need not be an adaptation: “phenotypic accommodation is adaptive 
adjustment, without genetic change, of variable aspects of the phenotype 
following a novel input during development” (West-Eberhard 2005: 610, italics 
added). In such cases, because the input is taken to be novel, there cannot have 
been selection for the particular developmental outcome that occurs. That 
                                                 
32
 See chapter five for a more detailed discussion of Evolutionary Psychology and 
psychological modules. 
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adaptive phenotypic novelty does not require genetic mutation is most famously 
illustrated in the case of Slijper's two-legged goat. Slijper, a Dutch veterinarian, 
performed a post mortem on a goat born with a congenital condition that resulted 
in the paralysis of its front legs. Nonetheless, the goat achieved mobility from an 
early age by walking upright on its hind legs:  
 
... it had developed several behavioral and morphological 
specializations… including the ability to hop rapidly when disturbed, 
enlarged hind legs, a curved spine, and an unusually large neck. (West-
Eberhard 2003: 51)  
 
The phenotype was altered in numerous different ways such that the goat could 
move about with relative ease. A coherent, integrated phenotype developed, 
despite the fact that the normal developmental trajectory had been severely 
perturbed. 
 Coyne (2009) has suggested that such phenomena have no relevance for 
evolution. The novel input that disrupted the goat's development was 
environmental rather than genetic, and so it is assumed the novel phenotypic 
arrangement would not have been shared by any offspring the goat might have 
had. Further, Coyne argues that this example does not demonstrate “some 
inherent self-regulatory property of development” but rather examples like this 
“reflect an evolved phenomenon: natural selection has given bones and muscles 
the adaptive property of developing in response to stresses they experience” 
(2009: 383). However, this is to miss the point of the example. Dealing first with 
Coyne's second assertion – that the goat's phenotype merely reflected the evolved 
response of its bones and muscles to respond to stresses – this significantly 
underplays the degree to which the goat's morphology and physiology differed 
from its conspecifics. It is not just the case that in Slijper's goat certain muscles 
were better developed than in other goats through greater use. There was a 
significant rearrangement of parts such that aspects of the goat's novel anatomy 
closely resembled that of other bipedal animals, such as humans, orang-utans and 
kangaroos (West-Eberhard 2005: 612). Beyond that, the goat developed a novel 
trait, tendons that attached the thickened and elongated pelvic muscles to the 
newly shaped pelvic bone (West-Eberhard 2005: 611). The arrangement of the 
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goat's anatomy was drastically altered, and novel traits were introduced. This 
appears to constitute more than just the evolved capacity of bones and muscles to 
respond to stresses.  Certainly, the evolved capacity for bones and muscles to 
respond to stresses will have been important, and will feature as part of the 
explanation, but alone this is insufficient.  
 This undermines Coyne's assertion that there is no evolutionary 
significance in this example. If the environmental inducer was no longer present, 
we can assume the goat's offspring would not have been bipedal, and in this 
sense the goat's novel morphology would not have had any evolutionary 
consequences. But granting this, Slijper's goat still has repercussions for how we 
think of development and evolution. This example appears to suggest that 
complex, adaptive phenotypes do not require a genetic programme to guide their 
development. Recall, genes are thought to contain instructions for development 
as a result of being selected for in virtue of the effect they have on phenotypes. 
Given the novelty of Slijper‟s goat, there can have been no selection for any 
genes involved in the development of this phenotype (or at least, no selection for 
them in virtue of their producing this sort of phenotype). A functional, integrated 
phenotype developed without generations of selection for genes that contained 
instructions for this developmental outcome. This undermines a key assumption 
of neo-Darwinian biology that adaptive, complex phenotypes must be 
adaptations. This is not to say that if such novel phenotypes arise, and if they 
prove to be heritable, they may not be selected for. Indeed, I will shortly discuss 
examples of this. Rather, the point here is just that developmental processes 
appear to be such that rather than requiring very small, incremental changes in 
order to produce complex, adaptive traits, quite big results can be had by small 
alterations in aspects of the developmental system.
33
 Genetic programmes do not 
                                                 
33
 Dawkins (1998) distinguishes between two kinds of large, sudden evolutionary change: 
“Boeing 747” saltation and “Stretched DC-8” saltation. The DC-8 airplane was modified by 
elongating its fuselage to create the Stretched DC-8. The “Stretched DC-8” saltation involves 
something similar; an existing structure is enlarged (or perhaps made smaller) or the structure 
itself might be repeated: “it refers to large and sudden changes in magnitude of some biological 
measure, without an accompanying large increase in adaptive information” (1998: 26). This kind 
of saltation is considered possible by Dawkins. The Boeing 747 airplane, unlike the stretched 
DC-8, involved a completely new design. Thus the saltation named after it involves “a big 
increase in information content or complexity” (1998: 26). Dawkins argues that such an increase 
in complexity or information content could only be achieved gradually, as a result of cumulative 
selection and so rules out the possibility of “Boeing 747” saltation. Although “Stretched DC-8” 
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appear to be required to do all the work in explaining phenotypic variation. 
Developmental processes, not encoded for in the genes, appear to be able to 
account for novelty and variation too. 
 Robert (2004) uses an example with more straightforward evolutionary 
consequences. Geomyoid rodents (pocket gophers and kangaroo rats) possess 
external, fur-lined cheek pouches in which they store food. This is in contrast to 
other rodents which possess internal pouches that do not have a fur lining. The 
external pouches tend to be larger, and more efficient at storing body water, and 
they are thought to be a more recent evolutionary innovation (2004: 100). The 
standard adaptationist account might lead us to expect the external pouch – given 
it is both a complex adaptation and an improvement on the older internal pouch – 
to have arisen as the result of cumulative selection. An examination of the 
developmental details, however, reveals something different. Rather than the 
external cheek pouch appearing in small steps between the original internal 
pouch and the current external pouch, it looks as though the external pouch 
appeared in more or less its current form from the start.  The mechanism that 
leads to the development of the cheek pouch, epithelial evagination, occurs in a 
slightly different place for external pouches such that the evagination process 
becomes entangled with the development of the lips, which in turn is connected 
to the development of the snout. As a result, the pouch develops with an external 
opening. Further, the fur lining of the external pouch develops as a consequence 
of the evagination process in this new location interacting with the developing 
facial epithelia (2004: 101). The very small change in the location of the 
evagination process leads to an innovative and adaptive novel phenotypic trait.  
 This small change in the location of the initiation of the evagination process 
may involve a genetic mutation. The neo-Darwinist might be tempted to explain 
                                                                                                                                    
saltations are considered possible in neo-Darwinism, it is assumed they must be underpinned by 
genes in order to be evolutionarily significant. Further, they must be underpinned by genes in 
order that the different aspects of the organism adjust in their development and positioning: “we 
know that a single mutation can orchestrate changes in many diverse parts of organs” (Dawkins 
1998: 27). Slijper‟s goat and further examples to be discussed below do not fit easily into 
Dawkins‟ categorisation of acceptable and unacceptable saltations. With the exception of some 
novel tendons, the same structures are present in Slijper‟s goat. However, the difference between 
Slijper‟s goat and a normally developed goat is not merely one of magnitude; Slijper‟s goat 
adopted quite a different sort of body plan, not unlike that of bipedal animals. Further, such a 
qualitatively different, yet adaptive, phenotype was arrived at without a genetic mutation to 
“orchestrate” the new timing and placing of developmental processes. 
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this in the usual way: a genetic mutation leads to a novel phenotypic trait that 
selection can act on. This genetic mutation is then understood as a change in the 
genetic programme or recipe which issues instructions guiding development. But 
recall that in the case of the goat above, the phenotype that emerged could not be 
understood as resulting from instructions in the genetic programme. If there is no 
need for instructions to guide development in that case, there is no reason to 
suppose they are required here.  
 West-Eberhard (1998, 2003, 2005) argues that evolutionary change should 
not be assumed to begin with genetic mutation. Normal developmental 
trajectories can be disrupted by environmental factors. Phenotypic 
accommodation allows for these perturbations to alter the normal path of 
development, but nonetheless produce adaptive phenotypes, as in the case of 
Slijper's goat. If an environmental perturbation is the cause of the developmental 
disruption, many, if not all, organisms in the population in that generation may 
now possess significantly different phenotypes from previous generations, and 
these novel phenotypes may be adaptive. This will not always be the case, of 
course, and an environmental perturbation may be seriously detrimental to the 
organisms involved, or may be buffered against as in cases of canalization, but in 
at least some instances such adaptive novelties may arise. West-Eberhard 
suggests that this flexibility helps determine evolutionary trajectories through a 
process of genetic accommodation. That is, phenotypic accommodation may 
enable genetic accommodation. Genetic accommodation occurs where there 
exists individual variation in responsiveness to environmental stimuli. Some 
individuals may need a high degree of exposure to an environmental stimulus 
before this results in the development of a new phenotype, while others require 
far less, depending on variations in their individual biology. For instance, the 
environmental stimulus may be adding to a chemical already produced by the 
organism. Some organisms will already produce a large amount of the chemical 
and so will only require a small amount from the environment in order to 
produce the adaptive response. Other organisms in the population, due to low 
levels of the chemical in their system, will require more of that chemical from 
their environment in order to produce the same adaptive response. If the 
environmental stimulus is, or becomes, scarce or just tends to fluctuate, those 
organisms that require a smaller exposure will have a better chance of developing 
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the adaptive phenotype. Any organism that, through some genetic mutation, or 
because of some previously latent genetic capacity, requires less exposure than 
its conspecifics will be favoured by selection.
34
 Generations of selection 
pressures acting in this direction may result in the population no longer needing 
very much, or any, exposure to the stimulus. A phenotype that first appeared as 
the result of an environmental perturbation can in later generations, through this 
process of genetic accommodation, develop in the absence of that environmental 
factor.  
 West-Eberhard argues that because behaviour is usually more flexible than 
morphology or physiology, it will tend to be what changes in an altered 
environment: 
 
The produced response subjects other attributes of the phenotype to an 
altered selective regime (e.g., a particular behavior may produce new 
physiological or morphological demands). This means that given 
sufficient genetic variation in morphology, a recurrent behavioral 
response to the environment can affect the evolution of the structures 
affected or employed as a result. Thus, behavior being especially plastic, 
behavior must often take the lead in evolution. (West-Eberhard 2003: 
180)  
 
Because behaviour tends to be particularly variable, we might expect to see 
behavioural changes when we see environmental changes. And because 
organisms play a role in generating the selection pressures they are subject to, 
when an organism‟s behaviour changes, so too will the selection pressures.35 
West-Eberhard is proposing a two-step model of evolution by natural selection 
here: “developmentally mediated variation and then selection resulting in gene 
frequency change” (1998: 8419). How does phenotypic accommodation followed 
by genetic accommodation affect the relationship between development and 
                                                 
34
 This will not always be the case. If the cost of internally reproducing the effects of the 
environmental stimulus outweighs the benefits of the new phenotype, then we cannot assume 
selection will favour genetic accommodation. See chapter seven for a more detailed discussion of 
this point. 
  
35
 See chapter two for discussion of the organism‟s role in generating selection pressures. 
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natural selection? West-Eberhard‟s approach may seem to marginalise 
development from an evolutionary perspective, leaving us with the standard neo-
Darwinian picture. For example, Sterelny (2000) has suggested that 
developmental considerations have not yet been demonstrated to be anything 
other than beside the point as far as population geneticists are concerned. He 
argues that population genetics requires two things: that there exists heritable (i.e. 
genetic) variation in a population which leads to differential success in survival 
and reproduction, and that this success is a function of the environment the 
organism finds itself in. Given this, he argues that a more detailed understanding 
of the mechanisms that generate phenotypic variation certainly broadens our 
knowledge of biological phenomena, but in terms of the primary target of 
population genetics – tracking gene frequencies as they respond to environmental 
demands – knowledge of how the variation came about is superfluous to 
demands: 
 
... the role of variation is acknowledged, but there is a tacit assumption 
that the mechanisms that generate variation will not bias or block 
evolutionary response to selective pressure... in this adaptationist 
perspective, phenotypic variability is not the cause of a particular 
adaptive shift, even though it is a necessary condition of any 
evolutionary change. (2000: S373) 
 
However phenotypic variation comes about, what matters from the neo-
Darwinian perspective is that adaptive phenotypes are propagated throughout the 
population, and it is selection rather than development that explains this spread. 
Only when the variation is underpinned by genes does it become relevant to 
selection in this account. If we want to understand evolution by natural selection, 
we can skip past the phenotypic accommodation and the developmental 
processes that enable this, and continue to focus on genes.  
It is not clear, however, that Sterelny has succeeded in undermining the 
attempts of evolutionary developmental biologists to make development relevant 
to understanding evolution. Sterelny assumes that if developmental 
considerations have not been demonstrated to be essential for evolutionary 
considerations, then those who seek to integrate development and evolution have 
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failed. This is not the assumption of evolutionary developmental biologists. 
Indeed, evolutionary developmental biologists maintain that sometimes the 
population genetics approach is the most appropriate. 
 Wagner (2000) demonstrates when a population genetics approach suffices, 
and when it is inappropriate. In the case of stable sex ratios in populations, the 
population genetics approach is appropriate. Higher mammal populations have a 
sex ratio of 1:1, held in a dynamic equilibrium. Events will tend to push the 
population away from this ratio, but equally mechanisms exist that return the 
population to this point. Whenever one sex becomes rare, those remaining 
members of that sex have an increased fitness compared with the opposite sex. 
The rarer sex is more likely to meet a member of the opposite sex with which it 
can mate. Thus it is more likely to have offspring than the members of the 
abundant sex. Selection will favour any mechanism that the rarer sex possess that 
biases the sex of offspring in the favour of that rarer sex. This will lead to the sex 
ratio edging back towards a ratio of 1:1. To explain this evolutionary 
phenomenon, Wagner argues that the standard population genetics approach is 
best. This is not to deny that there are no developmental issues at stake here. 
Indeed, there are a great many. Sex determination involves many different, 
complex, and not always fully understood developmental mechanisms (Wagner 
2000: 96). In fact, it is this variability in developmental mechanism which 
renders stabilising selection the more relevant factor in this evolutionary 
explanation. Different species rely on different developmental mechanisms and, 
even within a single species, different mechanisms play a role in sex 
determination. We cannot explain the general tendency towards 1:1 sex ratios 
with any single mechanism. On the other hand, stabilising selection is common 
to all scenarios: 
 
Hence, given the variety of molecular mechanisms involved in sex 
determination and the many levels at which sex determination can be 
influenced, there is no particular developmental mechanism that 
specifically can account for the phenomenon of a 1:1 sex ratio. The 
decisive mechanisms that explain the 1:1 ratio are all realised at the 
population dynamic level and involve frequency-dependent fitness in 
favor of the rarer sex. (Wagner 2000: 96) 
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Wagner contrasts this case with eyespots on butterfly wings (2000: 96). The 
eyespot organiser, a group of cells, is thought to be central to the development of 
eyespots. This organiser induces surrounding cells to produce a pigment, creating 
the distinctive wing pattern. The eyespot organiser utilises pre-existing genes 
involved in the development of the anterior-posterior compartment boundary (in 
both butterflies and Drosophila wing development) to produce this phenotypic 
novelty. The group of cells called the eyespot organiser are thought to have 
endowed the genes in these butterflies with a new regulatory function. Some 
genetic mutations may have been involved in the appearance of this wing pattern, 
but to understand the evolutionary innovation we need to attend to the 
rearrangement of the genetic and developmental architecture underpinning this 
trait (Wagner et al. 2000: 821). Here, the kind of explanation that cites changes 
in gene frequencies is less informative: “without prior knowledge of the 
regulatory relationships among these genes in the a-p compartment boundary it 
would have been impossible to understand which genetic changes were sufficient 
to establish an eyespot organizer, i.e., the evolutionary novelty” (Wagner 2000: 
97). 
 In both of these cases, selection and development are involved and 
important. However, in explaining these phenomena, selection and development 
do not play equal roles: 
 
It is obvious in the case of the origin of eye spots patterns population 
genetics is much less informative than in the case of sex ratio evolution. 
It does not help much to say that there were one or two mutations that 
created eyespots and that these mutant alleles were selected. There is not 
much we can learn from such a statement. (Wagner 2000: 97) 
 
Wagner suggests that developmental explanations will have more “explanatory 
force” than explanations in terms of population genetics in certain instances. 
Although multiple factors are always involved in any evolutionary phenomenon, 
some may be more relevant than others in terms of satisfying our explanatory 
goals. Robert points out that this is more than the claim that population genetics 
offers incomplete explanations but also that “the best explanation of evolutionary 
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change is not always made exclusively in terms of changes in gene frequency in 
a population” (2004: 98). Wagner argues for the adoption of a “shifting 
pluralism” which recognises “the idea that there are multiple causes and 
mechanisms involved in every evolutionary process and that their relative 
importance for the outcome of evolution shifts from situation to situation” (2000: 
97).  
 Sterelny's suggestion that population genetics does not need developmental 
considerations is correct, in the sense that it can continue to ask its central 
research question as it has not been demonstrated to be false. But the fact that the 
population genetics model can ignore developmental considerations without 
being wrong is entirely consistent with the evo-devo argument. Sterelny misses 
the mark in his discussions of the relationship between development and 
population genetics. Evolutionary developmental biologists do not claim 
population genetics approaches are mistaken, or that they will always be 
inappropriate and ought to be replaced, but that they will be incomplete and will 
sometimes be inappropriate. 
 Population genetics, and neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory more broadly, 
might concern itself with the changing gene frequencies in the population, and 
explaining at least some of these changes as responses to environmental 
pressures. It tries to answer the question “why are organisms adapted?” 
Developmental biology tries to answer the question “how do organisms 
develop?” Evo-devo tries to answer the question “what is it about development 
that makes adapted organisms possible?” Both of the first two questions may 
continue to be addressed, but they will not be answering the third question. 
Evolutionary developmental biologists argue that the neo-Darwinian approach is 
incomplete, that in some situations these sorts of explanations will lack 
“explanatory force,” and that more productive lines of enquiry can be pursued 
through addressing their central research question. Evo-devo does not seek to 
displace the population genetics approach outright but, where appropriate, to 
augment it with more informative explanations and to bring a new research 
question to the fore.  
 
4. Development in Evolutionary Developmental Biology 
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While evo-devo does not deny a role for population genetics in evolutionary 
theory, it diverges from neo-Darwinian biology in terms of how development is 
understood. In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore the evo-devo 
characterisation of development. I discussed above the idea that development 
does not appear to require a guiding programme in anything like the sense 
implied by Dawkins “lumbering robots” manipulated by genes (Dawkins 1976: 
20). But if genetic programmes do not accurately characterise development, what 
does? The shifting pluralism that Wagner (2000) argues for is, as he notes, 
characteristic of the entire evo-devo enterprise. Organisms are understood as 
hierarchically organised systems that have emergent properties at each level of 
organisation. Thus evo-devo rejects the reductionism of the neo-Darwinian 
approach that assumes phenotypes are adequately explained, from an 
evolutionary point of view, in terms of genes. This hierarchical organisation is 
combined with the idea that organic systems are modular. This concept, and how 
it informs the evo-devo understanding of evolution, will be explored below.  
 Although evolutionary developmental biologists reject the idea that genes 
strongly control development, nonetheless the gene is held to play a more 
important role in development than other developmental resources. I will also 
explore the evo-devo justification for this claim and argue that it is insufficient. 
 
4.1 Modularity 
The concept of modularity does a lot of work in evo-devo, but it is a difficult 
concept to give a rigorous definition for, and it has tended to be used 
operationally (Robert 2004; Bolker 2000). At the very least it is taken to pick out 
aspects of an organism that show a high degree of internal integration while 
being, to some extent, dissociable from the rest of the system. Modules have 
been defined in terms of functions, processes and structures, and are thought to 
exist at all levels of organisation, from the genome to entire organs and limbs, 
and even to whole organisms and populations (Hall 2003; Bolker 2000: 771; 
West-Eberhard 2003: 62). Such modularity could account for the ability of 
organisms to develop integrated phenotypes despite perturbations during 
development. For instance, modular processes might change location but 
continue, more or less, to develop in their normal way as in the case of the 
developmental process that led to the external cheek pouches of the geomyoid 
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rodents. Similarly, transplanting key ectoderm and mesoderm cells from the 
region of a frog embryo where a forearm normally develops to some other part of 
another embryo results in the growth of a forearm in this new location: “other 
regions, when grafted, produced hind limbs, tails, hearts, kidneys, depending on 
their original positions in the donor embryos” (Hall 2003: 228).  
 Alternatively, if the development of one module is affected, the semi-
independence of modules may ensure the effects of the perturbation are localised 
to one module, rather than being directly experienced by the entire phenotype. 
Other modules may have to be reorganised to compensate for the damaged 
module or modules, but modularity allows for such reorganisation. So for 
example we could imagine that in the case of Slijper's goat some event disrupted 
the normal development of the goat's front legs, but because biological systems 
are constituted by modular structures and processes, other structures and 
processes could be reorganised to compensate and ensure phenotypic integrity.  
That organisms can be thought of as being comprised of modules should 
not be taken as a restatement of the atomism Gould and Lewontin (1979) claimed 
at work in the adaptationist programme – that is, organisms can be understood as 
merely a collection of adaptations and do not need to be examined at the level of 
the organism as a whole. Modular traits are not entirely independent from other 
modules at the same level: 
 
Subindividual phenotypic components [modular traits] are only semi-
independent because they share traits, or overlap, with other subunits 
[modular traits], because they have physical connections with others, 
and because they cannot function, survive, and reproduce on their own. 
(West-Eberhard 2003: 82) 
 
Indeed, it is largely a matter of context as to what constitutes a module – modules 
are identified where there appears a good deal of integration in a particular 
structure or process, compared with the structures and processes surrounding it. 
This context-sensitivity may, in part, contribute to the difficulties had in 
attempting to define modularity compared with recognising it. 
 Modularity differs from the atomistic approach of neo-Darwinism in at 
least one other way. Biological systems are often thought of as nested hierarchies 
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of modules. This, argues West-Eberhard (2003), allows us to understand some 
apparently odd phenomena concerning homologous structures and processes. 
Two structures (or processes) are said to be homologous if the structures (or 
processes) appear to be very similar.
36
 They are usually taken as evidence of 
common ancestry when discovered in two separate lineages.
37
 Structures 
identified as homologous are sometimes found to be underpinned by distinct 
developmental mechanisms. Hall (1992) discusses such an example observed in 
an experiment on highly inbred mice. The mice were subjected to selection for 
longer tails and, after seven generations, several strains were produced with tails 
that had increased in length to the same extent. But this extra length had been 
achieved in different ways in the different strains. Some strains had a similar 
number of vertebrae as the first generation of mice, but those vertebrae had 
grown longer. In other strains, the vertebrae had remained the same length, but 
their number had increased:  
 
The developmental processes producing increased tail length are 
profoundly different in these two lines; early respecification of basic 
segmentation in the former, expanded growth of elements already 
present in the basic body plan of the latter... Are the tails and/or 
vertebrae in these selected lines homologous, either with one another, or 
with the tails or vertebrae in the unselected parental line? (Hall 1992: 
184) 
 
West-Eberhard's suggestion is that homologous structures of this sort are 
composed of a nested hierarchy of modular subunits. Some of these subunits can 
change without it affecting the form of the homologue (West-Eberhard 2003: 60). 
                                                 
36
 There are two broad cases of homology discussed in relation to morphology. The first is 
serial homology. This occurs within a single organism when a structure or process is repeated at 
different points in the developmental system (e.g. body segments, feathers, specific cell types). I 
will focus here on homologies present in (at least) two distinct lineages, or in a single lineage at 
different times, sometimes referred to as “special homology.” 
 
37
 Homologies are often defined as similarities in processes or structures as a result of 
common ancestry; however, Griffiths (2007) suggests this is misleading. Homology as a concept 
preceded Darwinian evolution, and has continued to be used independently of any commitment to 
evolutionary biology as a descriptive category within comparative anatomy.  
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Thus the tails of the seventh generation mice may be considered homologous, 
and perhaps some (though not all) of the vertebrae in their tails may be 
homologous too, but the developmental processes (or at least aspects thereof) 
that produce the tails are not homologous.  
This hierarchical organisation means that when we discuss a module, we 
must be clear about the level of organisation we are focusing on (Bolker 2000). 
That final structure (adult phenotype) can be preserved while the developmental 
processes that lead to it are modified indicates the important role of development 
in evolutionary considerations. The dichotomy invoked by both neo-Darwinism 
and process structuralism that supposed that development conserved while 
selection altered is shown to be incoherent in these cases. Development both 
conserves and changes. The adult structure remains in place, but the 
developmental processes that cause the appearance of these structures are altered. 
The evolutionary developmental biologist maintains that it is not just genes or 
whole organisms that are subject to selection, but also modular developmental 
processes. Developmental processes are subject to evolutionary change, and thus 
ought not to be neglected in evolutionary theory as has been the tendency in neo-
Darwinism.  
 A module is not to be understood as merely the sum of its parts, on the evo-
devo account, but instead is characterised by emergent effects: “the emergent 
qualities of different levels of organization are one of the reasons why biology 
needs to be studied at different levels, and why molecular biology, cell biology, 
or genetics alone cannot solve all of the important questions of evolutionary 
biology” (West-Eberhard 2003: 61). Modules at all levels act to mediate the 
effects of genes on phenotypes (Gilbert 2003), and are understood as the 
“building blocks of evolution” (Schlosser 2002: 2). Modules play two roles. 
They may constitute units of evolution (e.g. Hall 2000; Schlosser 2002; Gilbert 
2003), and they also underpin the evolvability of biological systems. That is, they 
are both the product of evolution, form part of the explanation for how evolution 
is possible, and can act as a level of selection. Identifying such modules and 
determining how it is they interact with one another will be crucial to 
understanding how organisms can come to have adaptations.  
   
4.2 Genes in Evolutionary Developmental Biology  
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In the introduction to this chapter I mentioned Gilbert's claim that evo-devo was 
the biggest threat to developmental systems theory, the subject of the next 
chapter (Gilbert 2003: 349). In the following chapter I will assess this claim, but 
here I want to discuss the role of the gene in development and evolution which is 
understood in very different ways by evolutionary developmental biologists and 
developmental systems theorists. I will outline the evo-devo position on these 
issues here, and in the next chapter I will deal with the developmental systems 
approach and discuss how it differs.  
 Evolutionary developmental biologists, like developmental systems 
theorists, reject the strong claims made by gene-centric neo-Darwinism that 
suggests that, developmental constraints aside, all that is evolutionarily relevant 
in development can be understood in terms of genes. But unlike the stance 
adopted by developmental systems theorists, evolutionary developmental 
biologists are committed to the idea that genes are ontologically distinct from 
other developmental resources.
38
 Robert (2004) calls this the gene-in-context 
approach. Genes are not considered able to have any causal effects on 
development in the absence of other developmental resources. This much is 
uncontroversial, though perhaps some of the rhetoric of gene-centric neo-
Darwinism suggests otherwise. Nonetheless, the genes in this context play a 
more important role than anything else. The gene-centric neo-Darwinian 
accommodation of context sensitivity in development is sometimes put in terms 
of genetic programmes involving the conditional rules discussed in chapter one 
(i.e. if X, follow developmental pathway A, if Y follow pathway B). The language 
of genetic programme seems to suggest that development can be understood, by 
and large, by attending to the genes alone; a position evo-devo rejects.  
 The idea of the gene as the unmoved mover in development has been 
abandoned in the evo-devo approach. Taking the genes-in-context approach more 
seriously than the neo-Darwinist, the evolutionary developmental biologist 
                                                 
38
 As discussed above, evo-devo is not univocal on these matters. Some advocate an 
interpretation of genes in development that is closer to that of developmental systems theory. 
Robert et al. (2001) outline the different positions adopted within evo-devo on the issue of 
genetic causation in development, as well as the positions adopted on inheritance that I will 
discuss shortly. However, those stances within evo-devo that more closely resemble 
developmental systems theory are not the views offered in the mainstream presentations of the 
discipline (e.g. Hall 1992, Gilbert 2003, Robert et al. 2001) and, given this, I have focussed on 
these latter claims here.  
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investigates how, for example, modular organisation impacts on the expression 
of genes. Further, the idea that genes are regulated by other genes, as well as 
other elements in the cellular milieu, is taken as a live topic for research. For 
example, evolutionary developmental biologists point to the fact that there is 
little contribution from the zygote nucleus early in development. Indeed, the 
zygote nucleus can be removed without disrupting the initial stages of 
development in some species (Hall 1992: 88). The egg cytoplasm is the site of 
most activity in these early stages:  
 
... it is highly misleading to view the female gamete as a large DNA 
molecule. The egg cytoplasm is full of all sorts of agents, both nutritive 
and informational, which have an important role to play in the initial 
development of the new soma. Indeed, key processes of early 
development may be initiated by cytoplasmic agents rather than nuclear 
ones... (Arthur 1987: 107) 
 
But although this attention to the role of other developmental factors marks a 
shift from the neo-Darwinian approach, non-genetic factors in development 
continue to be cast in the supporting role for gene action, albeit with a stronger 
supporting role than before. They are a repository of information for 
development unlike any other developmental resource.  
 This qualitatively different role for genes over other developmental 
resources, even with the genes-in-context approach, can be seen in the treatment 
of homologous genes. As well as homologous structures at a higher level being 
(partially) realised by non-homologous processes and structures at a lower level, 
higher level non-homologous structures may be underpinned by lower level 
homologous processes and structures. For example, experimenters identified a 
gene called eyeless in Drosophila that, when mutated, resulted in flies with no 
eyes. Similar knock-out experiments, targeting a gene called aniridia were 
performed with mice, and resulted in mice without any irises. Finally, a mutation 
in a gene called small eye in humans was found to result in the development of 
small eyes. Since their initial identification, these genes have been renamed Pax6 
as all three genes are now thought to be homologous (Burian 2005: 221). 
Although the eyes of mammals differ quite considerably from the compound 
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eyes of Drosophila, and thus the eyes themselves are not considered homologous, 
key genetic resources for their development are nonetheless thought to be 
homologous: 
 
... homologous processes can trigger the formation of organs that 
perform similar functions, but – because the structures produced have 
many features that are not shared and not derived from a common 
source – are not closely homologous. (Burian 2005: 252)  
 
As well as being homologous across a surprising range of species, Pax6 in 
Drosophila has some other surprising properties. When the Pax6 gene is 
activated in other tissues of Drosophila, for instance in its leg or antenna, an eye 
will develop (Burian 2005: 221). Pax6 is an example of a homeobox gene. 
Homeobox genes are involved in the establishment of the basic body plan of a 
wide range of organisms, including animals, plants and fungi, and lead to strange 
developmental outcomes when experimentally manipulated. Mutations in the 
homeobox genes in Drosophila have led to legs developing where we would 
normally expect an antenna, and a rearrangement of the thoracic segments 
(Robert 2004: 27). This has led some to consider Pax6 specifically, and the 
homeobox genes more generally, “master control genes” (Robert 2004: 27; 
Burian 2005: 224).  
This privileging of the gene can also be seen when non-genetic factors and 
epigenetic processes are defined in terms of genes, and the activity of genes they 
enable. Hall's definition of epigenetics is illustrative of this genes-in-context 
approach: 
 
Epigenetics or epigenetic control is the sum of the genetic and non-
genetic factors acting upon cells to selectively control the gene 
expression that produces increasing phenotypic complexity during 
development. (1992: 89)  
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Primarily it is their role as enablers of gene expression that renders epigenetic 
processes important to development.
39
 Genes may rely crucially on other aspects 
of the developmental system.  They are not just turned on or off by this context; 
their effect on development is also influenced by the context. That is, context 
matters both up and downstream from gene expression. Nonetheless, it is gene 
expression that is credited with producing “increasing phenotypic complexity 
during development.”  
 One reason to suppose that evolutionary developmental biologists such as 
Hall maintain a qualitatively distinct role for genes in development might be due 
to the acceptance of a degree of preformationism in his account of development: 
 
In one sense, epigenesis has triumphed for embryonic structures are not 
all preformed in the egg. Yet, in another sense, preformation “explains” 
some aspects of development. The genetic basis for development lies 
preformed in the DNA of the egg and subsequently in the zygote. The 
basic raw material for protein synthesis is preformed in the ribosomes 
and endoplasmic reticula of the egg. (Hall 1992: 86)  
 
... fundamental developmental processes... are controlled by epigenetic 
expression of preformed information. (1999: 115) 
 
Preformationism is an old idea in the history of biology that maintains that 
development involves the growth of existing structures and processes. Epigenesis, 
on the other hand, maintains that development involves the emergence of 
structures and processes. Gene-centric neo-Darwinism has been characterised as 
“neo-preformationist” (e.g. Griffiths & Knight 1998: 225; Oyama et al. 2001b: 4). 
Although structures and processes found in adult phenotypes are not thought to 
be contained in the genes, the instructions for their realisation are; there is some 
“representation” of the adult phenotype already present in the genotype.40  
                                                 
39
 Waddington (1942) was the first to coin the term “epigenetics.” In common with Hall's 
interpretation, he emphasised the role of the genes as “primary determinants in development” 
(Robert et al. 2001: 956). 
 
40
 See chapter one for an explanation for why genes are thought to represent the phenotype. 
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 If genes are understood as embodying preformed instructions for 
development, it is clear why they are held as a class apart from other 
developmental resources. But does this claim undermine the evo-devo 
commitment to development involving more than just genes? Unlike the 
preformationism of gene-centric neo-Darwinism, preformed information is not 
sufficient for explaining development: “early development is a mixture of 
preformed and epigenetic information” (Hall 1999: 115). Development remains 
characterised by emergence at different levels of organisation, and cannot be 
reduced to this preformed information. So whatever sense of information is being 
employed in Hall's account, it is not complete information, or even near-
complete information, for the realisation of the adult phenotype.  
 Perhaps Hall and like-minded evolutionary developmental biologists intend 
genes to embody preformed information about much more immediate 
developmental outcomes than adult phenotypes: 
 
Genes have homes: nucleus, cytoplasm, cell, and so forth. Just as our 
individual influences and interactions change the further we venture 
from our homes (street, community, suburb, town, municipality, 
province/state, country), so the gene's influence varies with distance 
from its locus in the nucleus. The gene lives, and has a home, and plays 
an active role as homemaker, albeit with household help. (Hall 2001:228) 
 
The idea here may be that genes contain or embody semantic information about 
very local phenomena. At higher levels of organisation, however, emergent 
properties may be considered to develop from the complex causal interactions 
between all developmental resources. That is, in virtue of their role as bearers of 
semantic information, genes continue to have a distinct ontological status from 
other developmental resources. Nonetheless, because developmental outcomes 
often involve more than genes and have emergent properties, genes cannot be 
considered to control or programme for these outcomes. Indeed, Dawkins‟ recipe 
analogy seems more appropriate here than “programme,” but note that this might 
suggest that the evolutionary developmental biologist is actually quite close to 
the gene-centric neo-Darwinian position after all. We might respond to this by 
arguing that although Dawkins has claimed that genes are better understood as 
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“recipes” than “programmes,” this has not had any impact on how Dawkins 
views the relationship between natural selection and development. Evolutionary 
developmental biologists, on the other hand, have taken the fact that there is 
more to development than genes seriously from an evolutionary perspective. 
Thus, although there might be some agreement on a metaphor for development, 
this does not translate into agreement on a good deal else.  
What reasons might an evolutionary developmental biologist have for 
privileging the gene in development? This may be explained in part by the fact 
that a good deal of time and energy has already been spent attempting to 
understand what genes do, meaning that their effects are better understood than a 
good deal else in the cellular milieu and giving an inflated sense of their 
importance in development: 
 
Given the ever-growing diversity of molecular tools and techniques, as 
well as the veritable explosion of information they produce, it is small 
wonder that [evo-devo] focuses so heavily on gene regulation and 
changes in gene expression... (Robert et al. 2001: 960) 
 
Another factor responsible for viewing genes as set apart from other 
developmental resources and may explain their distinctive informational role in 
development is that genes are considered to be the sole unit of heredity 
transmission for many evolutionary developmental biologists. Evolutionary 
developmental biologists acknowledge that a good deal more is inherited by the 
zygote than naked DNA: “organisms do not start life as naked DNA... the zygote 
is not a blank slate on which zygotic genes alone can write their instructions” 
(Hall 1998: 202-203). However, beyond DNA, what is inherited is characterised 
by Hall as either epigenetic potential, or products of maternal gene activity. 
Epigenetic potential refers to the ability of genes and their products to interact 
with their surrounding milieu in order to produce phenotypes:  
 
Epigenetic potential is heritable, epigenetic processes are not. There is 
an important difference between the ability to respond to environmental 
and genetic cues (epigenetic potential) and the actual responses to those 
cues (epigenetic processes). (Robert et al. 2001: 960).  
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Products of maternal gene activity include cell membranes, organelles, 
cytoplasmic polarities and all those other structures that comprise the zygote:  
 
… maternal cytoplasmic control, preformed organelles, and their role in 
spatial segregation at the initiation of development, are viewed as 
epigenetically inherited only if we forget that parental (usually maternal) 
genomes produced them. (Hall 1998: 203)
41
  
 
Although the evolutionary developmental biologist grants that more than DNA is 
passed to the offspring, only the genes constitute units of hereditary transmission. 
This is not to say that those other entities are causally inert and so do not play a 
role in ensuring heritable similarity. Rather, the claim here seems to be that these 
other entities are ultimately the products of (maternal) genes. So, on the one hand, 
evolutionary developmental biologists such as Hall argue that developmental 
outcomes are emergent, the result of complex causal interactions of 
developmental resources, and specifically, that genes require the activity of other 
developmental resources in order to have any effects. On the other hand, 
evolutionary developmental biologists allow that there are some cases where 
genes play the dominant role, such as in the production of organelles inherited by 
offspring. This suggests that cellular phenomena can still be understood 
primarily in terms of genes, an approach rejected for extra-cellular phenomena. 
This accords with the quotation from Hall above concerning the ever-decreasing 
power of the gene as we move further away from its “home.” 
The justification for this presumably stems from the idea that genes are 
instructional in a way that other developmental resources are not. As argued by 
                                                 
41
 Hall here mentions “preformed organelles.” There are perhaps two senses in which this is 
meant. The first is that if we accept that the zygote contains some structures from the beginning 
of its existence, then before development begins, there will be structures with form, i.e. 
development will begin with already formed structures. This is a very trivial sense of 
preformationism. The point is that, according to those that reject neo-preformationism, from this 
starting point development involves the emergence of new structures and processes, rather than 
merely the growth of pre-existent structures. The second sense in which these organelles might be 
considered preformed is that, as products of the maternal genome, they may be acting as bearers 
of maternal genetic information, and thus embody preformed semantic information in the same 
way genes are thought to. 
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Maynard-Smith (2000a) and outlined in chapter one, genes are construed as 
informational because they are considered the sole unit of inheritance and so are 
the only entities that can have a history of selection. This history of selection 
allowed neo-Darwinists to talk about genes representing phenotypic traits. But 
evolutionary developmental biologists acknowledge that genes are not the only 
unit of inheritance. Rather, they maintain that genes are the only unit of 
hereditary transmission; while numerous entities are contained within the zygote, 
it is only genes that underpin heritable similarity. Those other inherited entities 
are not causally inert in development, but instead they can be construed as gene 
products because genes play this instructional role in development. Whatever 
role these other entities play, they are realising genetic instructions of some sort. 
But this argument seems to be circular. The evolutionary developmental 
biologist‟s argument seems to be that because genes have a special role to play in 
development, this means other inherited entities can be construed as gene 
products or messengers carrying genetic information, thus allowing us to draw a 
distinction between units of inheritance and units of hereditary transmission. But 
the justification for the instructional role of genes stemmed from the fact they 
were considered to have a unique role as units of inheritance. We can ignore 
other inherited entities as distinct units of hereditary transmission because genes 
are privileged in development, but genes are supposed to be privileged because 
only they are inherited. In the absence of any other argument for why genes 
alone should be considered to have an instructional role in development, the 
distinction between those things that are merely units of inheritance, and those 
things that are also units of hereditary transmission seems unwarranted.  
If more than DNA underpins heritable similarity, we undermine the special 
status of the gene as the bearer of semantic information and thus the gene‟s status 
as either the ultimate driver of, or as playing a privileged role in, development. If 
an entity becomes a bearer of semantic information because it was selected for, 
then either everything that has a history of being selected for becomes a bearer of 
semantic information, or we ought to abandon the concept altogether and attempt 
to justify prioritising genes in some other way (Sterelny et al. 1996; Sterelny & 
Griffiths 1999; Griffiths 2001; Godfrey-Smith 2008).  
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6. Conclusion 
Evo-devo has been responsible for some remarkable discoveries and, in 
eschewing the dichotomy outlined in chapter two, it has highlighted the 
important work developmental considerations can do for evolutionary theory. 
However, it faces difficulties in justifying the role it grants genes in development. 
I mentioned here that Gilbert (2003) argued that evo-devo had successfully 
occupied the territory developmental systems theorists had established for 
themselves. In the following chapter I will outline the developmental systems 
approach and demonstrate the ways in which it differs from evo-devo, and in 
doing so will deny Gilbert‟s assertion. In particular, evo-devo and evolutionary 
developmental biology differ in how the gene is understood, and given the 
difficulties discussed here with the evo-devo characterisation of the role of genes 
in development, this will stand in developmental systems theory‟s favour. 
Nonetheless, evo-devo has had some remarkable successes and I will argue that 
developmental systems theory can be enriched by attending to some of the work 
of evolutionary developmental biologists.  
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Chapter Four 
Developmental Systems Theory 
 
1. Introduction 
Developmental systems theory (DST), like evo-devo, attempts to bring 
developmental considerations back into evolutionary theory. However, as I will 
show here, it does so in a way quite different to evo-devo. There are two broad 
strands to DST. The first strand, what Dupré terms its “negative phase” (2008: 
174), casts a critical eye over the neo-Darwinian approaches to evolution and 
development. Those writing in the DST tradition have developed detailed 
critiques of many of the implicit and explicit assumptions in mainstream 
evolutionary biology, particularly those that have resulted in the neglect or 
mischaracterisation of development. The second, constructive strand is 
concerned with developing an alternative way to frame the relationship between 
development and evolution that avoids the problematic issues identified in the 
first strand. This second strand is often either misunderstood or overlooked. It is 
misunderstood when critics accuse DST of being unworkably holistic such that it 
is of no use to science. It is also misunderstood when critics accuse 
developmental systems theorists of arguing that genes are unimportant. Both of 
these misunderstandings will be addressed here. The constructive strand is also 
neglected, for instance, when Gilbert (2003) suggests that evo-devo has rendered 
DST irrelevant because evo-devo corrects the mistakes in neo-Darwinian biology 
and also does what DST calls for; namely, evo-devo is taking development 
seriously. Certainly, evo-devo goes some way to addressing the neglect of 
development but, as I argued in chapter three, evo-devo is not without its own 
problems. Rather than pitting evo-devo against DST, however, I will argue here 
that not only do evo-devo and DST have something to contribute to one another, 
but also that productive dialogue between the two is already taking place.  
 
2. Developmental Systems Theory 
Developmental systems theory offers a very different approach to development 
and evolution than that proposed by neo-Darwinists. Both DST and neo-
Darwinism are ultimately interested in answering the same question: how do we 
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explain the morphology, physiology and behaviour of organisms? However, they 
approach this question from very different angles. Chapters one and two detailed 
one ways in which neo-Darwinism allowed development to be neglected in 
evolutionary theory; outside of their role as a limiting factor in evolution, the 
details of development are irrelevant to the project of identifying and explaining 
adaptations and tracking gene frequencies on this account. This view stems from 
the two commitments of neo-Darwinism: the adaptationist programme and the 
gene as the unit of inheritance. If evolution is what is to be explained, and 
development is an effect of evolution, development can be viewed as lying 
outside of the research concerns of neo-Darwinism. Evo-devo, discussed in 
chapter three, emphasises the role of development as a causal factor in evolution, 
but remains tied to the idea that the gene is the unit of hereditary transmission. 
DST, on the other hand, rejects both commitments of neo-Darwinism. It adopts 
the co-constuctionist approach developed by Lewontin (1978, 2001) discussed in 
chapter two, and extends the notion of inheritance far beyond the gene. This 
leads to a very different model of development and evolution. In particular, by 
extending the notion of inheritance, there is no longer any justification for the 
privileging of the gene and the subsequent marginalisation of development. 
Tracking genes is no longer viewed as a short-hand way of tracking development 
and organisms. Instead, we must attend to development itself.  In this spirit, DST 
first asks how developmental outcomes are achieved, and then asks how these 
systems have evolved. By beginning with development, the developmental 
systems approach jettisons any commitment to the gene as the unique unit of 
inheritance or hereditary transmission. This allows developmental systems 
theorists to re-evaluate how we view developmental interactions. Finally, we can 
incorporate this new approach to development into a co-constructionist approach 
to evolution by natural selection.  
 
2.1 Extended Inheritance 
In chapter three I discussed the fact that though evolutionary developmental 
biologists do not assume that the organism inherits naked DNA, this is not taken 
to challenge the idea that genes are the sole unit of hereditary transmission, since 
other cellular entities are construed as products of the maternal genes. However, I 
argued that this argument is circular; non-genetic components of the zygote are 
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considered genetic products because genes have a privileged role in development, 
and genes have this privileged role in virtue of the fact that they are the sole unit 
of hereditary transmission. In the absence of any reason to view the gene as 
ontologically distinct from other developmental resources, the zygote must be 
viewed as containing many different entities that have been inherited and that are 
essential for development. For example, membranes surrounding the nucleus and 
cell are essential for development; membranes can only develop if there are older 
membranes to act as templates. Also, cell differentiation depends upon the 
cytoplasmic polarities in the zygote, and DNA transcription requires the 
chromatin marking system (Griffiths & Gray 2001: 195). The study of epigenetic 
inheritance – the inheritance of cellular entities beyond DNA – is in its early 
stages, but the results so far suggest that there is far more to inheritance than 
DNA. The developmental systems approach does not stop at the cell; many 
extracellular and even environmental resources for development can be 
considered part of the expanded inheritance of an organism. Many mammals 
require certain gut bacteria to allow them to digest plant cellulose and they 
inherit these bacteria through eating their mother‟s faeces. Rabbits not only 
receive essential gut bacteria, but also have their food preferences influenced this 
way. In humans, the mother‟s diet during breastfeeding appears to influence the 
food preferences of the infant (Jablonka & Lamb 2005: 163-164). Beyond this, 
organisms can inherit features of their environment too: nests and/or nesting sites, 
dams, social groups, educational systems, and so on. All of these things can be 
passed from parent to offspring and they will play a role in the development of 
the offspring. Indeed, these things ensure heritable similarity. A child can inherit 
its mother‟s love of carrot juice because this is what she drank while 
breastfeeding the child.  
Differences in the details of what is inherited can be acted on by selection. 
Some species of butterfly tend to lay their eggs on the same plant that their 
mother laid her eggs on (Jablonka & Lamb 2005: 190). If, in one generation, a 
butterfly lays her eggs on a different plant, her female offspring will also lay 
their eggs on this new plant. Thus it is possible to have variation within a 
population. Sometimes this variation may be adaptive. Perhaps this new plant 
offers better protection from predators – the eggs may be better camouflaged – or 
is a more nutritious foodstuff for the larvae.   
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Neo-Darwinists may argue that, for instance, the imprinting for food 
preferences or sites for future egg laying that occurs in offspring are underpinned 
by adaptations for such environmental responsiveness and can be understood as 
disjunctive genetic programmes responding to environmental inputs. DST does 
not suggest that, for instance, imprinting is only determined by the environmental 
stimulus in question. Indeed, this suggestion would run counter to the view of 
development inherent in DST. But what DST suggests is that these aspects of the 
environment, and the cellular entities mentioned above, may play a similar role 
in explaining heritable similarity as genetic material. Arguing that imprinting is 
ultimately a matter of a genetically underpinned adaptation begs the question. It 
presumes the priority of the genes. However, the special status of genes is 
dependent upon them being the sole unit of inheritance, the very issue at stake 
here.   
Sterelny et al. (1996) have attempted to combine the notion of an extended 
inheritance with neo-Darwinian biology. Their extended replicator approach, 
while broadening the scope of what is inherited (though not quite as broadly as 
DST), retains the basic structure of neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology. The 
class of replicators is broader than neo-Darwinian accounts typically 
acknowledge, but very little else has changed. Development remains merely the 
result of evolution and is thus largely irrelevant to evolution itself, so that 
tracking the changes in replicator frequencies will remain a good way to track 
evolutionary change. If such an account can be made to work, this would mean 
that neo-Darwinism could take on board the idea of DST‟s expanded inheritance 
without it threatening the coherence of the overall theory.  
However, there are limits to how well the extended replicator theory can 
capture the numerous forms of extended inheritance (Jablonka & Lamb 2005: 
375-376; Griffiths & Gray 2001: 196-197). The theory of extended replicators 
suggests we understand inheritance in terms of different “channels” or “systems” 
of inheritance. With this approach we would have a genetic channel of 
inheritance, an epigenetic channel of inheritance, a cultural channel of 
inheritance, and so on. Creating distinct channels of inheritance in this way fails 
to recognise several key features of development. I will outline these features 
first, and then discuss the problem they pose for any attempt to interpret the 
notion of extended inheritance from within the neo-Darwinian framework. 
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2.2 Development 
Oyama et al. (2001: 2) describe four themes that they take to be characteristic of 
development and that they suggest need to be reflected in any theory of evolution. 
These themes are: (1) the joint determination of every trait by multiple causes; (2) 
the context sensitivity and contingency of development; (3) development as a 
constructive process; (4) the distributed control in developmental systems. I will 
deal with each of these in turn. 
It is, in one sense, trivially true that every trait is the outcome of multiple 
causes. In chapter one I outlined several varieties of genetic determinism, the 
strongest of which maintained that nothing but genes were required for 
development. Such a position is held by no one in this debate. But although no 
one denies the fact that developmental outcomes have multiple causes, this can 
be largely neglected in evolutionary considerations while genes hold a privileged 
position in development. So while everyone acknowledges that a trait has 
multiple causes, genetic causes are more salient in development than non-genetic 
causes if genes are understood as embodying instructions for development. 
Because DST begins by trying to establish the nature of developing systems, and 
only then attempting to understand how developing systems could evolve, these 
aspects of development, previously considered true but irrelevant, instead 
become central. 
The context-sensitivity and contingency of development, DST‟s second 
theme, is also not controversial in a general sense; however, as I will discuss 
shortly, those approaches that focus on the gene as issuing instructions in 
development tend to recast this context sensitivity in terms of some inherent 
potential in genes. The developmental systems approach, rejecting this construal 
of the gene, suggests that in any given situation a developmental resource may 
play an important role in the development of a trait. However, the role of the 
developmental resource is determined by the context in which it appears. In 
another context the same resource may have a different effect or none at all. The 
overall state of the developmental system determines what developmental 
factors are important.  
Context sensitivity may, the neo-Darwinist argues, be handled by 
disjunctive genetic programmes. These disjunctive programmes contain 
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conditional rules: if X is present, follow developmental path A; if Y is present, 
follow developmental path B.
42
  There are two responses to this. The first is that 
although neo-Darwinism may, to some extent, be able to handle context-
sensitivity, it may not always be best placed to notice its occurrence. This is 
because it is often in attending to developmental details that we notice this 
context sensitivity. DST, by beginning with development, is primed to notice 
these cases. Neo-Darwinism, on the other hand, need only attend to 
developmental details when they obviously conflict with specific claims. But 
given that the neo-Darwinian approach does not provide any motivation to ask 
questions about development, such conflicting evidence may not be discovered. 
So, both neo-Darwinism and DST may agree that context sensitivity is a genuine 
feature of biological systems. But while DST has this built into its fabric, the 
neo-Darwinian approach either acknowledges context sensitivity on a more ad 
hoc basis, or simply overlooks it. Unlike the issue of the joint determination of 
developmental outcomes by multiple causes which neo-Darwinian theory sees 
as irrelevant, context sensitivity is not irrelevant to its project and thus the ease 
with which it may be overlooked is problematic.  
There are further problems with the neo-Darwinian response to context 
sensitivity. The disjunctive programme suggests that the different developmental 
outcomes the programme is associated with are determined by the programme 
responding in different ways to different inputs from its environment. That is, it 
suggests that in different contexts, the gene or genes behave differently (i.e. 
issue different instructions). However, this does not reflect the facts of the 
situation. A gene can behave identically at two different times – that is, it can 
continue to lead to the production of the same type of protein – but the effects of 
this gene activity have very different developmental outcomes. Morange (2000) 
uses the Notch gene to make this point. This gene is involved in two distinct 
processes at two different times. During early development, it is involved in 
lateral inhibition – an intercellular process whereby cell differentiation is 
influenced by the path taken by its neighbouring cells. Later on in development, 
the same gene is involved in the control of neurite growth in nerve cells. The 
Notch gene is involved in the production of the very same protein in both cases, 
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  See chapter one for a more detailed discussion of these disjunctive programmes. 
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and this protein is involved in the same basic cellular interactions in both cases. 
At this level, nothing has changed. And yet we have two different 
developmental outcomes at two different times. It is the state of the system in 
which this gene and its product are located that has changed. The role played by 
the Notch gene and its products in the two different processes – lateral inhibition 
and neurite growth – is not determined by anything intrinsic to the gene or its 
product, but rather is determined by the state of the system in which they are 
situated.
43
 The disjunctive programme takes our attention away from the 
biological reality of the situation by allowing us to assume that the different 
processes the Notch gene is involved in can be explained in terms of the gene 
receiving certain inputs and producing certain outputs. However, the change is 
not at this level of biological organisation. The disjunctive programme approach 
is inadequate for handling this kind of context sensitivity. The neo-Darwinian 
neglect of development means that issues of context sensitivity, although 
permitted through disjunctive programmes, may not come to light. Worse, 
disjunctive genetic programmes appear to be an inadequate explanation for 
context sensitivity. 
The third and fourth themes of DST – development as construction and 
distributed control – are closely related and I will discuss these ideas together. 
Central to the idea of development as construction and distributed control is the 
rejection of any form of preformationism. Preformationism was a theory 
developed in the seventeenth century and was committed to the idea that 
development involves a quantitative but not qualitative change (Pinto-Correia 
1997). Nicolaas von Hartsoeker‟s image of a tiny man curled up inside a sperm 
most famously illustrates the point, though this is a strong version of 
preformationism; others believed that the essential form of the organism was 
already present and just required some “assembly.” Whether this image was 
taken literally or not, it captures the basic commitment of preformationism; 
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 Recent work has gone so far as to question whether there really is any such thing as a gene, 
and a number of different concepts appear to have been conflated in this one term. At the very 
least, a good deal of developmental work appears to be required before anything like a protein 
can be produced, and this involves more than just DNA. See, for example, Moss (2004), Dupré 
(2005), Stotz et al. (2004) for more detailed discussion of these points. I will not address the 
complications that arise from this as they do not damage my argument here. On the contrary, it 
further undermines the claim that genes can be uniquely informational and that they precede 
development. 
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development involves growth but not any kind of qualitative change. The 
essential form of the organism was taken to be present in either the sperm if one 
was a spermist, or the egg if one was an ovist. On such a view, there was no need 
to explain how biological order came to be; it was always there. Preformationist 
theories do not tell us about development; rather, they deny the need for 
development. 
Authors in the DST tradition have argued that gene-centric theories such as 
neo-Darwinism are a new form of preformationism (e.g. Oyama 2000a; Oyama 
et al. 2001). What comes preformed on this account is genetic information. 
Certainly, there may be scope for some indeterminacy in outcome; given 
different environmental contexts, development may proceed in different ways. 
However, the routes development must take are already broadly determined by 
the genetic instructions. Biological order arises from the genetic instructions: 
 
Today we think of preformationism as an archaic relic of outmoded 
thought, and we snicker at the absurd idea that there are little people 
curled up in sperm or egg cells. But replacing curled-up people with 
curled-up blueprints or programs for people is not so different. That is, 
there is not much conceptual distance between aggression in the genes, 
on the one hand, and coded instructions for aggression in the genes, on 
the other. What is central to preformationist thought is not the literal 
presence of fully formed creatures in germ cells, but rather a way of 
thinking about development – development as revelation of preformed 
essence rather than as contingent series of constructive interactions, 
transformations, and emergences. It is a way of thinking that makes real 
development irrelevant because the basic “information,” or form, is 
there from the beginning, a legacy from our ancestors. (Oyama 2000b: 
136) 
 
DST rejects the idea that genes should be construed as containing programmes or 
instructions for development and does not assume one, or some set of, resources 
control or issue instructions for development: “the claim that development occurs 
because it is programmed to occur or because it has been selected by evolution is 
merely a promissory note redeemable against future developmental biology” 
114 
 
(Oyama et al. 2001: 4). Preformationist approaches suggest there is nothing of 
interest to investigate in development (at least from an evolutionary point of view) 
and so discourage lines of research.  
In fact, the context sensitivity of developmental resources suggests that 
trying to locate the source of control of development in terms of developmental 
resources is a mistake. Each resource plays a role in the developmental outcome, 
and the role each resource plays is determined by the other resources involved in, 
and by the current state of, the system. Thus, the correct level of description to 
talk about control is at the level of the system itself rather than in anything like 
genetic instructions. The notion of the system controlling development is 
different in several respects to the idea that genes control development. Unlike 
the control that genes have over development in the neo-Darwinian picture, 
where the causal arrow moves in one direction – from genes to the rest of the 
developmental system – on the DST account the arrow points in multiple 
directions. The system exerts control over its component parts, but the system 
itself emerges from the interactions of its component parts. If control of 
development is most usefully located at the level of the system, and that system 
itself is to be understood as being composed of a “vast and heterogeneous 
assembly of interactants” that are “system-dependent and change over time” 
(Oyama et al. 2001: 5), the route development will is not “represented” in any 
resource prior to its realisation. What this means is that there is not a 
predetermined path (or set of paths) available for development to be pushed 
down. Rather, developmental systems theorists argue, development occurs 
because developmental resources interact with one another in ways typical given 
their context and do not require instructions. This leads to the conclusion that 
development is a process of construction or an “ad hoc” process (Moss 2004). 
 
2.3 Evolution as Construction 
DST also includes a commitment to evolution as a process of construction. DST 
pays due heed to the kinds of phenomena raised by Lewontin (1978, 2001) that I 
discussed in chapter two. The niche construction account developed by Lewontin, 
and more recently expanded upon by Odling-Smee et al. (2003), drew attention 
to the fact that the particular selection pressures faced by an organism are not just 
given, but are in fact the result of the interaction between the organism and its 
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environment. The organism constructs its niche; it makes certain aspects of the 
physical environment relevant to it, and in doing so generates the selection 
pressures it is subject to. Natural selection then involves looping effects as a 
result of the activity of organisms in a population turning some parts of the 
physical environment into their niche, while at the same time the niches provide 
selection pressures altering the population. But although there is much that is 
right in the niche construction account, DST does not incorporate it wholesale. 
The first reason for this is that Odling-Smee et al.‟s approach relies on a 
dichotomous account of inheritance which shares similarities with Sterelny et 
al.‟s (1996) extended replicator approach discussed above (Griffiths & Gray 
2001). Both accounts are based on the idea of distinct streams of inheritance. In 
Odling-Smee et al.‟s account there are two streams of inheritance: the genetic 
and the environmental. Bearing in mind the context sensitivity of development, 
any inherited entity will have its effects determined by the other entities being 
inherited, and by the larger collection of developmental resources available for 
any individual developmental system. This means that it might not always be 
best to think of inheritance in terms of individual entities or distinct channels of 
inheritance, as this will tend to obscure the interactions between them. As an 
example, Sterelny (2001; Sterelny et al. 1996) suggests we conceptualise 
inheritance such that we have a genetic system and an epigenetic system. 
However, the chromatin marking system, one part of the epigenetic inheritance 
channel or system, operates by modifying the pattern of gene expression 
(Sterelny & Griffiths 1999; Jablonka & Lamb 2005). The effects of each of these 
“channels” cannot be fully understood separately from one another. For example, 
the role the genes play and the role the chromatin marking system plays can only 
be determined by the overall system in which they are located. Separate channels 
of inheritance may be taken to imply that they each contribute to developmental 
outcomes additively and that each channel has some degree of independence 
from the others. This is something that cannot be assumed a priori. DST rejects 
any formulation which may make it easier to downplay this context sensitivity: 
“a central theme of the DST research tradition has been that distinctions between 
classes of developmental resource should be fluid and justified by particular 
research interests, rather than built into the basic framework of biological 
thought” (Griffiths & Gray 2001: 206). Because development is context sensitive, 
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whatever is inherited in one such channel will have its affects in part determined 
by what is inherited via other channels. Inheritance itself is developmental. It is 
the causal interactions between the elements of the system that underpin heritable 
similarity; intrinsic properties of inherited entities alone will not be enough to 
explain heritable similarity. Once we recognise this, the replicator/interactor 
distinction becomes less convincing. Recall that interactors were those things 
involved in causal interactions with the world, while replicators were merely 
copied.
44
 If what is “replicated” includes developmental processes, this blurs the 
distinction between replicator and interactor. Further, what persists from one 
generation to the next must first be constructed. Rather than the “replicator” 
preceding development, it is the product of development. And because it is the 
entire system that is implicated in any developmental outcome, DST views the 
entire developmental system as the replicator in evolution, thus integrating 
interactor with replicator.  
Like neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory more generally, Sterelny et al.‟s 
(1996) extended replicator approach relies on a distinction between replicators 
and interactors. But once an extended inheritance is acknowledged, as well as the 
fact that any developmental resource has its affects determined in part by the 
context it finds itself in, the replicator/interactor distinction breaks down and the 
extended replicator approach seems less convincing. Note that this should not be 
confused with Hull‟s argument, outlined in chapter one, that genes are both 
replicators and interactors. Genes act as replicators and interactors in different 
contexts on Hull‟s account. During meiosis and mitosis, the gene acts as a 
replicator; however, during protein production (and the programming of 
development more generally) genes act as interactors. Although these processes 
are causally related (programming development is supposed to increase the 
chances of replication), replication and interaction are two distinct processes on 
the neo-Darwinian approach. Proponents of DST, on the other hand, suggest that 
the replicator is the product of development and that the “replicator” is the entire 
developmental system. Rather than the replicator enabling interaction (via 
programming development), it is interaction that constitutes the replicator. Thus 
the dichotomy between interactor/replicator is rejected. 
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 See chapter one for a more detailed discuss of the replicator/interactor distinction. 
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The second distinction that proponents of DST draw between themselves 
and niche constructionists such as Odling-Smee et al. (2003) concerns another 
dichotomy inherent in this approach; namely, evolution by natural selection 
proceeds as a result of two causal processes. In the first, the organism alters its 
environment, and in the second, the environment alters the organism (Griffiths & 
Gray 2001: 206). While Lewontin argues that while neither organism nor niche 
can be understood without the other on this niche constructionist account, there 
are nonetheless two distinct things being considered; a boundary is maintained 
between organism and environment. DST changes the focus from organisms to 
developmental systems, which may or may not coincide with one another: “the 
developmental system is not two things, but one, albeit one that can be divided 
up in many ways for different theoretical purposes” (Griffiths & Gray 2001: 206). 
There may be a particular research question that necessitates taking the skin of 
the organism as a boundary in order to make the question tractable, and this is 
perfectly compatible with DST. Further, in a specific context, some proposed 
boundary might in fact be important. This does not conflict with DST either. 
However, what proponents of DST reject is having firm boundaries picked out in 
advance of any investigation into a particular biological phenomenon. The 
boundary between organism and environment can be less important than is often 
thought, and being committed to this boundary from the start can allow us to 
overlook important instances where this boundary is irrelevant, such as in 
extended inheritance. Given this, talking in terms of developmental systems, 
which can extend into the environment, engenders no preconceptions about what 
does and does not constitute them. In not specifying a boundary to the 
developmental system in anything other than general terms, this means that 
questions about how resources interact in development cannot be assumed to be 
answered, but instead must be investigated. Nonetheless, Griffiths and Gray 
argue that the niche construction model is essentially correct in its emphasis on 
the fact that environments are not given, but are made relevant by developmental 
systems and, further, they argue that the models designed by Odling-Smee et al. 
ought to be used, but used “tactically” (2001: 206). That is, we may draw a 
boundary at the skin of the organism (or indeed somewhere else) if this allows us 
to address our research question, and in some contexts this boundary may indeed 
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be important, but we should not grant this boundary any weight in broader 
theoretical considerations.
45
 
 
3. Holism  
The fact that DST allows, in principle, a great many things to be inherited and 
constitute a developmental system has led to worries that it is an unworkable 
approach for biologists to adopt. The concern is that it advocates a holism that 
cannot be made compatible with empirical investigation. However, such a 
concern is unfounded. DST is holistic, but not methodologically so. Proponents 
of DST do not suggest a change in the way experiments are performed, for 
instance; rather, they suggest further experiments. As already noted, it is entirely 
compatible with DST to bracket certain issues for the purposes of designing 
experiments. For instance, one can treat certain features of the developmental 
system as background conditions in order to establish a given causal relation. 
Knockout experiments are consonant with DST, so long as the fundamental 
principles of DST are kept in mind. How a given developmental outcome was 
achieved has not been fully understood just because a relevant gene has been 
identified. How that gene interacts with those “background conditions” is equally 
pertinent. Further experiments could be performed by making the genes part of 
the background conditions, and varying some other developmental resource. 
Methodologically then, fears of holism are misplaced.
46
  
A different worry about holism might stem from the fact that theories of 
natural selection seem to require discrete entities to form the basic units of the 
theory: “the sorts of things that can be counted, that… have clear boundaries and 
that… do not overlap so much that they cannot be distinguished from one 
another” (Griffiths & Gray 2001: 209). DST blurs the line between organism and 
environment. The developmental system will not be identical to our standard 
ideas of an organism; it will frequently extend beyond the skin of the organism to 
incorporate developmental resources traditionally considered “environmental.” 
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 This point suggests that Keller‟s (2001) worry that DST may lead to an elision of the body 
may be unwarranted here. DST does not preclude the possibility that the skin of the organism 
might be an important boundary in some contexts. Rather, the issue here is not to decide in 
advance what those contexts will be. 
 
46
 A good many of the contributors in Oyama et al. (2001) discuss DST-inspired scientific 
research demonstrating that this framework does not preclude practical research. 
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Further, the developmental system includes many more things than have 
typically been considered relevant for evolution. Many resources will play a role 
in the reconstruction of a life cycle and some of these developmental resources 
and interactions will be entirely unique to the individual developmental system, 
such as new languages, novel food stuff, medicines and so on. Such resources 
and interactions may be so entirely unique to an individual life cycle that they 
would seem to have no bearing on evolutionary questions. Given all this, how 
can we make principled distinctions in order to pick out fundamental units for 
DST?  
Developmental systems theorists respond to this worry by making a 
distinction between a developmental system and an evolutionary developmental 
system. When thinking in terms of evolution we can abstract away from the 
unique details of individual developmental systems to construct evolutionary 
developmental systems (Griffiths & Gray 2001). These systems are constituted 
by all those resources, and the interactions between them, that reliably recur in 
each generation of a lineage and that ensure that the normal life cycle is reliably 
reconstructed.  
Given that many populations are polymorphic – that is, have more than one 
form typical of the population (for example, sexual dimorphism and seasonal 
colour morphs in some butterfly species) – the evolutionary developmental 
system must account for the multiple phenotypes that constitute the lineage. This 
is an issue common to all evolutionary theories; variation within the population is 
an essential component for natural selection and thus descriptions of the lineages 
should reflect this. DST does this by incorporating everything required to 
reconstruct a normal life cycle, or the normal life cycles, into the evolutionary 
developmental system for that lineage. The evolutionary developmental system is, 
then, a description of the lineage at a particular time.  
DST refers to the organism-like entities in its theory as “life cycles.” The 
life cycle is the product of the developmental system. If developmental systems 
extend beyond the skin, how do we individuate life cycles? There are many 
biological processes that appear cyclical and involve the “repeated assemblies” 
of developmental resources; which of these repeated assemblies should be 
designated as a life cycle and which are merely components of a life cycle? A 
cell has its own “life cycle,” as do the leaves of trees (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 
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209). Symbiotic relationships may be particularly problematic; on a DST account, 
are there two life cycles in a symbiotic relationship, or just one? Griffiths and 
Gray suggest that if individual cycles can “give rise to new cycles of itself that 
are not coupled to the other member of the symbiosis in the characteristic way” 
then such cycles constitute distinct life cycles. Facultative symbiotic 
relationships are of this sort. For example, if a bird population commonly eats a 
fruit from a tree and so disperses its seeds, both bird and tree might continue 
relatively unharmed without one another if, for instance, there were other species 
that dispersed the tree‟s seeds, and other sources of food for the bird population. 
On the other hand, some cycles may no longer be able to replicate themselves in 
isolation from their symbiotic partners, in which case the cycles would be sub-
cycles of a larger life cycle. These are obligate symbiotic relationships. For 
instance, the eukaryotic cell is thought to have evolved from a symbiotic 
relationship between what became the cell nucleus and the cell organelles that 
became strongly obligate. While at some point each lineage may have been able 
to extract itself from the symbiosis, it is now contingently irreversible. 
“Contingent irreversibility” is a term coined by Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 
(1995: 9) and utilised by Griffiths and Gray (2001) to capture the sense in which, 
while technically possible, there are certain evolutionary paths that are so 
unlikely and difficult, we may disregard them. Thus, two lineages that become so 
intricately intertwined in a symbiotic relationship that they are contingently 
irreversible can be regarded as having become a single lineage. In each 
generation of this lineage, the symbionts constitute a single life cycle or 
developmental system. Life cycles are then those things that can reconstruct 
themselves in each generation. This allows us to pick out those things that are 
part of the evolutionary developmental system and those things that are not. Any 
resource which contributes to the developmental system that produces a life 
cycle, and which persists because of its contribution to that lineage of life cycles, 
is a part of the evolutionary developmental system.  
Not all developmental resources will have the same life span as the life 
cycle. A developmental resource may have a different periodicity to the life cycle, 
as we might expect if they are to be inherited by offspring. Some developmental 
resources may appear to outlive any individual life cycle, for example, a beaver 
dam may persist long after the beavers that originally constructed it have died. 
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Other developmental resources, such as sun light and gravity, will not depend on 
the life cycle for their persistence. But a niche that is “transmitted” vertically 
(parent-to-offspring) will still have to be maintained by each generation. The 
offspring will depend on the niche, and the niche will depend on the offspring. 
Indeed, it is this high degree of mutual dependence that makes the organism-
niche pairing better considered as a single developmental system. In at least 
some cases, it may be misleading to talk about niches being transmitted. Rather, 
each generation inherits certain resources which the next generation must use 
reconstruct, or at least actively maintain, the niche. A dam, for instance, may 
only persist because the next generation continue to maintain it. Offspring life 
cycles may inherit just enough to reconstruct the complex relations between the 
skin-bound organism and its ecological niche. This reconstruction is the 
construction or the development of the life cycle. So although some aspect of 
what we traditionally call the environment may seem to outlast the organism, the 
persistence of the resource is not really persistence at all. Rather the resource is 
reconstructed, or continually maintained, by each generation.  
Sunlight and gravity, unlike dams, do not have to be maintained. But recall 
Lewontin‟s (1978, 2001) point in chapter two that a niche is not just given but is 
constructed; the organism or developmental system makes certain aspects of the 
environment relevant. So although, for instance, sunlight is not itself the result of 
what Godfrey-Smith (1996) calls “causal construction,” its role in the 
developmental system comes about as a result of “constitutive construction.” 
And in each generation the relationship between any persistent resource such as 
sunlight or gravity must be constructed anew. 
Natural selection, on the adaptationist approach, seems to require 
something to which organisms can be more or less suited. The worry then is that 
given that developmental systems extend out into the environment, 
developmental systems subsume anything that might have been considered to 
generate selection pressures. That is, anything that causally interacts with the 
organism, and does the same for the offspring of that organism, and indeed for 
many generations in that lineage, seems to be a good candidate for being 
considered part of the developmental system of each generation: 
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Because the focus is on how the complete life cycle is achieved, 
everything needed for that life cycle is assumed to be present. So 
anything that impinges on the process is an element of the system itself. 
It is this that creates the impression that all change in the system itself 
must be endogenously driven and creates the apparent puzzle about the 
source of selective pressures. (Griffiths & Gray 2001: 207) 
 
DST does not wish to abandon the mechanism of natural selection, so does this 
imply that selection pressures are generated from within developmental systems? 
Griffiths and Gray (2001) suggest that this worry about endogenous selection 
pressures can be overcome. This first move is to shift focus away from the 
evolutionary developmental system, which is a description of the lineage, and 
onto populations of individual developmental systems. There will be some 
variation between individuals within a population. Resources normally inherited 
by offspring may be missing or scarce because parents did not generate the 
resources, the wider population did not generate the resources, or because 
resources independent of the activities of the population (persistent resources) are 
rare. Also, variation may occur because developmental systems incorporate new 
resources which result in new developmental outcomes. All these situations will 
lead to different developmental outcomes and thus variation within the 
population. This explains variation; the next step is differential reproduction. 
While neo-Darwinism explains differential variation as the result of selection 
pressures from an immovable environment, DST incorporates the idea of 
differential reproduction based on better or worse interactions between 
developmental resources within any individual developmental system: 
 
One variant does better than another, not because of a correspondence 
between it and some preexisting environmental feature, but because the 
life cycle that includes interaction with that feature has a greater 
capacity to replicate itself than the life cycle that lacks that interaction. 
(Griffiths & Gray 1994: 300) 
 
At the most extreme end, developmental systems that lack essential resources die 
out as they will be incapable of successfully reconstructing their own life cycle. 
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Moving up from this point, variation in developmental resources will lead to 
developmental systems replicating with more or less success. The least 
successful developmental systems die out because they do not replicate or 
because they replicate at rates so small compared to other developmental systems 
that they are soon swamped by the more successful systems. New developmental 
resources may also appear which allow the developmental system to cope better 
when other resources are rarer and thus to replicate at higher rates. 
Developmental systems may compete for the same resources. Because of facts 
about the organisation of the developmental systems involved, some may be 
more efficient at securing the resource, or require less of it to survive, and thus 
will be more or less capable of replicating themselves. These resources do not 
provide external selection pressures; they are part of the developmental systems 
involved.  
 A final worry that Sterelny (2001) raises concerns expanded inheritance. 
Although a good deal of what is inherited by offspring comes from their parents, 
the wide sense of inheritance advocated by developmental systems theorists also 
includes developmental resources that can be inherited from other, non-parental 
sources. Since beaver dams are the work of an entire lodge, they appear to fall 
into this category. Parents do not pass beaver dams to their offspring. At best, 
one generation of beavers transmits dams to the next, but this picture if 
complicated by the fact that generations commonly overlap. This kind of 
horizontal transmission is problematic and Sterelny has suggested that this 
undermines any attempt to define evolutionary developmental systems or the life 
cycles they produce: “if this is transmission at all, it is diffuse and development 
is holistic” (2001: 344).47 The objection here is that diffuse inheritance rules out 
the possibility of cumulative selection based on differences between individual 
life cycles; there will be no heritable variation that can be explained by inheriting 
the shared resource. Griffiths and Gray have suggested two possible responses to 
this. The first is that, although diffuse transmission will not provide a heritable 
basis for cumulative selection processes, “changes in ecological and cultural 
                                                 
47
 Sterelny et al.‟s (1996) extended replicator approach adopts a more limited form of 
extended inheritance than that employed by developmental systems theorists. The extended 
replicator approach restricts what can be inherited to only those things that are inherited 
vertically. 
124 
 
inheritance… could play important evolutionary roles both in opening up new 
sets of adaptive possibilities and by facilitating the dynamics of evolutionary 
change” (2001: 202). Another point can be added here. Although the shared 
resource may be available to all developmental systems in the population, not all 
developmental systems will interact with this resource in the same way. The role 
of a developmental resource is determined by the overall state of the 
developmental system, and there will be variation in the developmental systems 
within a population. A developmental system may make better or worse use of a 
resource from the point of view of selection. While the resource itself is not the 
difference maker which explains the differential fitness within the population, the 
entire system, including the shared resource, explains why one developmental 
system survives and reproduces with more success than another.  
Griffiths and Gray‟s (2001) second response to this worry invokes the idea 
of trait group selection as developed by Sober and Wilson (1998). A trait group 
is one in which all members possess a similar trait. Such groups may be long 
lasting, fleeting, or anything in between. Trait group selection occurs when there 
is a strong correlation between possessing a given trait, and belonging to a group 
of individuals with the same trait. Beavers will tend to form groups with other 
dam-building beavers. Organisms that engage in reciprocal and kin altruism tend 
to group together. The population is structured in such a way that interactions 
between organisms are biased; some organisms are likely to spend a good deal of 
time together, others are unlikely to do so. This gives groups a degree of 
coherence. Organisms in one trait group can have a selective advantage over 
conspecifics in other trait groups in virtue of the fact that they are in the same 
trait group. Sober and Wilson (1998) are particularly concerned with the 
evolution of altruism in their work. They suggest that in a population containing 
both altruists and free loaders, altruism need not be undermined by selection for 
free loaders as is often assumed, if the population is structured so that it contains 
smaller, interacting groups.
48
 Altruists will do badly in groups that have either a 
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 The worry here is that altruists will tend to be worse off than free loaders as altruists will 
share their resources with others, while free loaders will take resources from altruists, while 
keeping all their resources to themselves. In this way, the argument goes, a population of altruists 
will be eventually displaced by free loaders. This has led to what is known as “the problem of 
altruism.” Despite the fact that altruism does not look like it should exist, nonetheless acts of 
altruism are witnessed in the natural world. Examples include the alarm call of the vervet monkey 
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majority or equal number of free loaders, and the free loaders will be favoured by 
selection. However, although the free loaders will do well relative to the altruists 
where they comprise at least half of the group, in majority altruist groups the 
situation is different. In these groups, both altruists and free loaders do better 
than the free loaders in the free loader groups. But because altruists make up the 
majority of the most successful groups, they survive and reproduce in such a way 
so as to dominate within the larger population. So although some altruists do 
worse than some free loaders in the population, ultimately altruists are favoured 
by selection in this sort of scenario. It is, to use Hull‟s (1980) terminology, the 
group that is the interactor in these sorts of situations. Selection at the individual 
level may often favour the freeloaders, but groups composed primarily of 
altruists will do much better than groups composed primarily of free loaders. 
Thus, if there is some correlation between possessing a particular trait and 
belonging to a certain group (so that altruists tend to group with other altruists), 
there could be cumulative selection for altruistic traits. Dam building and other 
forms of diffuse inheritance are forms of altruistic behaviour on the part of one 
generation to the advantage of the next, or even to the advantage of other 
members of the same generation. Every time a beaver contributes towards 
building the dam, all the members of the lodge are better off. Similarly, 
organisms that engage in kin and reciprocal altruism ensure organisms other than 
themselves benefit from their behaviour. This can allow the evolution of traits in 
organisms or developmental systems as a result of selection acting at the level of 
the group. Thus diffuse inheritance need not undermine evolution by natural 
selection.  
What does all this mean for the developmental system and the life cycle? 
Sterelny (2001) worried that the extended inheritance promoted by DST meant 
that we would not be able to distinguish the fundamental units (lineages, 
individuals, and so on) for an evolutionary theory. This problem does not arise 
                                                                                                                                    
which alerts conspecifics to danger, but puts the individual who raises the alarm at increased risk, 
or the worker bees who forego their own chances of reproduction in order to further the chances 
of the queen reproducing successfully. Gene selectionists provide one response to this apparent 
dilemma (e.g. Dawkins 1989: 88-93). Genes, understood as acting to ensure their own 
replication, will programme development such that the organism will sacrifice itself if this will 
increase the chance that copies of that gene in relatives will be replicated. See chapter five for 
further discussion. 
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from all instances of extended inheritance, just to those that do not meet the 
vertical transmission criteria. However, this is only a problem if we are 
committed to a model of natural selection which allows it to act at only one level. 
Gene selectionist accounts are often like this; genes are the units of selection, and 
group selection, if acknowledged at all, plays a very minor role in evolution and 
cannot be the basis for complex adaptations (Lloyd 2005). But DST adopts a 
hierarchical model of natural selection whereby selection can act on many 
different levels: at the level of trait groups, at the level of life cycles, at the level 
of the gene, and at many other levels in between (Griffiths & Gray 2001: 210).
49
 
The possibility of trait group selection means that there can be natural selection 
where inheritance is more diffuse. And even if what is inherited cannot form the 
basis for cumulative selection, it can nonetheless play a role in an evolutionary 
trajectory. In chapter six I will discuss further ways in which, even when there is 
a high degree of horizontal transmission, this need not preclude the possibility of 
natural selection.   
 
4. Evo-Devo and DST 
In chapter three I mentioned Gilbert‟s (2003: 349) claim that DST faces its 
biggest threat from evo-devo. He argues that while DST has offered some useful 
insights into biological phenomena, and while many of these insights have found 
their way into evo-devo research, evo-devo looks set to take over the niche that 
developmental systems theory has carved out for itself. Prior to evo-devo, DST 
played an important role in calling attention to the otherwise neglected role of 
development in evolutionary biology. However, Gilbert argues that given evo-
devo has put development back in the picture, and done so in the lab rather than 
from “the armchairs of philosophy” (Robert et al. 2001: 958), evo-devo stands to 
make DST largely irrelevant. Essentially, Gilbert appears to be arguing that evo-
devo does what DST does, but better; it has brought developmental 
considerations into work in the lab and this has led to productive research 
programmes. However, Gilbert‟s argument largely hinges on the extent to which 
evo-devo and DST resemble one another in their theoretical commitments, and it 
is not clear that they do. If DST represents a distinct view of evolution and 
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 See chapter one for a discussion of the hierarchical model of selection. 
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development to that on offer from evo-devo, then evo-devo does not threaten to 
render DST irrelevant. Here I will argue that evo-devo neither takes over the 
conceptual space occupied by DST, nor offers a better way to understand 
evolution and biology.  
 There are a variety of grounds on which evo-devo and DST differ. Evo-
devo, as discussed in more detail in chapter three, is committed to the gene as the 
unit of hereditary transmission, whereas DST adopts a very broad understanding 
of what secures heritable similarity. As I argued in chapter three, the claim that 
the gene is the sole unit of hereditary transmission appears circular once it is 
acknowledged that a good deal more than genes are required for any 
developmental outcome, an uncontentious claim in evo-devo. DST rejects any 
privileged role for genes, whereas, at least on mainstream versions of evo-devo, 
the gene remains importantly distinct from other resources. In Gilbert‟s account, 
this is because the gene provides specificity to developmental interactions:  
 
DST has, generally, made the error of not assigning instructive or 
permissive influences in the interactions. To most of the developmental 
systems theorists, all the participants are on the same informational level. 
In this way, the genome is just one other participant, just as are cells or 
the environment… the specificity of the reaction (that it is a jaw that 
forms and not an arm; that it is a salamander jaw that forms and not a 
frog jaw) has to come from somewhere, and that is often a property of 
the genome… Instructive partners provide specificity to the reaction, 
whereas permissive partners are necessary, but do not provide 
specificity… The gene has to be given its proper respect. (Gilbert 2003: 
349-350). 
 
Gilbert acknowledges, however, that it is not always the gene that provides 
specificity – sometimes it may be an environmental factor. He cites the sex 
determination of turtles based on nest temperature as an example of a non-
genetic resource providing specificity (2003: 350). The resources that provide 
specificity here seem to be the difference makers in development against a 
background that is taken to be invariant. DST does not deny the importance of 
these resources, it merely cautions against assuming that there is something 
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inherent in these resources which means that, should the context change, the 
resources will play the same role. Nest temperature, genes, and any other 
developmental resource may be construed as difference makers only in the 
context of those “permissive” resources. Elsewhere they may have a different 
effect or none at all. DST does not entail viewing all developmental resources as 
contributing in exactly the same way to every developmental interaction. 
Different resources play different roles in specific developmental processes. 
What the DST proponent argues is that we should not prioritise a particular 
developmental resource in a general sense. As Gilbert notes, genes may be 
“instructive” in some scenarios (sex determination in mammals), and 
“permissive” in others (sex determination in turtles and some other reptiles). 
What the developmental systems perspective seeks to prevent is a neglect of the 
importance of the “permissive” factors in enabling the “instructive” resource to 
have the kind of effect it does. The contingent nature of the role played by any 
individual developmental resource – the degree to which it depends on its context 
within the developmental system – should always be remembered. Further, the 
acknowledgement in Gilbert‟s own account of the degree to which context 
matters – sometimes it is the gene that specifies, sometimes it is the environment 
– suggests that the developmental systems approach is merely foregrounding an 
uncontentious aspect of development. DST, by denying the privileging of the 
gene, does not amount to the claim that all developmental resources are the same. 
Many resources will have an entirely unique role to play. But a unique role is not 
the same as a privileged role. The developmental systems perspective attempts to 
ensure that this conflation of unique and ontologically distinct does not occur.  
 Evo-devo has done a good deal of important work in identifying semi-
autonomous aspects of the developmental system that can act as levels of 
selection. This work will benefit DST by drawing attention to some of the levels 
at which selection might work, allowing the development of a more fine-grained 
hierarchical model of selection. Equally, DST can bring something to the study 
of modularity. Griffiths and Gray note that, by incorporating developmental 
systems considerations, we might identify modules in places that might 
otherwise have been neglected because they breached the skin boundary: “there 
is no reason to think that extended forms of inheritance such as symbiont 
transmission or cultural traditions will be any less modular in their 
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developmental consequences than genetic factors” and, given this, “the range of 
phenomena that can and should be given selectionist explanations is considerably 
increased” (2001: 203). Further, the attention to context sensitivity intrinsic to 
the developmental systems approach will be important here. That certain 
developmental processes or structures can appear semi-autonomous is in fact the 
result of context dependence. When we identify modular structures or processes, 
what we have identified is a process or structure that is not significantly 
impinged upon by other structures or processes in that particular type of 
developmental system. We cannot assume that the same developmental resources 
in a different developmental system will result in the same quasi-independent 
processes occurring or the same structure developing. In chapter three I discussed 
Pax6, a type of gene found in a wide variety of organisms, which appears to play 
a role in (among other things) eye development. This gene has a similar effect in 
a wide variety of circumstances. For example, Pax6 from Drosophila was 
transplanted into a frog and induced an ectopic eye (Burian 2005: 252). 
Modularity can exist at any level of biological organisation and the section of 
DNA, or the genome more broadly, that we might identify as Pax6 looks like a 
good example of a semi-autonomous aspect of the developmental system. 
However, it is important to note that Pax6 does not always have the effect of 
initiating eye development. Pax6 will induce eye development in a number of 
different places in a mouse. However, in the pancreas, although Pax6 is active (it 
produces, or contributes to the production of, a protein), it does not lead to the 
development of an ectopic eye: 
 
What switches on the cascade that makes the eye or that produces 
pancreatic proteins is a group of interacting signal-transduction modules 
hooked into the right context. The multiple modules required to initiate 
the different processes are composed not only of genes but also their 
own gene products and a series of additional proteins that must interact 
correctly, with each other and with the nucleotide sequences that 
respond to the signals. (Burian 2005: 252) 
 
 The developmental systems perspective focuses our attention on the fact 
that although some developmental resources may seem to have the same effect in 
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a wide variety of situations, this does not entail that the resource is entirely 
responsible for those effects. Often, the developmental resource is situated in a 
broader developmental system that makes possible the particular contribution of 
the developmental resource in question. Modularity may well be an important 
feature of developmental systems which has permitted evolution, but we must be 
cautious not to create a new set of boundaries between individual modules and 
the rest of the developmental system. That is, we need to bear in mind that any 
processes or structures that appear semi-autonomous do so in part because of the 
context in which they appear, rather than exclusively as the result of any inherent 
properties they might possess.  
 Although Gilbert has pitched evo-devo against DST, such a move seems 
unnecessary. Rather, argue Griffiths and Gray, both have something to offer the 
other:  
 
… we believe that [evo-devo] and DST are essentially complementary. 
DST does not provide a theory of phenotypic integration and modular 
evolution, but rather stands in need of one, and [evo-devo] is beginning 
to supply such a theory (Griffiths and Gray 2004). Conversely, nothing 
in the fundamental inspiration of [evo-devo] precludes it embracing a 
wider conception of the developmental system, not as emerging from 
interactions between genes, but as emerging from interactions between 
the whole matrix of resources that are required for development. (2005: 
423) 
 
Indeed, Gilbert has written about the need for the work of ecological 
developmental biologists (developmental biology which attends to the important 
role of the environment in development) to be heeded by evolutionary 
developmental biologists. At times, Gilbert‟s message seems particularly close to 
DST: 
 
Experimental isolation of the embryo from “outside” influences during 
analyses of developmental mechanisms has proven a useful and 
powerful approach; the problem is that it excludes a priori the 
environment itself as a contributor to or influence on development... Our 
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“self” turns out to be a permeable rather than a discrete entity… the 
processes that generated our adult form themselves arose from 
interactions between us and our environment… Environmentally 
dependent development also calls into question our epistemology as 
developmental biologists… Studies of ecological developmental biology 
demonstrate that this internalist approach, although powerful, is 
incomplete. (Gilbert & Bolker 2003: 6-7) 
 
Gilbert shares a similar aim to DST; both wish to integrate ecological 
considerations into developmental considerations. Indeed, a special issue of 
Evolution and Development on ecological developmental biology edited by 
Gilbert and Bolker (2003) included a contribution from H. Fred Nijhout who 
works in the DST tradition (see, for example, Nijhout 2001). Evo-devo and DST 
do not compete for the same space, but rather they are adding to each other in 
productive ways. This should also serve as a further example against claims that 
DST is either unworkably holistic, or has nothing to say to biology as it is 
practiced.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Critics of DST speak of an unworkable holism implied by the theory or of its 
unsuitability for scientists in the lab or field. Collaboration with evolutionary 
developmental biologists offers just one indication of the wrong headedness of 
this line of thought.
50
 The developmental systems perspective offers the best way 
to approach the integration of development and evolution in that it does not rely 
on an unsupported preformationism about genes. The developmental systems 
perspective takes some relatively uncontroversial positions – developmental 
outcomes require more than genes, context matters in development – and 
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 Godfrey-Smith (2001b) has argued that as well as providing a framework for empirical 
research, DST has a second role as a “philosophy of nature” which “comes after empirical 
science and tries to redescribe structures in the world that have already been described by the 
sciences” (Godfrey-Smith 2001b: 284). He is quick to point out that these two roles are not 
always distinct, and that each one may influence the other. A philosophy of nature is not as 
constricted as a scientific research programme; although closely informed by science, it can for 
instance embrace holism and reject some of the language and interpretations used by scientists. 
This sort of activity can help with negotiating issues concerning science and society more 
broadly: “the scientific ideas should be fed into such discussions in a philosophically processed 
form, not in the raw language of science” (2001b: 284). 
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combines these with claims about extended inheritance. The result is a model of 
development and evolution that differs significantly from that presented by neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory. Though both agree on the importance of natural 
selection, DST eschews the overwhelming focus on a one-way line of influence 
from environment to organism, and incorporates the idea of evolution by natural 
selection as a matter of co-construction. Further, while neo-Darwinism has cast 
development as the process of following genetic instructions, DST rejects the 
notion that there is something given prior to development itself. This leads to the 
conclusion that there can be no “replicator” prior to development, and thus the 
interactor/replicator dichotomy breaks down. There is no information for 
development preformed in the genes, instead development is a matter of 
construction: “nature and nurture are not alternative causes but product and 
process” (Oyama 2000a: 148), so that “it is always a nurtured nature” (Oyama 
2000c: S341).  
 In the second part of this thesis I will turn to the specific issues of the 
evolution of culture and cognition. I will critically discuss research in this area, 
particularly that done under the heading of Evolutionary Psychology, inspired by 
neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. In bringing developmental considerations to 
the fore in evolutionary theory, the developmental systems approach leads to 
quite a different picture of the evolution of culture and cognition than research 
that is based in neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology.  
133 
 
 
Part Two 
 
Culture and Cognition 
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Chapter Five 
Evolutionary Psychology 
 
1. Introduction 
If we can offer evolutionary explanations for physiological structures such as the 
heart or the eye, and if we can offer evolutionary explanations for animal 
behaviour, such as the bowerbird‟s efforts to attract mates with its ornate nest 
and the blackbird‟s efforts to defend its territory, then perhaps we can explain the 
human brain, human psychology and human behaviour in the same terms. Of 
course, evolutionary explanations do not explain everything about a given 
physiological structure. Individual differences will exist between one heart and 
another. Similarly, there may be some variation in exactly how one organism 
defends its territory when compared to its conspecifics. So we should not expect 
an evolutionary explanation of human psychology to explain everything about 
how individuals think and behave. Nonetheless, many researchers have 
attempted to apply the lessons of neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology more 
generally to the particular case of human psychology, behaviour and culture. 
Some have even gone so far as to claim that they are mapping out human nature 
– those qualities that are universal among humans (e.g. Tooby & Cosmides 1992; 
Pinker 2002). There are a broad range of approaches taken in the attempt to 
understand the human mind in terms of evolution, and they operate under names 
such as sociobiology, human ethnology, evolutionary anthropology and 
evolutionary psychology. Even under the heading of evolutionary psychology 
there is a divergence of opinions and approaches. One of the most well-known 
approaches has developed out of the work of John Tooby and Leda Cosmides 
(1989, 1990, 1992), Donald Symons (1992), and David Buss (1992, 1999), 
among others, and it is this version of evolutionary psychology I will focus on 
here. Buller (2005) refers to this brand of evolutionary psychology using the 
upper case – Evolutionary Psychology – and I will follow this convention here. 
I will begin by detailing the rationale offered by Evolutionary 
Psychologists for their project. Evolutionary Psychology follows from an 
acceptance of both the adaptationist programme and the gene as unit of 
inheritance, two core commitments of neo-Darwinism outlined in chapter one. 
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Because Evolutionary Psychology relies on neo-Darwinism, any problems 
inherent in neo-Darwinism will also threaten Evolutionary Psychology. Given I 
have already argued that neo-Darwinian biology is deeply flawed, it follows so 
too is Evolutionary Psychology. Nonetheless, I discuss Evolutionary Psychology 
here for three reasons. The first is that Evolutionary Psychology faces problems 
particular to its own discipline, so that even if the case I have made against neo-
Darwinian biology can be answered, further work needs to be done to defend 
Evolutionary Psychology. The second reason for discussing Evolutionary 
Psychology here is that, in discussing its problems, it will highlight issues any 
account of the evolution of culture and cognition may need to contend with so 
that at least some of the arguments here may have broader applicability. I am 
particularly concerned in this thesis with what a theory of evolution more 
sensitive to the details of development might tell us about the evolution of human 
psychology and culture. The final reason to discuss Evolutionary Psychology 
here is that it will help to make clear what differences such a developmentally-
informed approach to the evolution of cognition and culture will make.   
Once the claims of Evolutionary Psychology have been outlined, I will 
discuss two classes of problems particular to Evolutionary Psychology.
51
 The 
first sort stem from the fact that Evolutionary Psychology only appears to utilise 
a subset of the tools provided by neo-Darwinism. Many of the key claims of 
Evolutionary Psychology, such as the idea that no significant evolutionary 
change could have occurred in the last 10,000 years, are difficult to support from 
a neo-Darwinian point of view. The second class of problem that Evolutionary 
Psychology faces arises from the combination of the adaptationist strategy and 
their particular explanandum: our cognitive architecture. The aim of 
Evolutionary Psychology is to uncover our hidden mental structures and this 
involves determining the nature of the selection pressures that caused these 
structures to evolve. However, there are good theoretical reasons to think that it 
will be difficult, if not impossible, to identify many of these selection pressures. 
This, if correct, would undermine the ability of Evolutionary Psychologists to 
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 This is by no means an exhaustive treatment of difficulties faced by Evolutionary 
Psychology. More detailed critiques can be found in, for example, Dupré (2001) and Buller 
(2005). 
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generate hypotheses about the hidden structures of our minds using this 
methodology.  
Finally, I will argue that Evolutionary Psychologists‟ arguments 
concerning culture are incoherent. Evolutionary Psychologists reject approaches 
to culture and behaviour that pay little attention to evolution and biology, such as 
those found in parts of the social sciences (Evolutionary Psychologists call this 
the Standard Social Sciences Model, or the SSSM). Evolutionary Psychologists 
also claim that modern humans are unsuited, or maladapted, to modern 
environments. I will argue that there exists a tension between these two claims 
such that Evolutionary Psychologists cannot maintain both and, as a result, face a 
choice. They can continue with their commitment to their version of neo-
Darwinism and accept they have little to say about modern human behaviour or 
culture, and thus must accept the SSSM. Alternatively, they can abandon their 
commitment to their version of neo-Darwinism, and lose much that is supposed 
to distinguish Evolutionary Psychology from other approaches to the evolution of 
cognition and culture.   
I will not challenge the model of the mind Evolutionary Psychologists have 
adopted here, but I will deal with this in chapter seven. What I want to do here is, 
first, spell out what Evolutionary Psychology is committed to and, second, 
demonstrate that, even if neo-Darwinism is correct in its model of development 
and evolution, Evolutionary Psychology has not made its case. 
 
2. Evolutionary Psychology 
Fundamental to Evolutionary Psychology is the idea that human psychology is 
the result of a collection of adaptations to a past environment. Recall from 
chapter one that adaptations need not be adaptive. That is, while the process of 
natural selection is ongoing, an adaptation must be adaptive. However, the 
environment can change, and a trait that once helped the organism negotiate its 
environment can be rendered useless, or even a hindrance. Evolutionary 
Psychologists argue that the evolution of complex adaptations, such as the ones 
that they believe underpin human psychology and behaviour, take a very long 
time (from a human perspective at least) to evolve. Our current environments are 
quite different from those of our ancestors. While we need to negotiate traffic, 
processed food, large cities, and so on, our ancestors had to master the skills 
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required to forage for food, negotiate the savannah, avoid predators, live in small 
tribes, and so on. Given the length of time required for the evolution of complex 
adaptations, and the novelty of our current environments, we should not expect 
evolution to have rendered us well adapted to our current environments. 
Evolutionary Psychologists term the aspects of our ancestral environment to 
which we are thought to be adapted to as the “environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness” (EEA). The EEA is not a particular time or place but “the statistical 
composite of selection pressures that caused the design of an adaptation” 
(Cosmides & Tooby 1997). For humans, Evolutionary Psychologists believe the 
EEA coincides with the Pleistocene (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 143). That is, we 
have evolved to suit particular features of our Pleistocene ancestors‟ environment. 
The key claim of Evolutionary Psychology, and what marks it out from 
earlier attempts to explain human behaviour in terms of evolutionary theory 
(such as sociobiology, for instance), is its massive modularity hypothesis. 
Evolutionary Psychology rejects the possibility of the mind as a general purpose 
problem-solver (Tooby & Cosmides 1992). Evolutionary Psychologists argue 
that instead of being a general-purpose problem-solving device, the mind is 
organised into modules. Each module has been designed to solve a particular 
problem our ancestors would have routinely faced. Given the large number of 
problems faced by our ancestors, we should expect to find a large number of 
modules that allowed them to solve these problems; hence, our minds are 
massively modular. That is, human psychology will not be characterised by a 
single adaptation that solved all, or even many, of the problems our ancestors 
faced in the EEA. Instead, there will be multiple adaptations or modules. These 
specialised modules are not thought to map directly onto the brain. Modules are 
functionally, rather than anatomically, individuated.
52
 The relevant bits may be in 
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 Other brands of modularity, such as those proposed by Fodor and Chomsky make different 
claims than those of Evolutionary Psychology and should not be confused with them. Fodor 
(1983), for instance, claims modules are “informationally encapsulated” which is not often a 
recognised property of the modules Evolutionary Psychology promote. However, Buller and 
Hardcastle argue that, despite the claims of Evolutionary Psychologists to the contrary, 
Evolutionary Psychology‟s modules must in fact be informationally encapsulated to make sense 
(2000: 309-310). Pinker has suggested that it would be more useful to think of mental modules 
more loosely as “mental organs” as Chomsky has done (1997: 31). Organs are less rigorously 
delineated – they cannot always be “encircled by a dotted line” – and they interact with many 
other parts of the body in complicated ways. This way of thinking allows Evolutionary 
Psychologists to reject information encapsulation as a property of their “modules.” The type of 
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various different locations in the brain – less like “the flank steak and the rump 
roast on the supermarket cow display,” and more like “roadkill, sprawling 
messily over the bulges and crevasses of the brain” (Pinker 1997: 30). 
Evolutionary Psychologists have adopted the massive modularity hypothesis less 
because of positive reasons for such a position, and more because of what they 
perceive to be the implausibility of a general-purpose problem-solver. In 
examining their arguments against general-purpose problem-solvers, we can see 
just what Evolutionary Psychologists have in mind when they discuss modules.  
 
2.1 The Massive Modularity Hypothesis   
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) offer a number of justifications for their massive 
modularity hypothesis. First they make a poverty of stimulus argument, that is, 
they argue that humans have cognitive capacities that exceed what they could 
have learnt from experience. This, they suggest, indicates that human minds are 
more than blank slates. The paradigmatic example cited here is language 
acquisition (e.g. Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 94-95; Pinker & Bloom 1992). The 
rules of grammar are highly complex and structured; nonetheless children 
routinely come to master them. A child who grows up with no exposure to a 
linguistic community may never fully master language in later life; however, it 
appears as though children do not require as much exposure to language as might 
be expected given its complexity (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 45; Pinker & Bloom 
1992; Pinker 1994). Children are not explicitly tutored in how to use grammar, 
they are not routinely corrected when they make grammatical errors, and they 
themselves are often exposed to grammatical errors. Indeed, children are thought 
capable of inventing complex, grammatically structured languages when only 
exposed to “pidgin” languages (Pinker 1994: 33-39). That is, there seems to be a 
paucity of the right sort of stimuli to account for a child‟s ability to learn 
grammar. It appears that a child‟s mastery of the structure of language surpasses 
what we should expect, given their limited exposure. Evolutionary Psychologists 
(among others) take this to suggest that when we are exposed to language, some 
                                                                                                                                    
module suggested by Chomsky et al. are “domain-specific systems of truth-evaluable mental 
representations that are innate and/or subject to informational restrictions,” rather than the 
information-processing devices and mental representations of Evolutionary Psychology (Samuels 
2000: 18). 
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pre-existing capacity allows us to extrapolate from the small amount of input we 
receive from our linguistic community such that we can come to speak a 
language fluently. This pre-existing capacity has been termed the “language 
acquisition device” and this constitutes one of the many modules thought to 
comprise the human mind. Evolutionary Psychologists contend that there are 
many other domains where the ability of humans to perform complex tasks can 
only be explained by similarly specific modules.  
Secondly, Tooby and Cosmides also argue that an entirely “blank slate” 
mind, or in their terms, domain-general content-independent problem solver 
would be fatal to an organism. A completely domain-general mind seems liable 
to become paralysed by combinatorial explosion. At any time, may be a large 
number of potential courses of action one might take, and each one of these will 
lead to further possible courses of action, and so on. In order to establish the 
most adaptive behaviour it appears necessary to evaluate a very large number of 
possibilities. These numbers can quickly becomes so large as to be 
unmanageable, rendering the individual incapable of evaluating the options: “any 
design for an organism that cannot generate appropriate decisions, inferences, or 
perceptions because it is lost in an ocean of erroneous possibilities will not 
propagate, and will be removed from the population in the next generation” 
(Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 103). In order to avoid this, some constraints are 
required such that not all courses of action need to be considered in any decision 
making process. This is, among other things, known as the “frame problem”; 
without a way to frame the world such that certain courses of action are seen as 
available, while others are effectively rendered invisible, the individual cannot 
make any decisions at all. The “unframed” perspective of a blank slate mind, or a 
general-purpose problem solver would not just be less efficient than a collection 
of domain-specific systems, it would be useless: 
 
… it is usually more than efficiency that is lost by being limited to a 
general-purpose method – generality may often sacrifice the very 
possibility of successfully solving the problem, as, for example, when 
the solution requires supplemental information that cannot be sensorily 
derived. (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 179) 
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The selection pressure in these cases would be maximally strong and we should 
see selection for domain-specific systems.  
This much, however, only establishes that an entirely “blank” mind is 
unfeasible. We might expect that some constraints are necessary to rule out 
combinatorial explosion, but allow a good deal of flexibility within those 
boundaries; not quite a completely content-independent, general-purpose 
problem solver, but not a highly domain-specific content-rich collection of 
modules either. However, Tooby and Cosmides present further arguments which 
suggest that natural selection will favour increasingly domain-specific content-
rich modules.  
Tooby and Cosmides argue that there cannot be a general problem solver 
because there is no such thing as a general problem (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 
142). Our ancestors would have faced a wide range of quite distinct problems – 
avoiding predators, attracting mates, finding food, and so on. What counts as a 
solution to one problem will not count as a solution to another. Pinker notes that 
a general-purpose problem solver is a jack of all trades and a master of none 
(Pinker 1997: 28). To successfully negotiate the environment, each problem 
faced by an organism requires a specific solution that cannot usually be 
generalised beyond that particular problem domain: “different adaptive problems 
are often incommensurate” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 111). So, in order to 
achieve greater success at solving any one adaptive problem, it is necessary to 
have very specific solutions. And given the large number of problems our 
ancestors would have faced in their environment, they would have required a 
large number of distinct solutions. There are two ways specific solutions could 
be found: the organism, starting with some broad constraints to rule out 
combinatorial explosion, could learn through trial and error different solutions to 
all the different problems it faced, or the organism could possess the sort of 
highly specialised modules Tooby and Cosmides propose. They offer three 
reasons why selection would favour the latter.  
First, the greater the generality of the problem-solver, the more inefficient 
it will be. Learning takes time, and inventing a solution takes even longer. This 
problem is only compounded by the fact that there are thought to have been 
many different problems, each one taking time to solve. In the meantime, 
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mistakes can be made. This suggests that whenever a more specific problem-
solving module was available in the population, selection would favour it:  
 
Such mechanisms will be far more efficient than general-purpose 
mechanisms, which must expend time, energy, and risk learning these 
relationships through “trial and possibly fatal error.” (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992: 111) 
 
Second, an individual is not always in a position to determine which of the 
options available to it is the most adaptive. Two courses of action may be as 
adaptive as one another most of the time, with one only very occasionally 
delivering a slightly higher degree of adaptedness. Such a slight difference in 
adaptedness might easily go unobserved by an individual. Further, if the benefit 
of one course of action over another is not immediate, it may not be possible to 
determine in advance which is most adaptive. For example, juvenile diet might 
affect adult fertility but this might be a difficult pattern to discern, especially if 
fertility improves only marginally. The thought is then that an individual, without 
any guidance in these matters, would then fail to systematically opt for the most 
advantageous option:  
 
Many adaptive courses of action can be neither deduced nor learned by 
general criteria alone because they depend on statistical relationships 
that are unobservable to the relevant individual. For a content-
independent system to learn a relationship, all parts of the relationship 
must be perceptually detectable … Natural selection, through 
incorporating content-specific decision rules, allows the organism to 
behave as if it could see and be guided by relationships that are 
perceptually undetectable and, hence, inherently unlearnable by any 
general purpose system (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 111-112).   
 
If a heritable cognitive variant should arise that disposes those individuals who 
possess this trait to opt for the fitness-enhancing option, there will be selection 
for this innovation and it will be pushed towards fixation in the population. 
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Third, even when the most adaptive course of action is observable in 
principle (i.e. the consequences of two courses of actions are immediately 
apparent to the observer), what grounds does an individual have for deciding one 
outcome is adaptive and the other is not? Avoiding a predator is quite a different 
thing to catching prey, and different again to discerning nutritious from 
poisonous fruit. Success in each of these domains looks quite different. How is 
an organism to tell which course of action to take when what counts as success is 
unclear? Things are complicated further by kin altruism. Kin altruism is the name 
given to the phenomenon whereby an organism harms its own chances of 
survival and reproduction in order to help kin survive and reproduce. This is 
explained by gene selectionists and Evolutionary Psychologists in terms of the 
fact that kin share a certain percentage of genes with each other, and thus it may 
be a worthwhile strategy for one token of a gene to sacrifice its “host” organism 
in order that its copies get to replicate. Hamilton‟s rule is thought to establish the 
relationship between the cost an organism will endure for a genetic relative and 
the degree of relatedness between that organism and its family member (Dawkins 
1989: 88-93). Siblings share half of their genetic material, and thus should 
endure higher survival and reproductive costs for one another than cousins would 
for one another, given they only share one eight of their genetic material. So, 
according to this line of thought, what counts as an adaptive course of action, 
from gene‟s eye view, is for an individual organism to risk harm and the ability 
to reproduce in certain situations, depending on the degree of risk and the degree 
of relatedness to the kin member such behaviour may help. This would suggest 
that even a general rule such as “adaptive success means avoiding harm” would 
not ensure the individual always acted adaptively. A general-purpose problem 
solver cannot latch onto some “general cue or criterion for success or failure that 
can apply across domains” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 111). Again, an individual 
with at least some “substantial built-in content-specific structure to discriminate 
adaptive success from failure” would be at a distinct advantage. 
Because selection will always favour modules that are more domain-
specific and content-rich, Tooby and Cosmides argue, selection will have pushed 
the organisation of human psychology towards massive modularity: 
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… human psychological architecture must be far more frame-rich and 
permeated with content-specific structure than most researchers 
(including ourselves) had ever expected. (1992: 112) 
 
2.2 The “Psychic Unity of Humankind” 
As well as expecting the mind to be massively modular, Evolutionary 
Psychologists also expect all normally developed humans to share the same sort 
of modular structure, and Tooby and Cosmides refer to this shared cognitive 
architecture as the “psychic unity of humankind” (1992: 79). There is nothing in 
the previous arguments that makes this so. That is, it is possible that massive 
modularity is a universal characteristic of normally developed humans, but that 
individuals may differ in terms of the sorts of modules they possess. For example, 
all normally developed humans have eyes, but there exists different eye colours 
in the human population. Similarly, humans differ in terms of their blood group. 
There could be completely different, perhaps competing, modules. In fact, 
despite claims that Evolutionary Psychology is concerned with a universal 
human nature, this option – that there exist different modules in different people 
– is a key claim of Evolutionary Psychology in one particular case. Men and 
women are supposed to have quite different modules in a variety of domains, 
though especially those concerned with mating (e.g. Silverman & Eals 1992; 
Buss 1992; Wilson & Daly 1992).
53
 This exception aside, there are no more 
instances where humans are thought to differ in terms of the adaptations they 
posses: “humans must share a complex, species-typical and species-specific 
architecture of adaptations” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 38).  
The justification for the claim that these adaptations constitute a universal 
feature of humankind stems from two arguments. First, all psychological 
adaptations must be underpinned by gene complexes, as this is the only way they 
could have been heritable, visible to selection, and thus adaptations: “the 
organization of our mental modules comes from our genetic program” (Pinker 
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 See Dupré (2001) and Buller (2005) for critiques of much of the work done by 
Evolutionary Psychologists in this area. 
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1997: 23).
54
 The more complex the adaptation, the more genes will be required to 
underpin it: 
 
Complex adaptations are intricate machines that require complex 
“blueprints” at the genetic level. This means they require coordinated 
gene expression, involving hundreds or thousands of genes to regulate 
their development. (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 78) 
 
That is, if the adaptation was not universal within the population, it would be lost 
during sexual recombination. So if such modules exist at all, they must be 
universal.  
The second argument is based on an analogy between our physiology and 
our psychology. Gray’s Anatomy is said to describe “in precise anatomical detail 
individual humans from around the world” and this “demonstrates the 
pronounced monomorphism present in complex human adaptations” (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992: 38). Normally developed humans all possess two arms, legs, 
eyes, ears, kidneys, a heart, a brain, a stomach, and so on. If such uniformity is 
present in our physiology, by analogy we should expect the same of our 
psychology. 
55
 
Because we share the same sort of cognitive adaptations, Evolutionary 
Psychologists maintain that this should lead to similarities in how we behave, 
and this to similarities between the cultures that such behaviour generates: 
 
Our immensely elaborate species-typical physiology and psychological 
architectures not only constitute regularities in themselves but they 
impose within and across cultures all kinds of regularities on human life, 
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 See chapter one for a more detailed discussion of these issues. 
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 Buller (2005: 424-428) offers a detailed critique of this claim. In particular, Evolutionary 
Psychologists are conflating two distinct grains of analysis here. Kidneys, hearts, and limbs are at 
the same level of biological organisation as the brain, and at one level of description are invariant 
in normally developed humans (indeed, at one level of description, they are invariant across all 
the primates). But modules (or the physical bit of the brain that are thought to correspond with 
the cognitive module) are at a level of description where a great deal more individual variation is 
found in anatomy. Thus the comparison is unjustified.  
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as do the common features of the environments we inhabit. (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992: 89) 
 
The regularities imposed on cultures by our shared psychology constitute what 
Evolutionary Psychologists call metaculture and are thought to characterise a 
great deal of human life: 
 
Such statistical and structural regularities concerning humans and 
human social life are an immensely and indefinitely large class… adults 
have children; humans have species typical body form; humans have 
characteristic emotions; humans move through a life history cued by 
observable body changes; humans come in two sexes; they eat food and 
are motivated to seek it when they lack it; humans are born and 
eventually die; they are related through sexual reproduction and through 
chains of descent; they turn their eyes towards objects and events that 
tend to be informative about adaptively consequential issues; they often 
compete, contend, or fight over limited social or subsistence resources; 
they express fear and avoidance of dangers; they create and participate 
in coalitions; they desire, plan, deceive, love, gaze, envy, get ill, have 
sex, play, can be injured, are satiated: and on and on. (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992: 89) 
 
But how do we account for the apparent cultural variation we observe? Or, for 
that matter, how do we account for the differences between individuals in any 
given culture? There are several ways Evolutionary Psychologists attempt to 
accommodate this variation. The first is in terms of “minor, superficial, 
nonfunctional traits” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 38). Evolutionary Psychologists 
are interested only in those cognitive traits that seem complex and they, like 
many others, assume complex traits must be the products of natural selection. In 
this sense, Evolutionary Psychology is adopting the explanatory adaptationism 
(and is thus vulnerable to the same criticisms).
56
 Our universal human nature 
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 Explanatory adaptationism maintains that complex adaptations are the most pressing or 
most important issue for evolutionary biology. The difficulty with this position, as discussed in 
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derives from our shared adaptations. Differences that arise from structures that 
are not adaptations are not of interest to Evolutionary Psychology, and further, 
not important enough to undermine the claim that we share a similarly structured 
psychology.  
A second way in which individual and cultural variation may be explained 
is in terms of epidemiological culture. Epidemiological culture arises when one 
or a few individuals develop a behaviour or idea that spreads throughout the 
population. This type of culture most closely resembles traditional notions of 
what constitutes culture. Ideas and behaviours spread like a virus (hence, 
“epidemiological”) to other members of the community. The ability to learn 
these behaviours and pick up these ideas is importantly underpinned by the 
modular mind and these modules bias which aspects of behaviour and which 
ideas are picked up: “domain-specific mechanisms influence which 
representations spread through a population easily and which do not” (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992: 121). 
The third way Evolutionary Psychologists explain individual and cultural 
variation is in terms of evoked culture. Evoked culture is thought to be the 
product of a mechanism or module responding to local conditions: 
 
… manifest expressions may differ between individuals when different 
environmental inputs are operated on by the same procedures to produce 
different manifest outputs. (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 45) 
 
Modules are not thought to be strongly deterministic; they do not result in one 
type of psychology or behaviour, but rather in the right behaviour for the right 
context, at least in the environments to which these modules are adapted. Tooby 
and Cosmides use an analogy with a jukebox to highlight their point (1992: 115). 
Identical jukeboxes are placed at different locations across the globe. Each one 
has a clock and a navigational device that measures their longitude and latitude. 
The jukebox is programmed to play particular songs for given times and places. 
So, in each location, the jukebox plays a different song. Nonetheless, because the 
                                                                                                                                    
more detail in chapter one, is that the claim about the importance of complex traits seems only to 
be a statement about our own interests. 
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jukeboxes are the same, they all have the same songs, and they all have the same 
programmed rules. They may play different songs, but this is because they are 
receiving different inputs from their environments. Similarly, the idea of evoked 
culture is meant to capture those aspects of cultures that may visibly differ from 
one another, but are underpinned by the same rules or evolved mental modules.  
Tooby and Cosmides seem to imply at least two ways organisms can 
respond in this flexible manner to environmental input: 
 
Thus, when we use terms such as “evolved design,” “evolved 
architecture,” or even “species-typical,” “species-standard,” “universal,” 
and “panhuman,” we are not making claims about every human 
phenotype all or even some of the time; instead we are referring to the 
existence of evolutionary organized developmental adaptations, whether 
they are activated or latent… For this reason, adaptations and adaptive 
architecture can be discussed and described at (at least) two levels: (1) 
the level of reliably achieved and expressed organization (as, for 
example, in the realized structure of the eye), and (2) at the level of the 
developmental programs that construct such organization. (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992: 82) 
 
The first is at the level of the adaptation itself. In this case, the same trait 
responds in different ways to different environmental conditions, and any change 
made is reversible. The expansion and contraction of the pupil in response to 
light conditions is an example of this sort of environmental responsiveness. 
Similarly, one might seek out one sort of food in one environment, and another 
sort of food elsewhere, or dress warmly in cold environments, and wear lighter 
clothing in hotter places, and so on. So one way human cognition might be 
responsive to environmental conditions is if a given module generates different 
responses given different inputs. 
The second way in which such flexibility can be achieved is at the level of 
development. Tooby and Cosmides seem to acknowledge some form of 
disjunctive genetic programme: 
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… different coordinated designs, psychological or physiological, cannot 
be the direct product of suites of genetic differences. Different genetic 
programs (corresponding to subsets of genes) are activated in one morph 
or another, but are present in all individuals. In short, the conclusion 
from evolutionary genetics is that different species have different 
designs because of different genes, but within a species, different 
designs emerge from the same genes… (Tooby & Cosmides 1990: 45) 
 
Genetic instructions or programmes for development do not appear to necessarily 
be followed, and can be triggered or activated by the right sort of inputs.
57
 At 
some point in development, an environmental input sends development down 
one of a number of potential trajectories and can lead to distinct developmental 
outcomes. For example, many species are thought to have their sex determined 
by environmental factors. The temperature at which they are incubated 
determines the sex of turtles for instance (West-Eberhard 2003: 121). 
Developmental plasticity of this sort explains the existence of polyphenic traits 
(that is, the existence of distinct phenotypic forms) in a population for the neo-
Darwinist. Unlike the previous example, this form of plasticity is usually not 
reversible. In this case, rather than a given trait reacting in different ways to 
different environmental stimuli, it is the genetic programme that generates 
different developmental outcomes for different environmental inputs. 
The difficulty with developmental plasticity from an Evolutionary 
Psychologist‟s perspective is that it allows distinct phenotypic forms with the 
same genetic basis to arise in a population. That is, it allows for different 
modules to develop. Once the possibility of this form of developmental plasticity 
is permitted, we seem to be suggesting that what tends to be shared by humans 
are not cognitive adaptations, but rather disjunctive genetic programmes. 
However this is a point not acknowledged by Evolutionary Psychologists. For 
instance, Barkow et al. write that “there is a universal human nature, but … this 
universality exists at the level of evolved psychological mechanisms, not of 
expressed cultural behaviors” (1992: 5). Rather than claiming the universality is 
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 See chapter one for a more detailed discussion of disjunctive genetic programmes. 
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due to shared developmental programmes, it is here explained by shared 
psychological mechanisms.  
Some explanation for this may stem from Tooby and Cosmides‟ 
justification for the elision of developmental adaptations in other areas of their 
work. While they acknowledge that adaptations can be discussed at two levels 
(organised structure and development), Tooby and Cosmides state that they do 
not “usually bother to terminologically distinguish between successfully 
assembled expressed adaptive architecture from more fundamental 
developmental adaptations that construct them” (1992: 82). While it is perfectly 
legitimate to discuss biological organisation at whatever level is relevant to one‟s 
research interests, this is distinct from conflating different levels of organisation. 
In this instance, Tooby and Cosmides treat the developmental adaptations and 
cognitive adaptations as, for their purposes, equivalent. However, this conflation 
is problematic; an important class of developmental adaptations are excluded on 
this formulation. They have neglected the class of developmental adaptations that 
are not expressed in a given individual as a cognitive adaptation. However, their 
justification for speaking of a universal human nature stems only from the 
inclusion of this class of developmental adaptations. 
Disjunctive genetic programmes are unproblematic in neo-Darwinian 
biology, and play an important role in explaining polyphenic traits in a 
population. Evolutionary Psychologists do not seem to deny the possibility of 
such disjunctive programmes, and rely on them to argue for the general principle 
that humans share a universal human nature as a result of natural selection. 
However, the possibility that such disjunctive programmes could allow the 
development of different modules in different individuals (sex differences aside) 
is not seriously countenanced, and no justification for this neglect is offered. 
Evolutionary Psychology, then, does not use the full range of tools made 
available to it by neo-Darwinism. 
 
2.3 Stone Age Minds 
Cosmides and Tooby (1997) have suggested “our modern skulls house a stone 
age mind.” The time that has elapsed since the Pleistocene is considered too brief, 
by evolutionary standards, to allow for “the design of complex circuits” in brains 
to have evolved. As a result, modern humans are considered better suited to the 
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Pleistocene than the modern world. I will argue in part three of this chapter that 
this claim is incoherent, but for now I want to focus on their evolutionary 
justification for the claim that we possess stone age minds. Neo-Darwinian 
evolution theory leads us to expect that there should be a time lag between 
adaptations and environments. If we focus solely on genetic inheritance, as neo-
Darwinian evolutionary biologists and Evolutionary Psychologists do, it is clear 
why this is assumed to be the case. Most genetic mutations are harmful, so the 
chances that an advantageous mutation will arise are small. Numerous 
generations will pass before the right sort of variation even exists in the 
population and selection can act. And once the right sort of variation is present, it 
can take a very long time for selection to result in the propagation of the trait 
throughout the population. If the adaptation is a complex one, the result of 
cumulative evolution, this process is extended even further in time. In this way, 
the speed with which environments can change far exceeds the speeds at which 
complex adaptations can arise. Given Evolutionary Psychology's commitment to 
the idea that our cognitive architecture is a complex adaptation, and that genes 
are the sole unit of inheritance, we should assume that our cognitive architecture 
took a long time to come about in the first place, and that it will take a long time 
for any significant alterations to this architecture to evolve. 
But there are better reasons than Evolutionary Psychologists suppose for 
imagining at least some of our psychological mechanisms could have been 
altered since the Pleistocene. A relatively recent evolutionary novelty involves 
the ability to digest lactose. This is thought to have arisen in response to the 
pastoral, dairy-based lifestyle of some human groups between 8,000 and 6,000 
years ago (Odling-Smee et al. 2003: 342-343). The suggestion is that dairy 
farming of some description came about first, and this created a selection 
pressure for the ability to digest lactose. This would mean that lactose tolerance 
has evolved far more recently than Evolutionary Psychologists allow for 
cognitive adaptations. 
One response to this might be to argue that modifications such as lactose 
tolerance are very small and simple relative to the complex developmental or 
cognitive adaptations Evolutionary Psychologists are concerned with. However, 
there is an important difference between the evolution of an adaptation in its 
entirety, and modifications of an adaptation. A structure as complex as the eye is 
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highly unlikely to evolve in anything like 10,000 years for humans. However, 
much smaller modifications of the eye are possible in this time. Further, not all 
genes are considered equal in neo-Darwinism (and mainstream evo-devo); while 
some are directly involved in the production of proteins, others play a regulatory 
role. These genetic switches or “master control” genes are thought to regulate 
other genes. They embody the conditional rules of the disjunctive programme; 
depending on the input, they activate different sets of genes. Modifications of 
such genes could have powerful developmental effects in the sense that it could 
result in an alteration to the conditions under which different phenotypic forms 
are expressed. Tooby and Cosmides argue that such switches are less effective 
than organisms that display flexibility at the phenotypic level (1990: 46). That is, 
the reversible plasticity made possible by a single module responding in a 
flexible way to different inputs will be favoured by selection over a 
developmental plasticity that tends to require that one developmental path be 
taken over another early on in development and cannot be reversed. In response 
to this, however, Buller notes that we see in nature both forms of plasticity, and 
that Evolutionary Psychologists offer no reason to suppose that developmental 
flexibility will always be selected against (2005: 116-119). While a module (or 
any other trait) that can display reversible plasticity allows the organism a greater 
degree of responsiveness to its environment, it may be a more energy demanding 
trait in terms of its development and maintenance. This is just to say that there 
are no a priori reasons to suppose selection will favour one form of plasticity 
over another. Further, even if flexibility in adult traits would be favoured by 
selection over developmental flexibility, this lone is not enough to allow us to 
conclude that we will only possess the former kind of flexibility. If the right 
variation in the population never arises, the adaptively optimum solution will not 
evolve.
58
 Given this, there does not seem to be any justification for Tooby and 
Cosmides ruling out the possibility that at least some of our developmental 
programmes/modules rely on genetic switches that could have been altered by 
the changing selection pressures in post-Pleistocene environments. Again, 
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 Further problems with the assumption that the most adaptive solution to a problem will 
evolve are discussed in Gould & Lewontin (1979). 
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Evolutionary Psychology appears to only attend to some aspects of neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory and not others. 
 
2.4 Uncovering Modules 
So far I have discussed the theoretical justification for what our minds should 
look like according to Evolutionary Psychologists. I now want to look at some 
issues concerning the methodology of Evolutionary Psychology. Human 
psychology should be structured, on this account, into a large number of modules, 
each dealing with a specific problem domain and equipped with some specific 
rules or knowledge for dealing with that domain. Given this general theoretical 
background then, Evolutionary Psychologists attempt to uncover these modules. 
This, note, is importantly different to the approach taken by evolutionary 
biologists. Often, the trait in question is observable by researchers; it is often the 
observation of the anatomical or physiological trait that will initiate and guide 
research. For instance, if we observe a peacock‟s extraordinary tail, mimicry in 
butterflies, or dam building in beavers, we might want to know why these 
organisms came to possess these traits. Even where evolutionary explanations are 
sought for behaviour, it is the behaviour itself that is the explanandum, rather 
than a proxy for some underlying cognitive adaptation. Evolutionary Psychology 
does not have this advantage. The structure of the mind is hidden, and it is the 
unearthing of this structure that Evolutionary Psychology promises. Evolutionary 
Psychology can “supply the missing middle: the psychological mechanisms that 
come between theories of selection pressures on the one hand and fully realized 
sociocultural behavior on the other” (Barkow et al. 1992: 6). Evolutionary 
Psychologists do not begin with either a module or a developmental programme. 
Instead, there are two possible approaches available to the Evolutionary 
Psychologist. The first is to look for cross-cultural regularities in behaviour and 
postulate underlying adaptations to explain the regularities. Identifying such 
regularities may be complicated by at least three issues. First, modules (or 
developmental programmes) do not lead to tightly regimented behaviours, so this 
variability will muddy the waters. Second, metaculture, evoked culture and 
epidemiological culture are not thought to be independent cultural streams, but 
rather interacting aspects of culture resulting in further potential for individual 
and cultural differences, thus making regularities resulting from similar modules 
153 
 
or developmental programs harder to detect. Finally, our adaptations were 
thought to be designed for the Pleistocene rather than current environments. Our 
radically altered modern environments may skew developmental programmes, or 
provide such odd inputs for psychological mechanisms that the manifest 
behaviours we witness may not be the behaviours our developmental 
programmes were selected for. 
Despite this, Evolutionary Psychologists believe at least some regularities 
can be identified. Pinker (2002: 435-439) lists what he terms “surface universals”; 
that is, universal behaviours rather than universal cognitive structures. The job of 
the Evolutionary Psychologist is then to postulate cognitive adaptations that 
generate these regularities or surface universals, and the selection pressures that 
would explain their evolution. But there are a number of problems with this 
approach. For example, marriage is typically cited as a cultural universal, but as 
Dupré points out, this is a rather broad category:  
 
Anthropologists describe systems of marriage that are monogamous, 
polygamous, occasionally polyandrous, hypergamous or hypogamous 
(women marrying up or down in status, though equal status is said to be 
the commonest case), between people of the same sex, and in some 
cases not involving sexual relations at all. (2001: 59) 
 
Even granting the existence of such regularities does not, by itself, establish an 
adaptation for such behaviour. There are many ways to explain common cross-
cultural behaviours, and Evolutionary Psychology does not have a principled 
means to decide which of these potential explanations is appropriate in any given 
scenario. A cross-cultural regularity may equally be explained by the presence of 
that behaviour in a common ancestral population that has been culturally 
inherited by modern societies. Evolutionary Psychologists cannot rule out that 
the common practice has been culturally, rather than genetically, inherited as a 
form of epidemiological culture. Perhaps only some of the regularities could be 
explained in this way, but the question is, which ones? How could we tell the 
difference between those regularities that are the result of cognitive adaptations, 
and those that are the result of a form of cultural inheritance? Evolutionary 
Psychology does not provide a solution to this. 
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 A regularity need not only be the result of common heritage. It is possible 
that some regularities are the result of epidemiological culture spreading very 
widely. For example, the sweet potato was only found in America, until 
approximately 1,000 years ago when Polynesian explorers brought it to New 
Zealand and some Pacific Islands. Later, Europeans explorers and colonisers 
came across the sweet potato in the West Indies and introduced it to Africa, India 
and Indonesia. It was then introduced into Papua New Guinea by Indonesian 
traders. By the time Europeans made contact with the communities living in the 
remote highlands regions of Papua New Guinea in the early twentieth century, 
the sweet potato had become an essential component of their agriculture and diet, 
as well as the agriculture and diet of numerous groups of people on many 
different continents (Bourke 2009). This example demonstrates the ease with 
which a good idea – the growing and consuming of a particular food stuff in this 
instance – can spread. Indeed, Levy (2004) argues that a marginal advantage of a 
given cultural practice over alternatives is enough to ensure the propagation of 
that cultural practice. Even groups of people typically conceived of as untouched 
by the outside world, such as the inhabitants of the highlands of Papua New 
Guinea, are susceptible. And such issues are only exemplified by issues 
surrounding globalisation: “surely the large majority do share, to a considerable 
extent, values shaped by exposure to the same transnational media” (Dupré 2001: 
59). While growing sweet potato is unlikely to be mistaken for the result of a 
cognitive adaptation, other behaviours are less clearly examples of what 
Evolutionary Psychologists would call epidemiological culture. Putting concerns 
about the applicability of the term “marriage” to such a wide array of behaviours 
aside for a moment, we could imagine something like marriage as a particularly 
successful element of epidemiological culture too. But if this were the case, it 
would look just like a cultural regularity that sprang from a universal adaptation. 
Again, Evolutionary Psychology does not give us a principled way to tell apart a 
regularity caused by a universal cognitive adaptation, and a regularity caused by 
a particularly successful element of epidemiological culture.  
 The Evolutionary Psychologist might respond to this by arguing that their 
job is not done just when they identify a cross-cultural regularity. They must also 
posit selection pressures that would generate the kind of adaptation that could 
explain such a regularity. Understanding the selective pressures faced by our 
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ancestors, and the kinds of adaptations that might evolve in response to these 
pressures, might be thought to allow us to pick out those cross-cultural 
regularities that can be explained by these adaptations. Once we have a better 
idea of what kind of cognitive adaptations would have been useful, it may be 
easier to see if current populations actually demonstrate evidence of such 
adaptations. However, thinking about the selection pressures our ancestors faced 
generates a range of problems of its own. We cannot directly access the selection 
pressures our ancestors were subject to, and can only infer what they must have 
been from rather indirect evidence. This is because, while many of our 
physiological adaptations were thought to be for the physical environment, 
Evolutionary Psychologists believe that the selection pressures that shaped our 
psychology stemmed primarily from our social environment, and social 
environments are difficult to reconstruct. Contemporary hunter-gatherer societies 
are often used by Evolutionary Psychologists in lieu of access to ancestral 
societies. The specifics of their physical environments might differ from one 
population to the next, but it is social environments that we are interested in, and 
these should demonstrate enough regularity in structure to give us a clue about 
life in the Pleistocene. However, things are not so simple. Buller notes two 
problems: 
 
First, it is naïve to think that the social lives of extant hunter-gatherer 
populations have not changed significantly in the last 10,000 years… 
Second, as the anthropologist Laura Betzig points out, there is 
considerable variation in the lifestyles of extant hunter-gatherer 
populations. (Buller 2005: 95) 
 
Hunter-gatherer populations are not all alike and have developed quite different 
social systems. For instance, the average daily caloric intake as collected by 
women across hunter-gatherer populations ranges from 2% to 67% and average 
parental care ranges from ten minutes a day to 88% of the day (Buller 2005: 95) 
Further, contemporary hunter-gatherer populations do not live lives entirely 
independent of the modern human world. To look at the culture of a hunter-
gatherer population is not to peer into our evolutionary past. Noss and Hewlett 
(2001), in their study of societies in the Aka forest in the Central African 
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Republic, document the greater participation of women than men in hunting than 
men and the equal participation of both parents in childcare. They have described 
the Aka as “probably one of the most gender egalitarian cultures in the 
ethnographic record” (2001: 1028). This stands in contrast, for instance, to the 
Baka women of Eastern Cameroon who do not hunt, but do carry spears for their 
husbands, brothers or fathers during a hunt. The Aka also exemplify the role 
played by exposure to other cultures. While the women do the majority of the 
hunting now, historically this activity had equal gender participation. The reason 
for this change in participation, suggested by Noss and Hewlett, concerns the 
recent employment opportunities afford to the Aka by large businesses not 
indigenous to the area. The employers, for their own cultural reasons (they are 
Euro-Americans and Western-trained Africans), appear willing to employ only 
men, and so these men are not available to participate in hunting. Further, this 
exposure of hunter-gather societies to other cultures is not a feature of the 
modern phenomenon of globalisation (though globalisation appears to have 
intensified a pre-existing trend). The spread of the sweet potato demonstrates the 
degree to which it has long been possible for cultures to interact and to influence 
one another. Buller notes that anthropologists have documented interactions 
between hunter-gatherer populations and the rest of the world at least since the 
dawn of colonialism (2005: 95). These interactions can result in cultural changes 
such as the greater participation of women in hunting in the Aka, but can also 
result in a homogenisation of cultures, as in the case of waged labour in the men 
of the Aka. This means that hunter-gatherer populations will not be particularly 
useful in shedding light of the social milieu, and thus selection pressures, faced 
by our ancestors.  
A more theoretical problem facing the identification of the relevant 
selection pressures concerns how exactly selection pressures arise. Lewontin‟s 
(1978, 2001b) niche constructionism highlights the role an organism plays in 
making salient some aspects of the environment over others.
59
 The life of a 
nocturnal animal may not impose on the life of a diurnal animal living in 
geographical proximity. A tree may be important to a bird which uses it to nest in, 
but irrelevant to a bird which nests closer to the ground. Large stones on the 
                                                 
59
  See chapter two for a more detailed discussion of Lewontin‟s niche constructionism. 
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surface of the ground may be important to a bird that uses them to crack the 
shells of snails, but irrelevant to the earthworm underneath. The life activities of 
an organism determine which aspects of the environment are potential sources of 
selection pressures. This suggests that we would need to know something of our 
ancestors‟ cognitive structure prior to the development of our current adaptations 
in order to know what parts of their environments were relevant. It is difficult 
enough to ascertain what cognitive adaptations we might currently possess, 
determining the adaptations of our very distant ancestors is even more 
problematic. This is further complicated by the fact that there is no fossil record 
to consult:
60
 
 
For our ancestors‟ motivational states and cognitive processes would 
have been selectively responsive to certain features of the physical and 
social environments, and only those features would have affected 
subsequent adaptive evolution of early human psychology. At this point 
we again collide with our ignorance of our early ancestors. And, given 
that psychologies don‟t fossilize, this ignorance is likely intractable. 
(Buller 2005: 98-99) 
 
Finally, even if we identify a selection pressure that did influence the course of 
our evolution, this does not give us enough information about what the adaptive 
solution would actually look like: 
 
But selection never designs solutions to adaptive problems from scratch. 
Adaptations all emerge through modifications to preexisting structures. 
The form of a solution to an adaptive problem, then, will always depend 
heavily on the form of the preexisting structure that got modified… 
Consequently, we can never infer the structure of an evolved solution to 
an adaptive problem from the nature of the problem itself. (Buller 2005: 
103-104)  
 
                                                 
60
 Even if a fossil record was possible, it would not definitively solve our problems here. It is 
not enough to see a structure to know how it was used. We might imagine a fossilised feathered 
bird faced selection pressures for flight, but would be wrong if the bird was in fact flightless.  
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For instance, if the problem a population faces is how to travel through its 
environment, there are multiple ways this might be solved: swimming, flying, 
walking and so on. Some knowledge of the previous state of the organisms in 
that population might help narrow down the possibilities, but such information is 
difficult to obtain in the case of our ancestors‟ cognitive structure. 
As well as difficulties associated with the practicalities of evidence 
gathering, even if we could identify the selection pressures that existed in the 
Pleistocene, this alone would not guarantee the appropriate solution in fact 
evolved:  
 
Some problems have a do-or-die character such that failing to solve 
them results in failure to survive or reproduce. But not every adaptive 
problem absolutely must be solved… often a population can survive and 
reproduce without variation that is differentially responsive to some 
selection pressure. Thus, even if we could identify all the adaptive 
problems facing our ancestral human populations, we still couldn‟t be 
assured that our ancestors evolved solutions to those problems. (Buller 
2005: 103) 
 
So, while solving the frame problem seems essential, for instance, other 
problems proposed by Evolutionary Psychologists may not have this “do-or-die” 
quality and we cannot assume a priori that such solutions in fact exist as part of 
our evolved psychology. One reason for this is because the evolution of an 
adaptation is dependent on the right sort of variation being present in the 
population; if the variation is not there, the adaptation will not evolve. Another 
reason concerns the fact that numerous selection pressures may have been in 
operation. The evolution of a new psychological mechanism is developmentally 
costly and, for instance, if this cost exceeds any benefit the mechanism might 
confer, then such a mechanism will not evolve. Even if we could identify one 
selection pressure, this does not inform us about other competing pressures. 
Again, this is a problem for evolutionary biology generally, not just Evolutionary 
Psychology. But unlike evolutionary biologists, Evolutionary Psychologists 
cannot directly examine the trait in question to see whether it appears to solve the 
proposed adaptive problem. 
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The Evolutionary Psychologist might respond by arguing that although 
there exists difficulties with both identifying the selection pressures faced by our 
ancestors and determining cross-cultural regularities that arise from cognitive 
adaptations, taken together the sorts of problems raised here can be avoided, or at 
least ameliorated. Perhaps we cannot be sure which cognitive adaptations would 
actually arise given various selection pressures, but we could posit an adaptation 
and then check for a corresponding cross-cultural regularity. If we find such a 
thing, then we can be reasonably sure we have identified a cognitive adaptation. 
However, that our ancestral environment posed a certain problem to our 
ancestors and that we see continued evidence of the solution to that problem does 
not rule out the alternative explanations. For example, I mentioned the possibility 
that a cross-cultural regularity could be explained by common heritage or just the 
spread of an aspect of epidemiological culture. Such aspects of epidemiological 
culture, if they are to be spread and maintained, are most likely to do so if they 
are found to be useful for the individuals involved. That is, epidemiological 
culture will often find success where it allows individuals to solve problems 
posed by their environments. The very same grounds that Evolutionary 
Psychologists cite to support their claim that a cross-cultural regularity must be 
explained by a shared cognitive adaptation also support the claim that the 
regularity is a particularly successful aspect of epidemiological culture. 
Evolutionary Psychology does not allow us to distinguish between these two 
cases.
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Beyond these worries with gathering evidence, there is a deeper problem in 
terms of the Evolutionary Psychologist‟s ability to tell us anything about modern 
human behaviour and culture, and their ability to use modern human behaviour 
and culture to support their evolutionary claims. There is a tension between, on 
the one hand, the claim that modern humans are maladapted to modern 
environments, and, on the other hand, the claim that we can explain culture in 
terms of our evolved psychological architecture. The remainder of this chapter 
will expand on this point and its consequences for Evolutionary Psychology. 
 
3. Culture 
                                                 
61
 Indeed, Levy (2004) argues that cross-cultural regularities in gender inequality may be 
better explained by something approaching the SSSM than by evolved cognitive adaptations.   
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Evolutionary Psychologists argue that culture is to be understood as the product 
of our evolved cognitive architecture, and that to gain a better understanding of 
culture we must understand this cognitive architecture and what it was selected 
for. They maintain that the social sciences have failed to adequately explain 
human culture and society, as a consequence of their commitment to the 
Standard Social Sciences Model (SSSM), and subsequent refusal to seriously 
countenance an evolutionary approach to psychology and culture. Evolutionary 
Psychologists also argue that other approaches to human behaviour and culture 
that incorporate evolutionary considerations (e.g. sociobiology) have failed to 
apply a genuinely Darwinian theory to behaviour and culture due to their focus 
on current adaptedness and behaviour rather than psychology. I want to argue 
here that Evolutionary Psychology cannot simultaneously maintain its opposition 
to these sorts of sociobiological approaches and oppose the SSSM. I will argue 
that Evolutionary Psychology's commitment to the idea that modern humans are 
ill-suited to their current environments means that it must either recognise a need 
for the SSSM in explaining modern human behaviour and culture, or it must 
deny that we are maladapted to modern environments, and move closer to 
sociobiology and its related fields. This latter move may require Evolutionary 
Psychology to reject, or at least seriously weaken, its commitment to the massive 
modularity thesis. 
 
3.1 The Standard Social Science Model 
Evolutionary Psychologists describe the social sciences as being largely 
underpinned by the Standard Social Sciences Model. The SSSM, according to 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992), combines two things, an account of how people 
develop, and an account of how culture operates. People are the products of their 
cultures and cultures are emergent phenomena such that they need to be studied 
at that level (rather than, say, the level of biology or psychology) according to 
Tooby and Cosmides‟ presentation of the SSSM. There are two causal arrows of 
interest here. One points from culture to individuals; minds are moulded by the 
culture or cultures they are surrounded by; they are the “blank slates” onto which 
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culture is written.
62
 The other points from an earlier culture to a later one: “the 
sociocultural level is a distinct, autonomous, and self-caused realm” (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992: 28).
63
 This leads to the idea that to study social science, one 
need not attend to the details of evolutionary biology or psychology: 
 
In discussing culture, one can safely neglect a consideration of 
psychology as anything other than the nondescript “black box” of 
learning, which provides that capacity for culture... evolved, 
“biological,” or “innate” aspects of human behavior or psychological 
organization, having been superseded by the capacity for culture. The 
evolution of the capacity for culture has led to a flexibility in human 
behavior that belies any significant “instinctual” or innate component... 
(Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 32) 
 
Evolutionary Psychologists are highly critical of this approach to studying 
culture:  
 
After more than a century, the social sciences are still adrift, with an 
enormous mass of half-digested observations, a not inconsiderable body 
of empirical generalizations, and a contradictory stew of ungrounded, 
middle-level theories expressed in a babel of incommensurate technical 
lexicons... (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 23) 
 
Evolutionary Psychologists instead argue that culture is not an autonomous entity, 
but rather that it is the product of our cognitive adaptations and should be 
understood by first understanding those adaptations. We will only gain a firm 
                                                 
62
  Levy (2004) argues that Evolutionary Psychology has created a straw man with their 
depiction of the SSSM. I will discuss this in more detail below. 
 
63
 The picture of the SSSM painted by Tooby & Cosmides is structurally very similar to that 
painted by neo-Darwinism, with culture in the place of the genotype. That is, the causal arrows 
points from the genotype in one generation to the phenotype of that same generation and the 
genotype of the next generation. Similarly, the causal arrows point from culture at one time to the 
psychological and behavioural aspects of the phenotype at the same time, and culture at some 
later point in time. 
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grasp on understanding culture when we approach it from an evolutionary 
perspective: 
 
... culture is the manufactured product of evolved psychological 
mechanisms situated in individuals living in groups. (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992: 24) 
 
...nothing the organism interacts with in the world is nonbiological to it, 
and so for humans cultural forces are biological, social forces are 
biological, physical forces are biological, and so on. The social and the 
cultural are not alternatives to the biological. They are aspects of 
evolved human biology and, hence, they are kinds of things to which 
evolutionary analysis can properly be applied. (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 
86) 
 
I want to argue that Evolutionary Psychology may in fact require the SSSM. 
Before I do this however, I first need to discuss why Evolutionary Psychologists 
reject another approach to understanding modern humans using evolutionary 
theory. 
 
3.2 Darwinian Social Science 
While Evolutionary Psychology focuses on evolved psychological mechanisms, 
the group of approaches Symons calls Darwinian social science, or DSS (human 
behavioural ecology, sociobiology, evolutionary biological anthropology, 
Darwinian anthropology) rely on a “psychologically agnostic science of human 
behaviour” (Symons 1992: 146). Instead of focusing on psychological 
mechanisms, DSS concentrates on behaviour. The basic strategy of this approach 
is to study human populations and determine if their behaviour is adaptive (that 
is, whether cultural practices and systems increase the reproductive success of 
individuals and their kin in that culture). The basic assumption is that humans 
will tend to behave in ways that maximise their reproductive success, and that 
such behaviour is the result of an adaptation. Symons criticisms of DSS are 
focussed in particular on Crook and Crook (1988). Crook and Crook argue that 
human beings have evolved the capacity to behave adaptively in given social 
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contexts. Even in quite novel circumstances, the claim is that humans will behave 
in ways that maximise their inclusive fitness. They focus on the system of co-
fraternal polyandry in Tibetan society. Their hypothesis is that this marriage 
system will prove to be adaptive given their particular ecological and socio-
economic situation. Such communities farm land in harsh, high altitude 
conditions and suffer other socioeconomic difficulties, such as the high taxes 
demanded by local landlords. A good deal of labour is required to successfully 
farm this land. There is a basic tension, according to Crook and Crook, between 
achieving what we might call short-term reproductive success (that is, having as 
many children as is physiologically possible), and not over-populating the land 
and placing too much strain on limited resources. Optimal inclusive fitness is 
reached when the happy medium between these two points is reached. Crook and 
Crook argue that the marriage system employed in these communities maximises 
reproductive success given these ecological constraints. Women marry the eldest 
brother in a family, and subsequently his younger brothers. This means the male 
children in a family will continue to live together looking after the farm, thus 
providing the required labour for the running of the farm. If the sons married 
different women, and the farm land was divided up among the brothers, the land 
would soon become unviable for farming. In this system, the land is kept intact 
as the brothers live together. Presumably, also, one woman who marries several 
brothers produces fewer children on average than would be produced if each 
brother married separately, creating less demand on the limited resources 
available. Thus, this system is thought to be adaptive; it ensures the land remains 
suitable for farming and it provides labour to work the land (and perhaps 
dampens population growth). This marriage system is thought to be the result of 
an adaptation that allows humans to establish systems that maximises their 
inclusive fitness in different, even novel, environments: 
 
The central prediction made in a Darwinian perspective is that humans 
are endeavouring, consciously or unconsciously to optimize their 
reproductive success... The genetic adaptation consists in the provision 
of a flexibility that allows reproductively optimizing behaviour to vary 
with context. (Crook & Crook 1988: 98-99) 
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What may have been demonstrated is that the value system of the 
individuals concerned have been shaped by adaptive learning to match 
the socioeconomic context in ways that are functionally effective with 
regard to reproduction. (Crook & Crook 1988: 98) 
 
Symons has two points in relation to this. The first is that evidence of adaptive 
behaviour is not evidence of an adaptation. This, in itself, seems uncontroversial. 
Symons' second point concerns Crook and Crook's assertion that some general-
purpose learning device could exist that would allow humans to behave 
adaptively in any given ecological or sociocultural environment. Evolutionary 
Psychologists consider the idea of such a general-purpose learning device to be 
incoherent. The commitment to the MMH entails that in novel environments – 
environments unlike our EEA – we should not expect people to behave 
adaptively in all respects: 
 
Since the adaptations that underpin human behavior were designed by 
selection to function in specific environments, there is a principled 
Darwinian argument for assuming that behavior in evolutionary novel 
environments will often be maladaptive. (Symons 1992: 154)  
 
Thus, we should not expect modern humans to display adaptive behaviour in any 
particular scenario. Indeed Evolutionary Psychologists suggest that we can 
assume the opposite, that humans are often maladapted to modern environments. 
The environment to which our cognitive adaptations have evolved to fit is, 
according to Evolutionary Psychologists, the Pleistocene. This is an environment 
(more correctly, a wide collection of environments) very different from modern 
industrialised cities. We can also assume the environment of our hunter-gatherer 
ancestors was quite different to that of agricultural societies. Humans, then, are 
not well adapted to the environments they have spent the last 10,000 years 
inhabiting. Thus, DSS is not, according to Symons, the correct way to employ 
Darwinian thinking to human behaviour and culture: “the hypothesis that human 
behavior is surprisingly adaptive does not derive from Darwinian theory and is 
almost certainly wrong in modern industrial environments” (1992: 155, my own 
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italics). Whether or not the co-fraternal polyandry of the Tibetans is adaptive, 
Symons argues, it is certainly not an adaptation.   
 
3.3 Mismatch 
The mismatch between our cognitive adaptations and our modern environments 
presents a problem for Evolutionary Psychology. Mismatches are not uncommon 
in evolutionary biology, and it is this that is often cited as the reason for the 
extinction of one species or another. But when this occurs with non-human 
animals, the changes that occur in the environment are not usually considered to 
have been caused by the species in question.
64
 A new species competing for the 
same food or habitat, a new predator, human interference, or catastrophic 
geological or meteorological events are typically cited in cases of mismatch. 
However, the change in the human environment since the Pleistocene is, by and 
large, not the result of autonomous environmental change. For instance, when 
Symons discusses why we should expect modern humans to be maladaptive, he 
mentions industrial cities. Presumably, our more recent ancestors were 
maladapted to agricultural societies, given life in such societies would differ in 
numerous ways from hunter-gather lifestyles. These are clearly environments 
created by human activity; it is human activity that has changed the environment. 
One issue then is to account for such environmental change. I will argue that 
Evolutionary Psychology cannot do this. 
 There are two aspects to thinking about culture and mismatch here. The 
first is the generation of culture such that it becomes ill-suited to our cognitive 
adaptations. The second is how we respond to a culture mismatched to us. These 
issues may be closely related – the maladaptive behaviours that arise due to 
mismatching might contribute to the generation of cultures that are mismatched 
in new, or more extreme ways. But as both the generation of culture and the 
response of individuals to that culture raise various issues of their own, I will 
treat them separately here. 
 
 
3.3.1 Generation of Culture  
                                                 
64
 Though see chapter two on niche construction for reasons to doubt this assumption. 
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Evolutionary Psychology is committed to the idea that our cognitive architecture 
was established in the Pleistocene and has changed very little since. It is this 
cognitive architecture that explains our behaviour and the generation of culture: 
 
Evolutionary Psychologists‟ general methodological strategy is to 
explain culture through explaining the evolved cognitive architecture 
that generates culture. If we understand what our cognitive mechanisms 
“that actually produce behavior,” were adaptations for, then we should 
be able to “predict behavior far more closely, even in modern cultures.” 
(Tooby & Cosmides 1989: 37, emphasis added.) 
 
Against this, however, Evolutionary Psychologists argue that our environments 
have changed quite radically. And Evolutionary Psychologists do not assume that 
these changes are merely superficial; recall Tooby and Cosmides‟, and Symons‟ 
suggestion that modern humans are often ill-suited to modern environments. The 
changes that have occurred in human environments are substantial enough to 
warrant Evolutionary Psychologists concluding that often our behaviour 
underpinned by cognitive adaptations will be maladaptive in modern 
environments. Evolutionary Psychology maintains that culture can be understood 
as the ultimate output of our cognitive adaptations, but how does this square with 
a culture so different from the EEA that we are maladapted? To put this tension 
into sharp relief, compare the following two quotations: 
 
By directly regulating individual behaviour and learning, [innate 
psychological mechanisms] directly govern cultural dynamics; the key 
to understanding cultural processes must therefore lie in the discovery 
and subsequent mapping of the properties of these complex and 
specialized psychological mechanisms. (Tooby & Cosmides 1989: 30, 
emphasis added.) 
 
Adaptive tracking must, of course, have characterized the psychological 
mechanisms governing culture during the Pleistocene, or such 
mechanisms could never have evolved; however, once human cultures 
were propelled beyond those Pleistocene conditions to which they were 
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adapted at high enough rates, the formerly necessary connection 
between adaptive tracking and cultural dynamics was broken. (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1989: 35) 
 
On the one hand, it is argued that culture is the product of our evolved cognitive 
mechanisms, while on the other hand, culture has run away from us. How do we 
explain, on the one hand, culture developing beyond our capacities to deal with it, 
and on the other hand, the claim that significant aspects of culture are directly 
governed by our evolved cognitive architecture? I will explore some possible 
answers to this question, but none will be particularly attractive to the 
Evolutionary Psychologist. 
 Evolutionary Psychologists, as discussed above, divide culture into three 
categories: metaculture, evoked culture, and epidemiological culture. 
Metaculture refers to the deep similarities that are supposed to exist between 
different human cultures. Evoked culture refers to the different cultural practices 
that result from the same adaptations receiving different inputs from the 
environment. In cold environments, for instance, finding materials and making 
clothing might be the output of an adaptation. In a warm climate, the same 
adaptation will not lead to this behaviour. To count as evoked culture, it must be 
behaviour that has occurred in the past and that has been adaptive and thus 
selected for. A cognitive adaptation that produced some entirely novel behaviour 
in an entirely novel environment could not be thought to be contributing to 
evoked culture. 
 The third type of culture Evolutionary Psychologists discuss is 
epidemiological culture. This arises out of individuals making discoveries of 
some sort (a quicker way to make a spear, a catchy tune, a new word), others 
learning from this individual's behaviour, and the trait slowly spreading 
throughout the population. This type of culture is the most likely explanation for 
cultural change, especially where cultural change is not preceded by any 
significant changes in the non-cultural aspects of the local ecology. (Where a 
cultural change occurs due to ecological change, the Evolutionary Psychologist 
can maintain that this cultural change is the result of evoked culture so long as 
the ecological change brings about conditions similar to those that existed in the 
Pleistocene.) Evolutionary Psychologists maintain that cultural differences are 
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superficial compared to the deep commonalities between cultures. If 
epidemiological culture is what accounts for (some of) the differences between 
cultures,
65
 it must only be superficial. It is difficult to argue about what is and is 
not superficial, such things can come down to explanatory goals or just personal 
interest.
66
 However, the ways in which modern humans are mismatched do not 
appear to be superficial by the standards of Evolutionary Psychology. For 
example, Evolutionary Psychologists, like evolutionary biologists more generally, 
put a good deal of emphasis on adaptations relating to reproduction. A good deal 
of time and effort has been put into avoiding reproduction in more modern 
societies, from celibate monks and nuns, to the availability of contraceptives. So 
if mismatch arises out of epidemiological culture, Evolutionary Psychologists 
must accept that epidemiological culture does not just concern “superficial” 
matters, but can alter behaviour in all manner of ways.  
 Evolutionary Psychologists also maintain that epidemiological culture is 
constrained by our evolved cognitive architecture. First of all, our cognitive 
adaptations will bring about epidemiological culture:   
 
... epidemiological culture is... shaped by the details of our evolved 
psychological organization. Thus, there is no radical discontinuity 
inherent in the evolution of “culture” that removes humans into an 
autonomous realm. (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 119) 
 
Second, our evolved cognitive architecture will determine what ideas and 
behaviours hit upon by one or a few individuals go on to form epidemiological 
culture. Someone may come up with a good idea or a clever way of doing 
something, but we need to be able to recreate the “representations or regulatory 
elements” in our own psychological architecture (Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 118). 
We require, according to Evolutionary Psychologists, mechanisms to allow us to 
infer the representations in the minds of those we observe:  
 
                                                 
65
 Evoked culture will also explain some differences between cultures. 
 
66
 See the discussion in chapter one of a similar issue in relation to explanatory adaptationism. 
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... this task of reconstruction would be unsolvable if the child did not 
come equipped with a rich battery of domain-specific inferential 
mechanisms, a faculty of social cognition, a large set of frames about 
humans and the world drawn from the common stock of human 
metaculture, and other specialized psychological adaptations designed to 
solve the problems involved in this task... Mechanisms designed for 
such inferential reconstruction evolved within a pre-existing complex 
psychological architecture and depended on this encompassing array of 
content-structuring mechanisms to successfully interpret observations, 
reconstruct representations, modify behavior, and so on. (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992: 119) 
 
So, epidemiological culture is constrained by our evolved psychological 
mechanisms on both sides. Our adaptations constrain the kinds of ideas or 
behaviours we might come up with, and our adaptations help determine what 
kinds of ideas or behaviours will succeed and spread throughout the population. 
 However, if epidemiological culture is shaped by the details of our evolved 
architecture in this way, it is difficult to see how this architecture can account for 
the generation of modern cultures to which we are supposed to be so unsuited. 
On the other hand, if epidemiological culture is responsible for the mismatch 
between our adaptations and our sociocultural environment, then the mechanisms 
that are thought responsible for the generation and transmission of culture cannot 
be particularly tightly constrained. In this latter case, Evolutionary Psychology 
will have little to say about epidemiological culture. Knowing about the 
evolution of the mechanisms involved in the generation of epidemiological 
culture will shed little light on the direction epidemiological culture has taken. 
As an analogy, evolutionary biologists may be able to tell us a great deal about 
the hand as an adaptation, but this adaptationist story will not tell us very much 
about the ability to write, play the guitar or sow. That is, the adaptationist story 
may put some constraints on what the human hand can do, but these constraints 
are quite broad. To understand writing, for instance, at best the evolutionary 
story will only feature as a partial explanation, and in many cases, may not be 
explanatorily relevant at all. Whatever the hand was adapted for, this has only a 
small bearing on writing now. Similarly, if the mechanisms that generate 
170 
 
epidemiological culture provide only the broadest of constraints on the kind of 
culture that can be generated, then knowledge of why such mechanisms evolved 
in the first place, though a potentially interesting story in its own right, will have 
little bearing on attempts to understand modern behaviour and culture.  
 Evolutionary Psychologists might attempt to diffuse this problem by 
claiming that epidemiological culture may have snowballed such that our modern 
environments are strikingly different than our EEA, but meta- and evoked culture 
retain their tight grip. Given this, Evolutionary Psychology still has a role in 
uncovering these aspects of our cultures and explaining them in terms of natural 
selection. This move will not work however. Epidemiological culture overrides 
much of meta- and evoked culture, otherwise there would be no interesting sense 
in which we were maladapted from the Evolutionary Psychologist‟s point of 
view. That is, if our cognitive adaptations were still producing meta- and evoked 
culture, then we would remain generally suited to our environments. If we are 
mismatched in important ways (recall the example of contraceptives above), then 
the adaptations responsible for evoked and meta-culture cannot be producing 
culture. Modern culture is then primarily epidemiological culture. And if 
Evolutionary Psychologists are forced to concede that the mechanisms which 
generate epidemiological culture only offer the broadest of constraints, they have 
rendered themselves irrelevant in attempts to explain culture and behaviour. That 
is, if modern cultures are different enough to allow us to assume, as Symons, 
Tooby and Cosmides do, that we are often maladapted, then Evolutionary 
Psychology has some work to do to explain this. In terms of the generation of 
culture, Evolutionary Psychology has to decide whether it wants to maintain that 
epidemiological culture is highly constrained and leave the appearance of 
mismatched cultures mysterious, or loosen the constraints placed on 
epidemiological culture, in which case Evolutionary Psychology loses its ability 
to explain very much about modern cultures. 
 
3.3.2 Responding to Mismatched Culture 
Evolutionary Psychologists might grant that the generation of epidemiological 
culture is largely unconstrained by evolved architecture and not something it has 
a great deal to say about. However, they may maintain that Evolutionary 
Psychology still has a role to play in explaining maladaptive behaviour in novel 
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environments. It cannot explain why such novel cultures come into existence, but 
it might explain why we behave in the maladaptive ways in response to such 
environments. 
 There are three ways in which we might expect individuals with 
adaptations to one sort of environment, or set of environments, to behave 
maladaptively in a new environment. The first is if an individual behaved in a 
manner appropriate for our EEA, but not for a modern environment. For example, 
a dispute between two people might end in violence. This might have been an 
adaptive response in the harsher environment of our ancestors, but is very likely 
to be maladaptive now. I will refer to this sort of a mismatch as a “positive 
mismatch” (in that a thought process or behaviour is actually elicited). The 
second kind of mismatch I will call a “negative mismatch” as it concerns the 
failure of any thought process or behaviour to be elicited. For example, Cosmides 
and Tooby (1997) claim that electrical sockets pose more of a threat to most 
Americans than snakes, yet these same people are more frightened of snakes. 
They argue that while we have evolved to be wary of snakes, we lack any such 
adaptation for electrical sockets (or many other features of modern 
environments). Mismatches occur because we fail to respond in this sort of case. 
The third way mismatch may come about is that, in a novel environment, 
cognitive adaptations receive new inputs which generated entirely novel outputs. 
This unpredictable output may be adaptive, but it is more likely to be 
maladaptive – there are just more ways to be maladaptive – in which case I will 
refer to it as “unpredictable mismatch.” I will argue that behaviour generated by 
positive mismatch is incompatible with the claim that modern cultures have 
become increasingly unsuitable for our cognitive adaptations. Evolutionary 
Psychology initially looks on firmer ground with failure to behave appropriately 
as a result of negative mismatch, but even here I will argue that its role is 
seriously circumscribed. Finally, I will argue that Evolutionary Psychology can 
tell us nothing about behaviour that stems from unpredictable mismatch. 
To demonstrate why a commitment to the idea that we are currently 
maladapted rules out the possibility that we frequently produce old ways of 
behaving (positive mismatch), let‟s take a hypothetical scenario based loosely 
around a hypothesis often proposed by Evolutionary Psychologists. According to 
Evolutionary Psychologists, men prefer as mates younger women due to their 
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greater reproductive potential, while women (at least of reproductive age) tend to 
prefer older men, as they are likely to have greater resources to provide for them 
and their children. As a result, we should expect younger women to marry older 
men. Now let‟s imagine a culture which, for some reason, considers marriage 
between two people of similar ages ideal, and marriage between people of vast 
age differences abhorrent; married couples with large age gaps face being 
ostracised by their communities, and so on. To act according to our supposed 
evolved preferences would be maladaptive. There are two possibilities here. 
Either people tend to act in accordance with their cultural norms, or they can act 
in accordance with their evolved preferences. If they act in accordance with their 
cultural norms, then Evolutionary Psychology has little to say about the 
behaviour of most people and (given the previous discussion) little to say about 
the origin or persistence of these cultural norms. At most, it may say something 
about the transgressors of the cultural norms (and even then, not all of them – 
some instances will have entirely different causes). At best, Evolutionary 
Psychology is highly marginalised. The real action is going on at the level of 
cultural norms, not evolved psychology.
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 If people tend to act in accordance with their evolved preferences instead 
of cultural norms, this would suggest that cultures should never stray too far from 
conditions similar to the EEA. Enough people breaking the rule about marriage 
would soon see that marriage system deteriorate and eventually abandoned. 
Societies might experience occasional perturbations as the result of 
epidemiological culture, but would generally hover around an equilibrium 
position.
68
 So, if mismatch leads to old behaviours in novel environments, we 
                                                 
67
 Evolutionary Psychologists may argue that their prime explanatory target is psychology not 
behaviour. Thus people may act in accordance with cultural norms but, for instance, feel 
conflicted in doing so, and Evolutionary Psychology can explain why. This is certainly an option 
available to them (though the discussion in the earlier half of this chapter casts doubt on the 
success for such a strategy). However, such a move would be to acknowledge that they are 
unable to discuss culture. 
 
68
  It might be argued that modern cultures represent only a perturbation in a system that will 
eventually right itself. 10,000 years is a short period of time from an evolutionary point of view. 
This line of thought, however, will not work. Cultural change can happen at a much faster pace 
than genetic evolution, thus 10,000 years is a lot of time for the system to have corrected itself. 
Tooby and Cosmides also deny that cultures are likely to resolve themselves to some optimal 
condition: “... there is no a priori reason to suppose that any specific modern cultural or 
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should expect mismatch to be rare as the old behaviours regenerate older, more 
“optimal” culture. On the other hand, if, as Evolutionary Psychologists suggest, 
mismatch often occurs such that we ought to assume it, and that the previous 
10,000 years have been characterised by a trend away from EEA conditions, this 
indicates that people do not tend to act in accordance with their evolved 
preferences. In this case, Evolutionary Psychology has little to say about modern 
human behaviour or culture. 
Evolutionary Psychology also faces problems with negative mismatch (the 
absence of an appropriate response to modern environments due to the absence 
of adaptations for modern environments). If we grant that epidemiological 
culture can exceed the limitations of our evolved cognitive adaptations, as we 
must do if modern cultures are unsuitable, we must also grant that we will be 
capable of behaving in ways we do not have specific adaptations for. Knowing 
that our EEA did not have a given feature tells us nothing about what modern 
humans can or cannot do. At best it may tell us about some of the things we 
cannot do because, first, our EEA did not contain the relevant structures and, 
second, epidemiological culture has not provided us with the wherewithal to deal 
with the particular problem. The inability to behave adaptively in a given 
situation is only partially explained by evolutionary considerations of the sort 
Evolutionary Psychologists employ. That is, the explanation will also have to 
refer to why epidemiological culture does not allow us to deal effectively with 
the problem. Recall Cosmides and Tooby‟s (1997) example of a negative 
mismatch: Americans are more at risk from electrical sockets than snakes, but 
are more wary of snakes than electrical sockets. Perhaps the absence of electrical 
sockets in our EEA explains why this is so. But if epidemiological culture can 
allow us to do things we have not been adapted for (agriculture, playing 
computer games, using contraception), then there is no principled reason why it 
might not also compensate for the lack of an adaptation to assess risk in relation 
to electrical sockets. So, to fully explain why we assess the risk of electrical 
sockets so poorly (if in fact we do), it is not enough to consider what we have 
been adapted for. Evolutionary Psychology alone cannot mark out the limitations 
of our cognitive abilities. At best, Evolutionary Psychology provides part of the 
                                                                                                                                    
behavioral practice is 'adaptive'... or that modern cultural dynamics will necessarily return 
cultures to adaptive trajectories if perturbed away” (1989: 35). 
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answer. In any given situation, it will be an open question as to whether 
epidemiological culture can supplement what evolution did not equip us with. 
The final option is that new environments provide input to our cognitive 
adaptations, and this results in some entirely novel behaviour being produced. 
This novel behaviour may occasionally, through blind luck, be adaptive, but we 
can probably assume that it usually will not be – again, there are far many more 
ways for something to go wrong than right. This sort of approach has potential in 
that it might explain why modern cultures have drifted so far from the EEA. If 
some small changes (perhaps due to epidemiological culture or change in the 
broader ecology) fed into our cognitive adaptations and produced strange and 
unpredictable behaviour, this potentially could have a snow-ball effect, pushing 
culture further and further away from its “optimal” state. However, the ability to 
explain why modern cultures are so far away from this optimal position comes at 
a high cost for Evolutionary Psychology. Evolutionary considerations will do 
little to explain these novel behaviours. Certainly, evolution can be thought of as 
creating the cognitive architecture that underpins these behaviours, but it cannot 
explain why a given behaviour was generated in a given environment – there is 
no evolutionary logic to the generation of this behaviour. The behaviour is a by-
product of cognitive adaptations, not their function. This is similar to the point 
above about the evolution of the hand and writing as a by-product. Knowing 
what a trait is adapted for tells us very little about by-products of that trait. The 
situation is in fact worse for Evolutionary Psychology than it is for the biologist 
who can tell us something about the evolution of the hand. The biologist can at 
least point to facts about physiology that constrain and enable the holding of a 
pen and so on. Given Evolutionary Psychology focuses solely on function (what 
the cognitive mechanism was adapted for) rather than the neurological details of 
mechanisms, it will have even less to say about any by-products of these 
cognitive adaptations.  
 
3.3.3 The Upshot for Evolutionary Psychology 
Evolutionary Psychology cannot explain how modern mismatched environments 
came about. It also cannot explain how this mismatch manifests itself. Behaviour 
as a result of positive mismatch, except in a minority of cases, seems ruled out as 
this would push modern cultures back to more “optimal” states. At best 
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Evolutionary Psychology only has a partial role in explaining the failure to act as 
a result of negative mismatch, and it has nothing at all to say about behaviour 
generated by unpredictable mismatch. This leaves Evolutionary Psychology with 
three options: deny mismatch occurs, accept DDS, or accept the SSSM. I will 
outline the consequences of each of these options for Evolutionary Psychology. 
Evolutionary Psychologists could reject the claim that modern humans are 
ill-suited to modern environments. They might argue that humans are not 
maladaptive in modern cultures because we replicate the conditions of the EEA 
(in the manner discussed above in relation to positive mismatch). The differences 
between conditions created by current cultures and the EEA would be merely 
superficial on this account. This gives Evolutionary Psychologists two options. 
They can argue that agriculture, industrialisation, systems of writing, birth 
control, states of all political hues, China's one child policy, and so on, all 
recreate at some deep, structural level conditions of the EEA. Alternatively, they 
can argue that these things are merely superficial. Neither strategy seems 
particularly promising. It is very difficult to see how, for instance, birth control 
and industrialisation recreate EEA conditions; this seems outright implausible. 
On the other hand, arguing that such behaviours and cultural practices are merely 
superficial elements of modern cultures seems difficult to accept too. For 
instance, given that reproduction is at the heart of natural selection, modern 
contraceptive use seems to amount to more than a superficial element of culture. 
In any case, it is evident that Evolutionary Psychologists do not currently think 
such cultural practices are superficial, given their assumption that we are often 
maladapted to our modern worlds. Although arguing that we are in fact well 
adapted to modern environments would allow Evolutionary Psychologists to hold 
on to most of their other theoretical commitments (unlike the alternatives I will 
shortly explore), it is not clear how such a move could be achieved. An awful lot 
of work would need to be done to establish that modern environments really do 
substantially replicate our EEA. 
Alternatively, Evolutionary Psychology could move closer to DSS and 
claim that we are capable of more flexible responses to the environment which 
ensure our adaptedness. In line with the sort of argument presented by DSS, 
evolution would have had to endow us with the ability to respond effectively to 
brand new circumstances and to learn new ways of coping with them such that 
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we remain adaptive. Cultures may change over time, but we are capable of 
behaving adaptively in such new environments because we have some general 
capacity for culture. This would allow evolutionary considerations to continue to 
play a role in explaining modern human behaviour and culture. However, this 
move cannot be made by Evolutionary Psychologists unless they relinquish their 
MMH. Recall Tooby and Cosmides (1992) argument for MMH was motivated 
by the thought that a general-purpose problem solver – in this case a general 
ability to generate and acquire cultural practices – is incoherent. If Evolutionary 
Psychologists accept such a general-purpose capacity for culture they have 
undermined their argument for domain-specific, content-rich modules. It is 
possible to develop accounts of the mind that mix special-purpose modules with 
general-purpose capacities. However, if Evolutionary Psychologists wish to 
move in this direction, they will need to develop an entirely new set of arguments. 
The argument offered for the MMH was the implausibility (even impossibility) 
of a domain-general problem solver. If they grant that such general-purpose 
problem solvers are possible, they have removed the foundation of their 
particular argument for any modularity. New grounds would need to be sought to 
establish the idea that any modules are required. 
Finally, if Evolutionary Psychologists wish to maintain that we are 
fundamentally ill-suited to modern environments, they cannot explain modern 
cultures or behaviours. Evolutionary Psychologists could accept a division of 
labour with the SSSM. Evolutionary Psychology can attempt to explain the 
evolution of our cognitive architecture, but leave discussions of human behaviour 
and cultures since the Pleistocene to those employing the SSSM. Evolutionary 
Psychologists might concede that evolutionary considerations will not be enough 
to explain everything about human behaviour and cultures. Indeed, they do admit 
this much, though what they expect to not be able to explain is merely superficial 
differences, rather than the much larger portion of human behaviours and 
cultures at stake here. But even if they acknowledge that they cannot fully 
explain modern human behaviour and culture, they might still argue that the 
SSSM ought to be avoided due to their belief that its basic commitment to the 
mind as a “blank slate” is utterly wrong-headed. However, it is not clear that the 
SSSM really is committed to the mind being a blank slate: 
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Certainly, no-one – not even Skinner and his followers – has ever 
believed in the blank slate of Pinker's title. Even behaviorists believe 
that the human mind has in-built learning mechanisms and preferences, 
in the absence of which schedules of reinforcement would be useless. 
All sides in the nature-nurture debate (at least all minimally rational 
sides) are interactionists. (Levy 2004: 461) 
 
The SSSM then does not deny that the mind has some structure, and that this 
structure may have some evolutionary explanation, it rather maintains that this 
structure is flexible enough to allow for some general capacity for culture. If the 
point is to study culture, this general capacity will not be particularly interesting 
or explanatorily relevant. This is similar to the view of the mind employed by 
DSS, except that the SSSM does not require that the mind produces adaptive 
behaviours and cultural systems. Thus the SSSM model of the mind is more 
plastic than that assumed by DSS, but this has the benefit of allowing 
Evolutionary Psychology to claim modern environments are not what humans 
adapted to, and thus we should not expect modern humans to tend to act to 
increase their inclusive fitness. 
 Evolutionary Psychology cannot help us explain – even in quite broad 
terms – the kinds of cultural changes that have occurred since the Pleistocene, 
nor can it explain how individuals react to these changed circumstances. It 
cannot give us guidelines, drawn from evolutionary considerations, about what 
we should and should not expect people to do. If cultural change has been 
significant enough to render us often maladapted, it seems culture can evolve 
well beyond any constraints our adaptations might have been assumed to place 
on culture. And if culture is nothing more than the product of our minds, our 
minds can do a good deal more than what they have been adapted for. 
Understanding our cognitive adaptations as adaptations will shed very little light 
on the generation of modern cultures or the behaviour of modern humans. 
Research into human behaviour and culture would be preferable, 
methodologically, assuming very little about the mind, at least from an 
evolutionary point of view. Building into any theory the details of the 
evolutionary explanations for cognitive architecture will be superfluous to 
demands given that evolutionary understandings of cognitive architecture will do 
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no work for anyone interested in modern human behaviour or culture. If we 
accept that we live in environments mismatched to our adaptations, whatever 
constraints the evolved architecture of our mind imposes, on the Evolutionary 
Psychologist's account, they must be broad and uninformative.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Evolutionary Psychology has its foundations in neo-Darwinian evolutionary 
theory. However, Evolutionary Psychologists make stronger claims about 
evolution and development than are warranted given this foundation, and do so 
without justification. To establish the universality of our supposed evolved 
cognitive architecture, Tooby and Cosmides allow that this universality can be at 
the level of genetic programmes; however, universality is discussed only the 
level of cognitive architecture once the case for universality is made. Similarly, 
the commitment to the idea that “our modern skulls house a stone age mind” 
downplays the role of genetic switches and the potential for evolutionary changes 
in periods of time shorter than they will allow. Again, such switches have 
become uncontroversial in neo-Darwinian biology, and Tooby and Cosmides do 
not offer justification for the marginalisation of such phenomena.  
Further, the adaptationist programme poses a range of problems specific to, 
or at least more acute for, Evolutionary Psychology. It is very difficult, if not 
often impossible, to determine the selection pressures our ancestors would have 
encountered in their social worlds. This means that Evolutionary Psychology 
must rely on modern humans as a major source of information about our 
evolutionary past. However, modern humans – whether living in industrialised 
cities or hunter-gatherer societies – often do not appear to behave in accordance 
with the kind of cognitive adaptations Evolutionary Psychologists propose. We 
have created and maintained very different cultures from those of our ancestors 
by Evolutionary Psychologists‟ own admission. What this means is that 
Evolutionary Psychologists will find it difficult to use modern human behaviour 
– or inferences about our psychology based on this behaviour – as evidence for 
claims about our Pleistocene ancestors. Ultimately, the tension for Evolutionary 
Psychologists with regard to culture arises here because on the one hand, they 
want to argue that culture is generated and constrained by our evolved 
psychology, and on the other, that we are often poorly matched to modern 
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cultures. If Evolutionary Psychologists downgrade their commitment to the idea 
of mismatch, then they are forced to either explain why modern cultures really 
are like our EEA, or they are forced to move closer to DSS and abandon their 
massive modularity hypothesis. Alternatively, if they feel it is implausible that 
modern environments are really that close to our EEA (as they appear to do at 
least some of the time, when not discussing cultural universals), and want to keep 
the idea of mismatch, then they are forced to allow the SSSM to do most of the 
work in explaining modern human behaviour and cultures.  
Although I have focused here on Evolutionary Psychology, these issues 
will pose a problem for any attempt to offer an evolutionary explanation for 
human psychology and behaviour that supposes we are adapted to ancestral 
environments and mismatched to the modern world. There is a requirement for 
any theory of this sort to explain why modern cultures are so different. And 
because modern human behaviour and culture is so different, it cannot be used to 
decide between different hypotheses about selection pressures in our ancestors‟ 
social environments. Even if we do possess cognitive adaptations for our EEA, it 
seems unclear that we behave in accordance with them. Thus, any approach to 
the evolution of human psychology and behaviour that suggests we have evolved 
to suit very different environments to the ones we currently inhabit will be faced 
with a large evidential gap.  
In the following chapter I will explore a broad class of approaches to the 
evolution of culture known as gene-culture co-evolutionary accounts. I will 
suggest how elements of this sort of approach can be made compatible with a 
developmental systems perspective. Unlike Evolutionary Psychology, these 
approaches do not focus to the same extent on the details of psychology. 
However, especially in the case of the model of gene-culture co-evolution 
presented by Richerson and Boyd (2005), a model of human psychology not 
unlike that employed by Evolutionary Psychologists is assumed. In chapter seven 
I will examine a very different model of cognition. Together, chapters six and 
seven will present an alternative way to understand the evolution of cognition 
and culture which incorporates the developmentally informed view of evolution 
developed in part one of this thesis.  
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Chapter Six 
Biology and Culture 
 
1. Introduction 
A different kind of evolutionary approach to culture has been developed under 
the heading of gene-culture co-evolution. I will briefly examine one version of 
this – memetics – and argue that this approach adds very little to our 
understanding of culture or cultural evolution. The second approach, developed 
by Richerson and Boyd (2005), is more promising. They develop models of 
cultural evolution that undermine the worry that vertical transmission and error-
prone learning make cultural evolution unlikely. While I will argue that they 
have identified some plausible mechanisms that might underpin cultural 
evolution, I will reject their assumption of evolved psychological modules of the 
sort Evolutionary Psychology supposes, and their dichotomous genes/culture 
account. 
 Richerson and Boyd's work on models of selection provides a means of 
dealing with an objection raised against developmental systems theory and 
discussed in chapter four – that of vertical transmission. I will use their general 
approach to sketch an account of the evolution of developmental systems that can 
be partially constituted by culture. However, I will argue that evolutionary 
explanations will not provide a complete explanation for culture, and using the 
work of Hacking (1996) on the looping effects of human kinds, suggest that the 
study of culture cannot easily be made contiguous with the natural sciences. 
 
2. Gene-Culture Co-Evolution 
Evolutionary Psychology views culture as the product of evolved cognitive 
architecture, and maintains that culture can be explained primarily by 
understanding these cognitive mechanisms. DSS, on the other hand, is non-
committal about the nature of our psychology, save that we have evolved the 
capacity to establish an adaptive way of living in novel environments and to 
learn these ways of living from others. It nonetheless views culture as 
underpinned by the drive of individuals to maximise their inclusive fitness. A 
third approach to evolution and culture takes culture as something to be 
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understood in its own right. It may be related to biology, but it is not tightly 
constrained by it, and it can be largely understood at the level of culture (rather 
than psychology or biology). Cultures or cultural variants can, on these accounts, 
evolve and form lineages: 
 
... cultural diversity should be understood in many respects in the same 
way as biological diversity – that is, as the result of an evolutionary 
process. In particular, individual variation, and processes analogous to 
selection, should be seen as providing a historical basis for the present 
existence of various internally articulated and integrated cultural forms. 
(Dupré 2002: 140) 
 
Possibly the most well-known version of this view is memetics, and I will briefly 
discuss this to begin with. Far more interesting however is an approach 
developed by Richerson and Boyd (2005) which applies population thinking to 
the issue of cultural evolution. I will discuss this approach, and although I will 
ultimately disagree with some basic assumptions underlying it, I will suggest that 
a number of the tools developed by Richerson and Boyd can be of use to DST. 
Finally, I will sketch a picture of culture and cultural evolution from a DST 
perspective.   
 
2.1 Memes 
Cultural evolution, it might be thought, shares many similarities with biological 
evolution. There can be variation within a population, there can be inheritance of 
culture (or aspects of culture) from one generation to the next (and from peer-to-
peer – I will discuss this complication in more detail below), and some 
cultures/aspects of a culture will be more successful than others in terms of their 
longevity. Memetics, for instance, takes this approach. The idea here is that we 
can understand culture as a collection of memes – discrete, gene-like ideas that 
behave in much the same way as genes. They form a distinct inheritance channel, 
and are replicated in each generation. Some memes disappear quite quickly, 
while others seem to spread from person to person over longer periods of time 
(Dawkins 1989; Blackmore 1999). 
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 However, Sperber (1996, 2000) argues that culture cannot be understood in 
this way; it is neither particulate, not replicated. Certainly some cultural variants 
may conform to something like the meme-like picture. Sperber uses the example 
of a chain letter, for instance. Like genes, successful memes are supposed to 
benefit themselves through promoting their own replication, and not necessarily 
benefit the vehicle for their replication. A chain letter which warns of dire 
repercussions for the person who does not forward the letter does not benefit the 
individual who passes on the letter, but ensures its propagation throughout the 
population. Something like this, Sperber grants, might be considered a meme. 
But, he argues, such examples are not representative of culture more generally. 
Culture cannot be understood as being composed of discrete, gene-like entities. 
Cultural variants are not inherited vertically on this picture, and beyond this, are 
not even inherited from one or two parents, but potentially from a large number 
of sources. Memes do not appear to form lineages: 
 
In general, if you are serious in describing bits of culture – individual 
texts, pots, songs or individual abilities to produce them – as 
replications of earlier bits, then you should be willing to ask about any 
given token cultural item: of which previous token is it a direct replica? 
In most cases, however, you will be forced to conclude that each token 
is replica not of one parent token, nor (as in sexual reproduction) of two 
parent tokens, nor of any fixed number of parent tokens, but of an 
indefinite number of tokens some of which have played a much greater 
“parental” role than others. (Sperber 1996: 104) 
 
 If memes are analogous to genes, we should also expect them to be 
replicators. However, a problem often raised against the idea of memetics is that 
the “replication” of memes is highly error-prone. While genetic replication is 
quite faithful, people can misremember a recipe, or the lyrics to a song, and so on. 
Selective forces can be rendered ineffectual against a high enough mutation rate 
(Williams 1966; Sperber 2000; Richerson & Boyd 2005). Whatever selection 
acts upon must persist long enough for a trend to emerge. The lack of fidelity in 
the replication of memes (and the transmission of culture in other theories of 
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cultural evolution) is taken to count against the possibility of selective forces 
having any effect on cultural traits. 
 Dawkins (1999b) argues that this objection is wrong. Dawkins and Sperber 
discuss the same sort of issue, and I will use Sperber's example here. Sperber 
imagines two groups of people where one person from each group is shown a 
picture and asked to make a copy. They must then show their picture to the next 
person in the group and ask them to make a copy. The process continues until all 
the people in the group have drawn a picture. The first group is shown a familiar 
picture, which in Sperber's example is a star. The second group is shown a 
random pattern. Sperber's reasonable assumption is that the individuals in the 
group that began with a picture of the star will all produce a picture of a star, 
while the group that began with the squiggle will produce pictures that tend 
further and further away from the original picture. The first picture will be more 
easily reproduced than the second. Dawkins explains the difference in fidelity of 
the copying as a result of individuals in the first set following a particular set of 
instructions for drawing a star – the “genotype” for the star's “phenotype” 
(Sperber 2000) – while the individuals in the second set have no access to the 
instructions or “genotype” for the scribble, and can only try to reproduce the 
“phenotype.” In terms of the star, Dawkins argues, “the instructions are self-
normalising. The code is error-correcting” (Dawkins 1999b; quoted in Sperber 
2000). Errors are thus the result of individuals not having access to the 
instructions. Once we have access to the instructions, faithful replication can 
occur. Of course, the group that reproduced the picture of the star will not have 
produced perfect facsimiles of the star; there will be variations between each 
drawing. However, there will still be a recognisable star in each case. This, it is 
argued, is much like biological reproduction. The genotype is replicated, but the 
phenotype can vary as a result of environmental influences and the vagaries of 
development. Despite variations in the phenotype, replication is still occurring at 
the level of the genes. Similarly, while the stars may not be identical in each 
picture, the instructions followed will be the same. Thus, once we have access to 
the instructions we can replicate a meme for long periods of time and so the idea 
that memetic evolution lacks fidelity is thought to have been dealt with. However, 
as Sperber notes, this has only replaced one problem with another: “saying that 
the instructions are 'self-normalising' amounts to resolving a problem by 
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invoking a mystery” (2000). That is, how is it that the instructions are so much 
better replicated than the drawing? Dawkins has not adequately responded here 
to the worry that cultural transmission is too error-prone to allow for selection to 
operate.
69
 
 Ultimately, the meme approach is beset by problems. Even if we accept, as 
Sperber and Richerson and Boyd do, that some things like chain letters exhibit 
meme-like (or gene-like) properties, it is far from clear that this is typical of all 
aspects of culture. Culture does not replicate itself in the way genes are supposed 
to (on a neo-Darwinian reading of genetic replication at least), and cultures are 
very difficult to partition up into neat particles for selection to act on. For 
example, Lewens notes: 
 
Ideas stand in logical relations to each other. Whether an individual is 
able to acquire some belief, for example, depends on their related 
conceptual competencies. It is impossible to believe in the theory of 
relativity without understanding it, and one cannot understand it without 
holding many additional beliefs relating to physics. (Lewens 2007) 
 
However, as Lewens, notes, genes cannot be properly understood in isolation 
from other genes either. At the very least, genes need to be understood in the 
context of the DNA sequence, and a DST perspective would suggest a far wider 
context again. Despite this, it might be argued by neo-Darwinians, we can still 
think about genes as being selected for and forming lineages. Similarly, while 
memes might only be understood fully when viewed in their broader context, we 
can still talk about and study memes.  
 Perhaps the most damning problem for memetics is that it tells us very little; 
it merely re-describes well-known phenomena in the language of memetics, but 
gives us no new insight into these phenomena (Lewens 2007). Some ideas or 
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 Sperber himself argues that the meme approach cannot handle this problem of replication, 
because replication is not what is occurring. The failure of memetics to recognise this is because 
it is relatively neutral about human psychology. Sperber prefers an account that is based on 
domain-specific competencies that allow us to infer the intentions of the artist of each star 
drawing, so that rather than copying instructions for the drawing, the next person is able to infer 
the intentions of the previous artist and draw the star themselves. Thus, the star is not replicated, 
but rather re-produced. 
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behaviours are very popular and persist for many generations, others do not. 
Memetics does not tell us why some memes succeed while others fail. Memetics 
appears to be descriptive (and descriptive of potentially only a very small aspect 
of culture) rather than explanatory. If we want to know why certain ideas succeed 
or fail, we need to look somewhere other than memetics. 
 
2.2 Population Thinking 
Richerson and Boyd (2005) offer a more promising account. They reject the idea 
of memes, agreeing with Sperber (and others) that cultural variants are rarely 
particulate and are not faithfully replicated. However, they disagree with Sperber 
that the problem of error rules out the possibility of cultural evolution.  
 Culture need only be seen as meme-like if our account of cultural evolution 
is to be analogous to neo-Darwinian evolution. However Richerson and Boyd 
suggest that cultural evolution will not be strictly analogous to (neo-Darwinian) 
biological evolution. Nor need it be. In the case of DST, what can be inherited 
can come from numerous sources, and these resources cannot be understood 
independently, but only in the context of the entire developmental system.  
 One reason for treating culture as a collection of discrete gene-like memes 
stems from an early criticism of Darwinian evolution theory by Jenkin (1867). 
The worry here was that a system of inheritance like the one Darwin (1905) 
proposed (pangenesis) would lead to the blending of traits and eventually the 
averaging out of any variation. The worry is that if cultural inheritance is not 
particulate blending will eliminate variation and leave nothing for selection to 
work on. However, Richerson and Boyd argue that this need not be a concern for 
cultural evolution. The issue here turns on rates of mutation. In genetic evolution, 
mutation rates are taken to be relatively low; however, with cultural evolution the 
tendency for error means that mutation rates will be high. This means that the 
variation in the population will not level out; errors will continue to introduce 
novel variants. Contrary to the worry, raised above, that high levels of error ruled 
out cultural evolution by natural selection, moderately high error may actually 
make possible cultural evolution.  
 Richerson and Boyd admit that very little is known about the kinds of 
cultural variants that will be subject to selection, or how exactly we should 
understand them, but argue that “if it were true that adaptive evolution depended 
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critically on the units of transmission, Darwin and all his followers would still be 
marking time, waiting for developmental work definitively showing how genes 
give rise to the properties of organisms” (2005: 81).  Such considerations allow 
Richerson and Boyd to remain relatively agnostic about the exact nature of 
cultural variants that selection might work on, instead focussing on the 
mechanisms that might enable cultural evolution. 
 But although some error may in fact help a non-particulate theory of 
cultural evolution, if the error rate is too high no cultural variant will be visible 
for long enough to be subject to selection. Richerson and Boyd suggest that the 
problem of error-prone learning can be overcome by focussing on the population, 
rather than the individual, level. That is, errors can be made by individuals, but at 
the population level we still see cultural variants persist. Richerson and Boyd 
propose three mechanisms that will keep error in check: content bias that allows 
individuals to decide between variants based on their perceived value, conformist 
bias that means that individuals tend to adopt the most common cultural variant, 
and prestige bias that means that individuals tend to adopt the cultural variant 
adopted by successful members of the population. With these three mechanisms, 
they argue, errors made by individuals in learning can be minimised to the extent 
that selection is possible.  
 Content bias allows individuals to decide between variants in the 
population. One individual may have made some error in learning a particular 
recipe, for example.
70
 Now there are, in this very simplistic example, two 
variants to choose between – the original recipe and the new one. Perhaps the 
new recipe is preferred because the food produced tastes nicer, or because it 
relies on more easily available ingredients. In such a case the new recipe may 
spread through the population. On the other hand, perhaps the new recipe is 
inferior. In this case, other individuals can chose to reject it and stick with the 
original recipe. The point here is that individuals may make errors, but this does 
not mean that errors will propagate throughout the population. If people 
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to some change in the original cultural variant. The individual in question may have consciously 
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analogies with neo-Darwinian evolution. 
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generally prefer one way of doing things, for whatever reasons, even quite 
frequent errors do not have to undermine the persistence of cultural variants.  
 Conformity bias is a tendency for individuals to imitate the most common 
variant in the population. Errors that occur in any one individual's attempt to 
imitate the behaviour of others will fail to be imitated by others in a large enough 
population where individuals are exposed to a representative sample of that 
population. Individuals who have made errors will form a minority of any sample, 
thus a conformity bias will ensure that a new imitator will favour the common 
type. 
 Finally, a prestige bias is a tendency for individuals to imitate the 
successful. As an example, going to university may be a cultural variant adopted 
by teachers. Let's assume for this example students view teachers as successful 
and so want to imitate them by going to university too. At least some of those 
students will go on to become teachers and exert the same sort of influence over 
future generations of students. The cultural variant – going to university and 
becoming a teacher – persists. For prestige bias to take place, there needs to be a 
correlation between those things that signal success and those things that cause 
success. For example, some students may make an erroneous connection – 
perhaps they suppose the teacher's accent or dress sense, rather than education, is 
the key to success and instead copy these aspects of the teacher's behaviour. Such 
individuals will not go on to be teachers, and their cultural variant (the accent or 
dress sense) is not imitated by future students (though future students may also 
independently hit upon these variants). However, so long as there is a causal 
connection between the cultural variant in question and the success of the 
individual, this will have the effect of dampening error. Those who get it wrong 
will be less able to influence future generations than those who get it right. With 
these three mechanisms, approached from the level of the population rather than 
just the level of individual learning, Richerson and Boyd argue that cultural 
evolution can withstand a high degree of error-prone learning.  
 Of course, stability is important, but so too is variation. Richerson and 
Boyd allow two mechanisms for the generation of variation: cultural mutation 
and cultural drift (2005: 69). Cultural mutation is the idea of error already 
discussed: people misremembering or misunderstanding something, or 
purposefully doing something in a new way. Content bias may then allow 
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individuals to compare variants and decide on the best one. The already common 
variant may be preferred, but where an error leads to some perceived benefit, that 
may be adopted instead. Cultural drift is analogous to genetic drift and is the 
result of sampling errors. While Richerson and Boyd provide mechanisms that 
prevent error propagating throughout the population, these mechanisms are only 
thought to be most effective in larger groups, in smaller groups cultural drift will 
play a more prominent role. If only a small number of people in a group possess 
a skill (boat building in Richerson and Boyd's example), and should they all die 
young, the skill may die out with them. The larger the population, the smaller the 
role drift will play. 
 Richerson and Boyd believe these mechanisms ensure cultures have the 
requisite properties required for evolution through selection. Cultural variants 
can persist long enough to be visible to selection, there can be competition 
between variants, and mutations can arise. I will turn to some criticisms of this 
approach, but argue that developmental systems theory can take much from this 
approach. 
 
2.3 Culture, Genes and Development 
Cultural evolution, on this account, does not float completely free from genetic 
evolution in two ways. First, the biases discussed above (for conformity or 
prestige) are thought to be grounded in evolved cognitive mechanisms so that 
genetic evolution influences cultural evolution. Second, cultural evolution is 
thought to impact on the direction of genetic evolution. Richerson and Boyd are 
presenting here a gene-culture co-evolution theory similar to Lewontin‟s niche 
constructionism whereby when we alter our environments, we alter the selection 
pressures we are subject to.
71
 The development of dairy farming and the 
subsequent evolution of lactose tolerance in some human populations is the best 
known example of this. Richerson and Boyd also suggest that technologies 
invented by our ancestors affected the evolution of our morphology. Our hominid 
ancestors are thought to have been physically stronger and more robust than 
modern humans. Effective projectile weapons are suggested to have played a role 
in selection for less robust, but cheaper, physiques. Similarly, they argue that our 
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vocal tracts and auditory systems evolved in response to proto-languages, which 
allowed us to develop more nuanced, sophisticated languages, which in turn 
provided more selection pressure on our vocal tracts and auditory systems (2005: 
193).  
 The evolution of cognitive mechanisms that leads to the kinds of biases 
Richerson and Boyd invoke in their theory are more problematic, in that these 
mechanisms are assumed to be of the same sort as are postulated by Evolutionary 
Psychology, and so are susceptible to many of the same objections as face 
Evolutionary Psychology and neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology.
72
 Key to 
Richerson and Boyd's approach is a dichotomy between biology and culture that 
we can also put pressure on. Developmental systems theory allows us to view 
recurrent environmental structures as part of the developmental resources of an 
organism. Culture, or aspects of a culture, can form structures that feature as 
developmental resources for humans. The developmental systems approach, 
unlike gene-culture co-evolutionary accounts, does not envisage a dichotomous 
inheritance system – culture forming one inheritance channel and genes the other. 
Richerson and Boyd's account conceives the biological and the cultural as 
distinct domains, though domains that may interact. This allows Richerson and 
Boyd to assume certain psychological mechanisms (modules for conformity bias, 
for prestige bias) are already given, with culture as inputs to, and output from, 
pre-existing structures. But such a picture is misleading. Ingold argues: 
 
... behavioral dispositions are neither preconstituted genetically nor 
simply down-loaded onto the passively receptive individual from a 
superior source in society, but are rather formed in and through a 
process of ontogenetic development within a specific environmental 
context. (2001: 257) 
 
Psychological mechanisms do not appear first, only then to be given inputs from 
the environment. The developmental picture assumed by Richerson and Boyd's 
account, whereby we have specific modules that tend us towards imitating 
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 See chapter five for a discussion for why we should doubt the evolutionary reasons given 
for the appearance of such mechanisms, and chapter seven for reasons to doubt the picture of 
cognition implied by such an approach. 
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common behaviours, or behaviours of the successful, is as misleading as that in 
Evolutionary Psychology and neo-Darwinism more generally. Psychological 
architecture develops in a culture: 
 
The notion that culture is transmissible from one generation to the next 
as a corpus of knowledge, independently of its application in the real 
world, is untenable for the simple reason that it rests on the impossible 
precondition of a ready-made cognitive architecture. In fact, I maintain, 
nothing is really transmitted at all. The growth of knowledge in the life 
history of a person is a result not of information transmission but of 
guided rediscovery, where what each generation contributes to the next 
are not rules and representations for the production of appropriate 
behavior but the specific conditions of development under which 
successors, growing up in a social world, can build up their own 
aptitudes and dispositions. (Ingold 2001: 272) 
 
In a world where certain environmental structures are ubiquitous and available as 
developmental resources, members of the population may experience similar 
developmental trajectories. As a result, it is possible to accept that the sort of 
biasing phenomena Richerson and Boyd discuss do in fact occur, but to locate 
the causes of these phenomena elsewhere.  
 For example, conformity bias suggests that we imitate the most common 
forms of behaviour in the population. A young beaver will often be born into a 
group which has built, and maintains, a dam and lodge. This will structure the 
behaviour of the beaver in many ways. As they learn how to gather food, they 
will tend to use the artificial lake created by the dam to transport the food home. 
They will tend to use the lake to get closer to the food and thus avoid predation. 
They will behave like other beavers because they are born into environments in 
which behaving this way is an easily available course of action. Similarly, if pens 
and paper are readily at hand because people commonly use them to, say, solve 
complex mathematical problems, new generations may continue to use them to 
solve complex mathematical problems. Thus a behaviour – solving complex 
mathematical problems – is reproduced in the population. Once a particular 
behaviour that is constituted by aspects of the environment is already common, 
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the environmental structures in question will be readily available to new 
generations and thus increase the likelihood of the cognitive process or behaviour 
persisting.  
 Prestige bias may partially be explained in a similar way. That is, prestige 
bias may – in some cases at least – be a special case of conformity bias. 
Richerson and Boyd might explain a fashion for dressing like a particular 
celebrity as an example of people attempting to imitate already successful people. 
However, this need not be the case. For example, if a celebrity adopts a certain 
style of clothing, high street stores soon offer clothing of a similar type. Indeed, 
many high street stores only offer clothing of this type. To buy new clothes, we 
must buy clothing that resembles the clothing of the celebrity. The environment 
becomes structured in such a way that we may end up dressing in a similar 
manner to the celebrity, though without any specific intention to do so. The 
success of the celebrity explains the ubiquity of the clothing in shops, but it is not 
(necessarily) the case that a wish to imitate the celebrity explains why in fact 
people may end up doing so. Rather, it is a fact about the structure of the 
environment, and why it has been structured that way. Successful people may 
often have more opportunity to structure the environment in ways that suit them, 
and so, as with conformity bias, the ubiquity of the environmental structure may 
explain (at least some of the time) why there can be a trend to behave in ways 
similar to successful individuals. In this way, we can accept Richerson and 
Boyd's idea that cultural evolution is possible, without subscribing to the idea 
that we have evolved specific modules for conformist and prestige biases. The 
alternative I have sketched here focuses on how environmental structures can 
shape behaviours, but says very little about our psychology. This, however, will 
be the topic of the next chapter.  
 Concerns raised by Sterelny (2001) about the possibility of selection in 
circumstances where inheritance is not largely horizontal were aimed as much at 
theories of cultural evolution as DST. In chapter four I discussed some reasons 
why this did not have to be a problem for DST. Similarly, it need not be a 
problem here. The worry with respect to cultural evolution stems from 
considerations of the intergenerational stability of traits. It is generally assumed 
within neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology that for evolution by natural 
selection, offspring should more closely resemble their parents than strangers in 
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order that traits can be visible to selection and acted upon over numerous 
generations. With cultural evolution it is envisaged, not that children will 
necessarily resemble their parents, but that individuals in one generation will 
tend to resemble individuals in the next such that cultural practices persist over 
time. But because horizontal transmission is possible, new variants could arise 
and spread throughout a population in less time than it takes for one generation to 
replace another.  
 Richerson and Boyd's (2005) psychological biases, and the idea developed 
here concerning behaviours structured by ubiquitous environmental structures, 
provide mechanisms which may act to suppress some cultural variation and 
preserve stability. Although neither of these accounts assumes 100% vertical 
transmission, or anything close to this, so long as there are mechanisms which 
preserve some variants over others, intergenerational stability of variants can be 
preserved. More broadly, developmental resources may be inherited from a wide 
range of places, but this need not lead to the instability that undermines the 
possibility of selection so long as mechanisms exist that recreate or maintain the 
relevant environmental structures. Some individuals may make errors, but 
viewed from a population-level perspective such stability-preserving 
mechanisms may prevent such errors from propagating throughout the 
population. A conformity bias, created by the ability to use a particular aspect of 
the environment as a resource for development, combined with the ubiquity of 
that aspect of the environment, will tend individuals towards recreating 
behaviour or developmental trajectories already common in the population.   
 This suggests that evolutionary developmental systems can include aspects 
of culture among the inherited developmental resources for the developing 
system. Further, developmental systems will recreate many of those 
developmental resources, including the cultural resources, so that they are 
available for future generations (as well as peers).  
 
3. The Limits of Theories of Cultural Evolution 
The preceding arguments have been aimed at establishing the possibility of 
evolution by natural selection for developmental systems partially composed of 
resources in the cultural environment. This is not to say that all aspects of culture 
ought to, or even can, be understood in this way. Indeed we might still maintain 
193 
 
that, even with some mechanisms that promote stability, a good deal of culture is 
too transient to be visible to natural selection.  
 Dupré (2002) notes that cultural variants may be less persistent in modern 
societies in which there exists a good deal of interaction between different 
cultural traditions, and that any useful cultural taxonomy may break down in the 
modern world. This merging of cultures may lead to cultural change at a rate too 
rapid for selection processes to operate on. The study of evolution is, among 
other things, the study of the diversity of species. Theories of cultural evolution 
need to identify analogous taxonomic entities, and Dupré calls these entities 
“cultural species.” He argues that in the modern world such a taxonomy breaks 
down because people may “be divided by economic class, ethnic background, 
religious belief, geographic region, and no doubt many other factors, all of which 
more or less cross-classify the population” (2002: 145). Against this, however, 
are the case studies of Richerson and Boyd (2005) concerning Anabaptist 
communities in America and Canada, as well as farming communities descended 
from German-Catholic immigrants in the American Midwest. Such communities 
are, by and large, maintaining their distinctive cultures. This, it is argued by 
Richerson and Boyd, is due to the aspects of their cultural practices which act as 
mechanisms to preserve their identity. For instance, the Anabaptist practice in the 
United States of parochial schooling, as well as lack of exposure to television and 
a good deal of other modern technologies, means children inherit cultural 
practices only from other Anabaptists. Particularly striking is the tradition of 
allowing young people between the ages of sixteen and their early twenties (their 
“rumspringa”) to take the opportunity to live like other non-Anabaptists of the 
same age. During this time, the young people have a relatively free hand from 
their parents and community elders to behave as they want. However, if after this 
they submit to adult baptism, they will no longer be granted these freedoms. 
Serious social repercussions befall those who deviate from the community norms 
after baptism. This period of living out in the world, followed by a voluntary 
baptism and a stricter code of conduct to live by, has the effect of weeding out 
“outlaws” and ensuring those that return preserve and reinforce the Anabaptist 
cultural practices. So it is possible for distinctive cultural groups to maintain their 
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identity in the face of strong modernizing forces.
73
 That said, such groups are 
undoubtedly atypical and Dupré‟s point that useful taxonomic distinctions will be 
difficult to make in the modern world seems right (2002: 144-147). This should 
not be taken to imply that cultural evolution, or the idea of a “cultural species,” is 
irrelevant however: “historical significance is hardly to be demeaned when the 
underlying topic is evolution” (Dupré 2002: 147). Further: 
 
... if contemporary culture is seen as historically resulting from the 
gradual hybridization of many earlier cultural species, it should be clear 
that this only emphasizes the importance of culturally transmitted 
properties. (Dupré 2002: 145) 
 
 A different sort of criticism of theories of cultural evolution has been 
developed by Sober (1991). He argues that models of cultural evolution tell us 
about the consequences of cultural inheritance systems and differential fitness, 
but not about the most interesting aspects of culture – the sources of cultural 
variants and what makes some successful while others fail. Some of the 
discussion above dealt with one explanation for the differential fitness of cultural 
variants in terms of conformity biases and ubiquitous environmental structures. 
However, this is hardly exhaustive (it does not, for example, explain how the 
environmental structure became ubiquitous in the first place). While some 
practices may be explained in the sorts of ways outlined above, many will not be. 
A theory of cultural evolution will not tell us everything about culture, or 
behaviour. Neither will theories of cultural evolution always be the most 
appropriate explanation for cultural phenomena, even in the domains in which 
such theories have some purchase. Approaches such as Richerson and Boyd's 
(2005) do not claim otherwise. They instead argue for a methodological 
pluralism; the richer narratives of historical analysis, say, can be “complementary, 
not competing” with the simpler, more abstract models of cultural evolution they 
propose: 
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psychological modules guiding the preferences of individuals. Rather, it is the structures of the 
environments these individuals inhabit that preserves the cultural practices. 
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... such explanatory models are not laws but tools to be taken up or not 
as the situation warrants. Good models are like good tools, they are 
known to do a certain job reasonably well... (2005: 95) 
 
We might add to this Oyama's advice that any analysis “should be conducted in 
the interests of the eventual synthesis of a complex, multi-levelled reality” (1998: 
420). We ought not to forget that analysis at one level, using one set of tools, will 
at best give us an incomplete picture. Understanding how these different analyses 
interact and may (or may not) fit together is an important task, and any individual 
approach which tends to obscure or deny the need for multiple approaches to 
such complex phenomena will ultimately hinder useful research. 
 Accepting that aspects of our cultural lives cannot be given evolutionary 
explanations, does not entail that culture and biology are distinct. Much of our 
individual “biological” development is to be explained primarily with reference 
to the unique set of events that characterise an individual life – a scar, muscle 
mass, and so on. That aspects of cultures cannot be best understood in 
evolutionary terms does not mean culture is distinct from biology, any more than 
failing to have an evolutionary explanation for the particulars of individual 
development separates development from biology. Aspects of our cultural 
environments can constitute developmental systems even when they do not 
constitute evolutionary developmental systems.
74
 Not everything about culture 
needs to be understood in evolutionary terms in order to view culture as part of 
the developmental system. 
 
3.1 The Looping Effects of Human Kinds 
Although I have spent some time dealing with how stability in phenotypes can 
come about, I want to now deal with a particular source of variation, what 
Hacking calls the looping effects of human kinds. This source of variation is 
important because it raises a fundamental difficulty for studying human evolution 
if such studies are conceived as being continuous with the study of the evolution 
of non-human animals.  
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Hacking (1996) suggests that studying humans – specifically, human kinds 
– is a very different activity to studying natural kinds. Hacking lists four essential 
criteria for a classification to be a human kind. The first is that this kind must be 
relevant to at least some of us. Second, the kind must be a way of sorting people, 
their behaviour and their actions. Third, we must want to gain knowledge about 
this kind. Finally, human behaviour and action is relevant only to the extent it is 
projected to form a type of person (child abuse is projected to form the idea of 
the child abuser, and so on); it is kinds of people that are important (1996: 354). 
Human kinds are different to natural kinds in at least one important way. This 
difference lies in the fact that human kinds result in looping effects, whereas 
natural kinds do not. Looping effects occur when a group of people are classified 
as a human kind, and their awareness of this classification alters their behaviour 
in some way. Because their behaviour has changed, they no longer behave in 
accordance with the criteria for membership of this kind. This results in the 
criteria for kind membership changing in order to track the group of individuals 
in question, and this can result in these individuals further altering their 
behaviour, and so on. Thus a feedback loop is created between the group of 
people being classified, and the classification criteria.  
 Human kinds (alcoholics, teenage mothers, child abusers) carry with them some judgment. 
For instance, the kind “alcoholic” might be thought to be a bad thing (morally, medically, etc.). 
Knowledge about these groups will allow us to intervene and stop behaviour we dislike, and also 
prevent people behaving in this way in the future. If the human kind is one we approve of, 
knowledge about it might help others become part of this group. In the case of the kind 
“alcoholic,” anyone finding themselves as a member of this kind may want to modify their 
behaviour in some way so as to avoid the negative judgement of others. Alternatively, or in 
addition, the individual classified as an alcoholic may not wish to be part of this kind. This may 
mean taking steps to hide the addiction, or it may mean seeking help to overcome it. Self-help 
groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous are one type of institution that helps define human kinds. 
These groups encourage an understanding of alcoholism as something that can be controlled with 
will power. The medical profession – another institution which helps define human kinds – has, at 
least in some quarters, taken to understanding alcoholism as a medical problem, and treated it 
likewise. The medical approach has claimed to have identified a group of people who were 
alcoholics but who went on to become moderate social drinkers – that is, they are recovered 
alcoholics. On the other hand, Alcoholics Anonymous claim that an alcoholic is never cured and 
so must avoid consuming alcohol at all times. At best they are always recovering alcoholics 
(Hacking 1996: 373). Different classifications have different effects on the behaviour of those 
classified and have created two different kinds of alcoholics as a result of looping effects. Those 
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individuals who followed the AA route may never again drink alcohol, and attend AA meetings 
for very many years. Recovered alcoholics, on the other hand, may indulge in occasional alcoholic 
drinks, and have no significant contact with the medical community in relation to alcohol 
consumption after they are “cured.”  
 Not all groups of individuals classified as a particular kind accept such classifications: 
 
Classifications can change our evaluations of our personal worth, of the moral kind of 
person we are. Sometimes this means that people passively accept what experts say 
about them, and see themselves in that light. But feedback can direct itself in many 
ways… A classification imposed from above is rearranged by the people to whom it is 
supposed to apply. (Hacking 1999: 131) 
 
Here Hacking notes the gay pride movement as an example of a group of people that actively took 
charge of their own categorisation. “Coming out” and more generally participating in the gay 
pride movement became a way to reject the moral and medical norms that had previously been 
associated with this kind. The gay liberation movement embraced their classification as 
“homosexual,” but in doing so, changed what it meant to be gay (Hacking 1996: 381). How 
people will respond to being classified is unpredictable, but once they are aware of being so 
classified, there will be a response of some sort. And it is this awareness and subsequent 
behaviour that changes those criteria for kind membership. 
 
 
3.2 Obesity 
Looping effects such as those discussed above demonstrate the role of 
classification by social institutions on behaviour. I want to focus here on the 
obese as a human kind. The looping effects generated by this human kind 
demonstrate how awareness of classification not only alters behaviour, but the 
entire developmental system.  
 The category “the obese” meets Hacking‟s criteria for human kinds. First, 
as a kind, the obese and obesity is relevant to at least some of us. Discussion of 
how to put a halt to the perceived rise in rates of obesity dominates not only 
academic and medical research, but television, radio and newspapers all carry 
regular stories on new drugs and the latest public health policy, as well as 
Byzantine advice on what we should eat. Second, it is a way of sorting people. 
There are a variety of measures, but perhaps the most popular is the BMI scale, 
and these measures sort people in to one of four groups: obese, overweight, ideal, 
and underweight. Third, this is a group of people we want to know more about, 
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as evidenced by the large number of academic journals devoted to the issue (e.g. 
International Journal of Obesity, Obesity, Journal of Diabetes, Obesity and 
Metabolism) as well as more general medical journals such as the British 
Medical Journal and the New England Journal of Medicine, which regularly 
feature articles on the topic. Finally, “obese” is not merely a description of a 
phenotype, but is projected to form the idea of a person. Research suggests that 
obese people are often thought to be lazy, dirty, ugly, overly emotional, asexual, 
sloppy and weak (Young & Powell 1985: 234). Teachers may have lower 
opinions of their obese students (Dwyer et al. 1970: 276). This attitude is also 
apparent in the medical community. For instance, Young and Powell discuss a 
study in which doctors professed to not wanting to advise and/or treat obese 
patients because “the physicians viewed obesity as an indicator of several 
undesirable qualities, including lack of control” (1985: 235). In their own 
research Young and Powell assessed the attitude of mental health workers to 
obese individuals. They presented clinicians with case histories and one of three 
possible photos. In one photo, the person was in the “ideal” weight range, in the 
next, the same person‟s image was distorted to make her appear overweight, and 
in the last, she is made to appear obese. They found that the clinicians they 
questioned were willing to treat individuals regardless of their weight. However, 
evaluations of the case histories that accompanied the picture of the obese 
women were far more negative than the same case history with the slim and 
overweight versions of the woman. Some of the symptoms more likely to be 
assigned to the obese woman included agitation, emotional behaviour, impaired 
judgement, inadequate hygiene, inappropriate behaviour, obsessive compulsive 
behaviour, and self-injurious behaviour (Young & Powell 1985: 238). The obese 
appear to meet Hacking‟s criteria for a human kind. 
  The next step in Hacking‟s argument requires that the group categorised is 
both aware of, and reacts to, this classification. I want to argue here that being 
classified as “obese” may be leading those individuals to develop bad health, 
thus the idea that to be obese is to be unhealthy may be a self-fulfilling prophecy 
as a result of these looping effects.  
 There is no straight-forward correlation between health and weight (Gard 
& Wright 2005; Ernsberger & Koletsky 1999). Thin or “ideal” does not equate to 
good health but neither does fat automatically equate to bad health. The risks 
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associated with various measurements of weight (BMI being a favourite) are not 
easily generalised beyond the cohort studied. Epidemiological studies which 
have attempted to discover a correlation between weight and mortality and 
morbidity have had varying successes. Some studies show a correlation, others 
show little, while some even show an inverse correlation. The accuracy of 
predictions based on BMI has been argued to be a function of age, sex, and 
ethnicity (Gard & Wright 2005: 93-94; Kaplan 2000: 139).  
 The issues discussed above, as well as aesthetic judgements made about 
fatness in mainstream Western media, will often be well known to the obese. It is 
unsurprising then that those classified as obese might wish to lose weight. 
Calorie controlled diets are one way individuals attempt to control or reduce their 
weight. However, calorie controlled diets are increasingly being recognised as 
ineffective for anything more than short term weight loss: “The desired 
permanent solution to the problem of long-term weight maintenance… still 
seems far off” (Jeffery et al. 2000: 14). What this means is that many individuals 
engage in weight cycling (sometimes referred to as yo-yo dieting). This occurs 
where an individual loses weight only to regain it again, and so is forced to try 
and lose weight once more, followed by the inevitable regain, and so on. Recent 
research has suggested that weight cycling may lead to an increased risk of 
health problems (e.g. Ernsberger & Koletsky 1999; Berg 1999; Kassirer & 
Angell 1998). Problems thought to arise from weight cycling include elevated 
blood pressure, a reduction in the level of high density lipoprotein cholesterol 
(the “good” cholesterol), a reduction in the body‟s reserves of omega-3 fatty 
acids, and an increased risk for gall bladder disease, kidney cancer, breast cancer 
and cardiovascular disease (Gaesser 2003). It has been suggested that those 
studies which suggest some degree of correlation between obesity and mortality 
and morbidity do so because those in the sample group who are overweight and 
obese are those most likely to embark upon weight cycling behaviour 
(Ernsberger & Koletsky 1999). For instance, in a study of young American 
nurses, there was a definite risk associated with obesity. However, Ernsberger 
and Koletsky have suggested, plausibly, that this group is very likely to engage 
in weight loss practices (1999: 224). Further, those in this group who are in the 
overweight or obese range are more likely to adopt a diet than those who are in 
the ideal range. Given this then, and the risks thought to be associated with 
200 
 
weight cycling, it seems unsurprising that obesity should be linked with 
increased mortality and morbidity for this group. Obesity, in some of these cases 
at least, will not be the direct cause of the associated risk – though of course 
being classified as “overweight” or “obese” may be why this group diet. 
Ernsberger and Koletsky (1999) compared the findings of a large number of 
studies, including the young nurse study mentioned above, with the likelihood of 
weight cycling being a common phenomenon within the group under scrutiny. 
From their analysis, there appears to be an inverse relation between the degree of 
risk associated with obesity and the prevalence of weight cycling. Those studies 
which looked at people who are very unlikely to diet find either no risk 
associated with excess body fat, or find an inverse relationship between body fat 
and risk levels. Groups where dieting was more likely were subject to a much 
higher risk of ill health. This suggests that, at least some of the time, bad health 
and obesity may be related to attempts to become thinner rather than being 
overweight or obese per se. That is, bad health in the obese might sometimes be 
the result of being classified as “obese.”  
 But although classifying individuals as obese may lead to a greater risk of 
poor health, this does not mean the original classification will remain unchanged. 
The ways in which this poor health manifests itself may differ from the ways in 
which such poor health was supposed to manifest itself given the differences 
between the actual aetiology and the supposed aetiology of the health problems. 
Further, the health risks of obesity may be felt more acutely by some groups 
depending on whether, and to what extent, they engage in weight cycling. The fat 
acceptance movement, through US groups like the National Association to 
Advance Fat Acceptance, may also have some effect on the behaviour of this 
group similar to the gay liberation movement. These factors, and no doubt others, 
may all lead to changes in this group of individuals. The classification will need 
to change in order to track this group.  
 Looping effects will occur any time a subsection of the population is classified as a 
particular kind and this classification comes with numerous judgements. As a result, that group of 
people, aware of being scrutinised and judged by others, and perhaps judging themselves, 
becomes motivated to modify their behaviour, joining Alcoholics Anonymous, enlisting the help 
of the medical profession, or dieting. This new behaviour may result in reclassification to a better 
kind, from “alcoholic” to “recovered alcoholic” for instance. It may also result in behaviour that it 
is hoped exemplifies membership of that kind, as exemplified by the gay liberation movement, if 
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belonging to such a kind is considered a source of pride. In the case of the obese, a presumption 
that obesity entails poor health may be leading this group, or at least some in this group, to poor 
health. But whether those classified act so as to distance themselves from the original 
classification, as in the case of recovered alcoholics and the obese, or whether they embrace the 
classification but seek to change the judgements associated with it, as in the case of the gay pride 
movement, this has the effect of altering the original classification. The kind “alcoholic” may now 
be a group that can be medically treated, while the kind “homosexual” may no longer be 
considered a psychological illness. When this happens a new body of knowledge must be found, a 
new human kind may be created (“recovered alcoholics”), and an old one is modified (the 
alcoholic can now be medically treated).  
In the physical and natural sciences, we can make predictions based on our understanding 
of natural kinds because they tend to behave in predictable ways. Human kinds are unstable and 
unpredictable, as a result of the awareness of those so classified of our interest in them. The 
characteristics by which we define a human kind (types of behaviour, physical appearance, etc.) 
are not stable – the very attempt to study this group may lead to its instability. The result of this is 
that we cannot treat human kinds like natural kinds – we cannot make law-like predictions about 
human kinds in the way we can about natural kinds. Human kinds are not natural kinds – not even 
“messy” natural kinds (Hacking 1996: 362). For this reason, argues Hacking, the social and 
human sciences cannot be seen as part of the same project as the physical sciences. 
 
3.3 Objections 
Cooper (2004) has objected to the idea that there is a meaningful difference between human and 
natural kinds on the grounds given by Hacking. She claims that feedback is not restricted to 
human kinds, and that the classification of natural kinds also results in feedback. Cooper discusses 
the effects of the classification of marijuana as illegal. Because it is illegal to grow marijuana, it 
tends to be grown in dark places such as wardrobes and attics, and this has caused an alteration in 
the physical appearance of marijuana. This, claims Cooper, is an example of our classificatory 
practices altering a natural kind (2004: 78). While I do not wish to deny that this classification has 
altered the world in some way here, it is not because marijuana is classified as marijuana that this 
happened, but rather because it is classified as illegal. Classifying marijuana as illegal may have 
altered something about marijuana, but this differs from the phenomena discussed by Hacking in a 
number of ways. First, it is marijuana‟s classification as “illegal” rather than as “marijuana” that 
has brought about this change. That is, it is a legal kind rather than a natural kind that has had this 
effect. Second, the changes that have occurred in the appearance of marijuana have not resulted in 
a change in the definition of either the natural or the legal kind. That is, there has been no 
feedback between the classification and the behaviour of the thing classified. It is these looping 
effects that are important – it is these that cause the instability of human kinds. Cooper has not 
demonstrated that natural kinds exhibit a similar instability. 
Ereshefsky (2004) has raised a similar objection to Hacking's distinction between human 
kinds and natural kinds, specifically other biological kinds in this instance. He suggests that social 
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structures can affect non-human animals too: “if a monkey is classified by his troop as dominant, 
then he is permitted to engage in certain activities” (2004: 915). We can acknowledge 
Ereshefsky's point that social structures may affect the lives of non-human animals without 
undermining Hacking's argument. It may be that the classificatory practices of the troop do alter 
the behaviour of the monkey. What is not clear is whether the monkey's new behaviour alters the 
classificatory practices of the troop. If the monkey should fail to live up to his dominant status, it 
is questionable (and perhaps unanswerable) whether the rest of the troop would alter their concept 
of “dominant” in response. What is vital for Hacking's argument in this context is not the initial 
effects of classification, but how these effects feed back to alter the classification system. The 
point is not, ultimately, one about causal relationships in the world (though it does depend on 
them), but rather about classification and about what appears to be a genuine difference between 
the natural and the human sciences. Looping effects do not appear to occur when we study parts of 
the non-human world, but do seem to feature in our attempts to study humans. 
 
4. Looping Effect, DST and Theories of Cultural Evolution 
A theory of cultural evolution may provide an account of trends in cultural 
practices, and offer insights into why some cultural variants persist while others 
do not. The kinds of mathematical models that Richerson and Boyd have devised 
to test many of their theories often generate unexpected results, such as the idea 
that we do not need primarily vertical transmission for selection. Population 
thinking picks up on trends that can emerge that might not always be discernible 
at the level of individuals. Richerson and Boyd‟s approach to cultural evolution, 
just like population genetics, say very little about the traits being tracked, but 
unlike population genetics they provide some explanation for why some cultures 
might die out, while others flourish based on considerations of population 
structure. It does not offer any explanation for errors. Mutations in genetics can 
be assumed to be random, but cultural mutations will not always be. Some 
mutations will be intended; variation can be guided and perhaps explained. 
However, providing explanations for this will not be within the ability of theories 
of cultural evolution; cultural evolution is at best a partial explanation of cultural 
trends. 
 This sort of approach may seem more powerful if we assume the sharp 
distinction between biology and culture inherent in Richerson and Boyd's 
account. The gene-culture co-evolutionary account allows that culture can 
change the selective landscape for genes, but does not allow for any 
evolutionarily significant interaction between culture and biology in any 
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individual lifetime. On such an account, the details of development can be 
skipped over. Development is easy to black box when it only involves the 
realisation of coded instructions in the genotype and adds little of evolutionary 
importance to the final phenotypic outcome. Culture only interacts with fully-
formed cognitive architecture in these sorts of accounts, acting as an input into 
cognitive mechanisms, but never acting as a resource for their development. And 
although culture may affect genetic evolution, genetic evolution is slow, and 
mostly what will be tracked is cultural change. Culture and biology are thus kept 
as distinct, occasionally interacting, domains. 
 A more robust version of development, however, undermines the idea that 
we can understand cultural evolution as floating free of biology in any 
individual's life time: 
 
What this means, in general terms, is that the forms and capacities of 
humans and other organisms are attributable, in the final analysis, not to 
genetic inheritance but to the generative potentials of the developmental 
system... that is, the entire system of relations constituted by the 
presence of the organism in a particular environment. (Ingold 2001: 261) 
 
A developmental systems perspective can offer a genuinely developmental 
account of evolution, and can account for some of the trends Richerson and Boyd 
picked up on with their account. And though Richerson and Boyd's account does 
not do justice to the complexity of development, they have developed a model 
for evolution by selection that allows for horizontal transmission that could be of 
great use to a developmental systems perspective.  
 The picture of culture that emerges from this perspective is quite different. 
Rather than understanding cultural inheritance as the transmission of information, 
as do Richerson and Boyd (2005), cultural inheritance involves each new 
generation inheriting the resources to recreate that culture: 
 
The growth of knowledge in the life history of a person is a result not of 
information transmission but of guided rediscovery, where what each 
generation contributes to the next are not rules and representations for 
the production of appropriate behavior but the specific conditions of 
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development under which successors, growing up in a social world, can 
build up their own aptitudes and dispositions. (Ingold 2001: 272) 
 
The looping effects created by the human kind “the obese” demonstrate the 
problems with taking biology as given, and culture as something that is added on 
top. Neither “biology” nor “culture” is given. Rather both develop anew in each 
generation as parts of a population of developmental systems.  
What this means for those studying the evolution and development of humans, particularly 
where the focus is behaviour and culture, is that the kinds being tracked change. Of course, 
evolution is the study of change, but in traditional studies, the change is not considered to arise 
from the activity of studying the evolutionary trends. For human kinds, on the other hand, change 
may not just be the result of evolutionary forces distinct from the researchers' activities, but may 
be in virtue of being studied. An example of this may be found in Morton et al. (2006). They 
demonstrate the effects of research into supposed gender differences. Participants in their study 
were shown a contrived article detailing research into brain function. The researchers generated 
four different articles, but any individual participant saw only one. The articles reached 
conclusions that flattered either male or female cognitive abilities, and were presented as either a 
piece of stereotypical neuroscience research (complete with pictures of MRI scans) or as a piece 
of stereotypical social science research. The researchers found – perhaps unsurprisingly – that 
participants tended to support the continuation of the research funding where the results flattered 
the participant's gender. Further, participants were more likely to accept the conclusions of the 
research when it was presented as a stereotypical piece of neuroscientific research. This suggests 
that, for instance, when Evolutionary Psychologists discuss gender differences, they may not be 
mapping out species-wide gender differences produced by natural selection, rather they may be, in 
part, creating these differences as a result of the sort of looping effects discussed above.
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If we understand culture and biology as combining together to create developmental 
systems, the changes to human kinds brought about via the kind of looping effects discussed here 
will not just affect behaviour and culture, but anatomy and physiology too, as illustrated in the 
obesity example. This poses unique difficulties for those who wish to study humans, and 
challenges the idea that the study of humans can be made continuous with the natural sciences. 
These sorts of phenomena also point to the problem with viewing biology and culture as separate 
spheres. Looping effects do not necessarily manifest themselves just at the level of behaviour or 
culture, but can be felt throughout the developmental system. Because DST eschews predefined 
boundaries (beneath/beyond the skin, biology/culture, gene/environment), it can provide a 
framework for exploring further the complex interactions and feedback loops, even those 
feedback loops created by DST-inspired research. 
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In this chapter I have primarily discussed biology, behaviour and culture. Where Richerson 
and Boyd made use of cognitive mechanisms to explain a bias towards reproducing the behaviour 
of the majority or of successful individuals, I suggested that instead of cognitive mechanisms, at 
least some of these phenomena could be explained by cultural structures guiding behaviour. But 
not everything we do can be explained in this way, and some account of cognition is required. In 
the next chapter, I will discuss a different model of cognition – extended cognition – to that 
supposed by both Evolutionary Psychologists and Richerson and Boyd. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Evolution of Cognition 
 
1. Introduction 
Evolutionary Psychology offers an internalist model of the mind. Cognitive 
processes are constituted only by structures and events within the brain. Against 
the internalist model of cognition is an externalist model known as, among other 
things, the extended mind hypothesis.
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 Here the idea is that cognitive processes 
are constituted not just by structures within the brain, but also by action and 
aspects of the environment. I will outline this alternative view here, and defend it 
against some recent criticism. Attempts have been made by Rowlands (1999) and 
Menary (2007) to give an evolutionary explanation for this extended cognition 
hypothesis. However, I will argue here that these attempts are flawed; Rowlands‟ 
argument does not go far enough, and both his and Menary‟s approaches are 
wrong-headed in their adoption of an extended phenotype approach to this issue. 
As argued in chapter two, the extended phenotype approach privileges the 
internal, whereas the extended mind hypothesis suggests a framework for 
understanding cognition where no such privileging takes place. Given this, 
proponents of the extended mind hypothesis undermine their position by seeking 
to give an evolutionary account of extended cognitive processes in terms of the 
extended phenotype hypothesis. Instead I will argue that a developmental 
systems perspective offers an evolutionary account far more sympathetic to the 
model of cognition entailed by the extended mind hypothesis. Further, 
developmental systems theory allows us to deal with some worries about the 
vulnerability of extended cognitive processes compared to internal processes. 
 
2. Cognition 
Hurley describes one key distinction that can be drawn between the externalist 
positions available in the debate about cognition: there are “what”-externalist 
positions and “how”-externalist positions (Hurley forthcoming). “What”-
externalism is an account of mental content that maintains that mental content is 
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 The extended mind hypothesis has also been referred to as environmentalism (Rowlands 
1999) and cognitive integration (Menary 2007). 
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individuated by the external environment. Although I will say a little more about 
this position later on, it is not the focus of this chapter. “How”-externalism (also 
known as enabling externalism and vehicle externalism), the focus of this 
chapter, is an account of cognitive processes that maintains that such processes 
are not always constituted exclusively by structures and mechanisms internal to 
the brain.
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 The “how”-externalist maintains that we cannot give a full account of 
the nature of (at least some of) our cognitive processes without including aspects 
of the environment in our account.  While internalist accounts may include 
reference to the environment, this will not be in terms of the environment 
constituting cognitive processes. Rather, where the internalist makes reference to 
the environment it is in the sense of the environment providing specific “inputs” 
for cognitive processes to work on.  
The what/how distinction is also referred to as the content/vehicle 
distinction. The what/how or content/vehicle distinction picks out a genuine 
difference, but this does not mean that particular externalist accounts deal only 
with either the content or the vehicle issue; sometimes both are run together. The 
position one takes on the question of how cognitive abilities are enabled may 
influence or inform the position one takes on the question of the nature of mental 
content, and vice versa, and so it may be natural to treat them together in this 
way. However it is important to keep in mind the distinction between these two 
positions. Criticism of one, for instance, does not usually translate into criticism 
of the other. My focus here will primarily be on the “how” variety of 
externalism. 
There are a few things that externalism of this sort is not. It is not the claim 
that the mind is a “blank slate” or “silly putty” (Pinker 2002), or that the 
environment does all the work in cognition. Rather it is a claim about how much 
of the work in cognition can be attributed to the brain alone, and how much must 
be understood in terms of a brain, a particular environment, and the interaction 
with that environment through bodily actions. It is also not the claim that all 
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 The sense of externalism used here differs from that in chapter two. Externalism, as defined 
there following Godfrey-Smith (1996), is an explanatory strategy that cites states of affairs 
external to the organism to explain structures or processes of the organism. This approach does 
not deny that factors internal to the organism might also have a role to play, but the focus is 
squarely on the external. The “how”-externalism discussed here does not fit with this taxonomy 
in that it attempts to explain cognition by citing both internal and external factors. 
208 
 
cognitive processes or capacities are necessarily constituted by aspects of the 
environment and/or bodily actions. The externalist may grant that some cognitive 
processes may be constituted by internal structures and mechanisms. “How”-
externalism maintains that at least some cognitive processes will be constituted 
by features of the environment (Hurley forthcoming). Externalism of this sort 
suggests that attempts to explicate the nature of cognitive processes only in terms 
of structures and mechanisms internal to the brain will, in at least some cases, be 
inadequate.  
 
2.1 The Extended Mind 
Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue that internalist approaches to cognition are mistaken and 
instead suggest that cognition must be understood as something that is constituted by more than 
just the brain, including features of the external environment. Their approach falls under the 
“how”-externalism approach, in that they are discussing how it is cognition is achieved, rather 
than what it is that cognition is about. They split cognition into three categories: cognitive 
processes, cognitive states and experiences. Cognitive processes “consist in operations whereby 
one semantically evaluable state, or group of such states, is transformed into another state or 
group of states” (Rowlands 2003: 129). That is, cognitive processes are thought to be operations 
on cognitive states. It is cognitive processes and cognitive states that Clark and Chalmers are 
interested in for their argument. They are happy to allow that experiences (such as pain) may be 
best understood internally. I will outline the two thought experiments offered by Clark and 
Chalmers (1998) and the lessons they seek to draw from them, before dealing with some 
criticisms of their argument.  
 
2.1.1 Tetris  
Clark and Chalmers (1998) begin with a thought-experiment which seeks to test 
our intuitions about what might constitute cognitive processes. They ask us to 
imagine three scenarios involving a game much like Tetris. The aim of this game 
is to fit various shapes into sockets appropriate for those shapes. In many 
instances, the shapes may need to be rotated to achieve the best fit. In the first 
scenario, the subject is asked to rotate shapes in order to work out where the 
shape should be placed relying solely on internal capacities. In the second 
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scenario, the subject may rotate the shape on the screen by pressing a button. In 
the final scenario, the subject has been fitted with a neural implant that can 
perform the rotation. In the first case, it is the brain alone that enables the player 
to solve the cognitive task of correctly orientating the shape. In the second case, 
it is the process of physically manipulating the shape via the button that, along 
with the processes internal to the subject's brain, enables the cognitive task to be 
completed. In the final case, it is the neural implant, and the processes internal to 
the subject's brain that enables the task to be completed. 
Clark and Chalmers then ask “how much cognition is present in these 
cases?” (1998: 9, italics in original). They argue that, despite obvious 
differences, there are also some important commonalities between these 
scenarios. In particular, the different ways the subject has of playing the game 
are all cognitive and all equally so. If, they argue, we accept that the brain-
implant pairing counts as a case of cognition, then we have no good grounds for 
excluding the case involving physical manipulation. The neural implant does 
much the same work as pressing a button and having a computer generate images 
of the shape at various degrees of rotation, in that, like the computer, it reduces 
the workload for the brain. If the brain-implant coupling can count as a cognitive 
system, then so too should the brain-body-computer coupling. The conclusion 
Clark and Chalmers draw from this is that cognition can be dependent on 
processes that extend beyond the brain to include, for instance, the activity of 
pressing the button. Pressing the button to rotate the shape is part of what enables 
cognition in virtue of the fact that it is a constituent of a cognitive process.  
Clark and Chalmers use this thought experiment to motivate a parity of 
reasoning about cognitive processes: 
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world 
is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 
8) 
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2.1.2 Otto's Notebook 
Clark and Chalmers push their argument further. Many cognitive processes are 
unavailable to us in conscious experience; we are simply unaware of many of the 
things we do. That such things might be extended into the world is one thing, but 
those aspects of cognition we are aware of do seem, perhaps intuitively, to be 
located beneath our skin. However, Clark and Chalmers also claim that aspects 
of cognition, such as memory and belief, are extended into the world.  
Clark and Chalmers use another thought experiment to try to demonstrate 
that external features can partly constitute the processes that result in mental 
states such as beliefs. Inga and Otto are informed that there is an exhibition in the 
Museum of Modern Art, and both wish to attend. Inga recalls that the museum is 
located on 53
rd
 street, and sets off in that direction. Otto however suffers from 
Alzheimer's disease and cannot recall the location of the museum in the manner 
of Inga. Instead, Otto has a notebook in which he records any information he 
thinks he might require as he comes across it, including the location of the 
Museum of Modern Art. Once Otto checks the notebook, he too believes that the 
museum is located on 53
rd
 street and sets off in that direction. Clark and 
Chalmers argue that the role the notebook plays for Otto is analogous to the role 
played by Inga's biological memory. Otto's interaction with his notebook and 
Inga's interaction with her biological memory are such that they both come to 
have an occurrent belief about the location of the museum and subsequently 
move in the direction they believe the museum to lie.  
Although Clark and Chalmers conclude that “a belief is simply not in the 
head” (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 14), their argument does not demonstrate that 
beliefs have locations, either internally or extended out into the environment. 
Rather, this is an argument concerning how it is Otto comes to form certain 
beliefs. Just as certain parts of Inga's brain may feature in an explanation of her 
ability to locate the museum, so Otto's notebook will feature in any explanation 
of his ability to locate the museum. And just as those parts of Inga's brain might 
be thought to somehow encode information that enables Inga to locate the 
museum, so Otto's notebook can be thought to encode information that enables 
him to locate the museum. The details of how it is that biological memory 
actually stores information is not thought to be important here, rather what is 
important are the functional similarities between Inga's biological memory and 
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Otto's notebook. Both Inga's and Otto's abilities require physical objects (internal 
structures and mechanisms alone in Inga's case, or a combination of internal 
structures and mechanisms, a body with which to interact with the notebook, and 
the notebook itself for Otto), and require information (encoded in biological 
memory or encoded in the notebook). Both the objects and the information play a 
very similar role in the cognitive systems of Inga and Otto, and given this, Clark 
and Chalmers argue that this allows us to think of Otto's notebook as functionally 
equivalent to Inga's biological memory. 
Where matters get somewhat more complicated is when we consider the 
non-occurrent beliefs of Otto and Inga. When Inga is not actively thinking about 
the location of the museum, she is not undergoing an occurrent belief. She has 
the ability to recall the location of the museum when required to do so. Given 
this, argue Clark and Chalmers, it would seem odd to deny that Inga has no belief 
about the location of the museum when she isn't actively contemplating it. So, 
even when Inga isn't actively thinking about the location of the museum, it would 
seem she has a standing, or dispositional belief, about the location of the 
museum. What about Otto? Does he have a dispositional belief about the 
museum when he is not consulting his notebook about it? Clark and Chalmers 
think so: “the information in the notebook functions just like the information 
constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information 
lies beyond the skin” (1998: 13). More precisely, the notebook contains 
information that partly constitutes non-occurrent beliefs. The notebook must be 
in the right sort of relationship with Otto for this to be the case. It must be a 
constant feature of Otto's life, and he ought to consult it in most situations where 
he needs to recall something – much the same as Inga's biological memory must 
be a constant to her in order for it to count as a functioning memory. It also needs 
to be easily accessed, without any difficulty – again, just as Inga's biological 
memory needs to be. Otto's notebook must be a trustworthy source of 
information for it to function as a memory for Otto – again, just as Inga's 
memory might be considered dysfunctional if she were to always doubt whatever 
she recalled. Clark and Chalmers argue that if the notebook is a constant feature 
of Otto's life, if it is easily accessible and trustworthy, then it is genuinely 
functioning in the same way (or at least in the same relevant ways) as Inga's 
biological memory.  It is the relationship that Otto has with the notebook, as 
212 
 
much as the information it might contain, that allows Clark and Chalmers to 
conclude that the notebook partly constitutes Otto's dispositional beliefs, or 
rather, partly constitutes the enabling conditions for dispositional beliefs. Given 
this, the notebook does not contain non-occurrent beliefs, but rather, the system 
that consists of Otto and the notebook is one that has dispositional beliefs.  
 
2.1.3 Constituting Cognition 
Clark and Chalmers are not arguing that anything cognition depends upon ought 
to be considered a constituent of cognition. To be considered a constituent of 
cognition, certain conditions must be met. First of all, Clark and Chalmers utilise 
a distinction originally made by Kirsh and Maglio (1994) between epistemic and 
pragmatic action. Whereas pragmatic actions alter the world in order to bring one 
physically closer to a goal, epistemic actions alter the world in order to enable 
cognitive processes or make them more efficient. Building a wall might count as 
a purely pragmatic action, as the wall is the end in itself. Counting on one's 
fingers will constitute an epistemic action on this distinction. Whatever 
alterations to the physical world occur because of this action (change in posture, 
position, etc.), these alterations are not the point, but merely a means to an end – 
adding numbers in this instance. The same action can have both pragmatic and 
epistemic aspects. Rotating the shape in the Tetris game is an example of this. 
The shape must have the correct orientation in order to fit into the available 
socket. So rotating it helps to ensure the pragmatic goal of putting the shape in 
the correct place is fulfilled. But the shape is rotated many more times than is 
strictly necessary to achieve the correct orientation for the available socket, even 
by expert players of the game (Kirsh & Maglio 1994). Given that speed is of the 
essence in playing this game, this suggests that rotating the shape is not just a 
pragmatic action. That is, the players do not rotate the shapes merely so that they 
will fit into the available sockets. Rather, they rotate the shapes for both 
pragmatic and epistemic ends. Rotation not only ensures the block has the correct 
orientation for the available socket, rotation allows the player to establish what 
the correct orientation ought to be. 
Kirsh and Maglio claim that epistemic actions have three effects: they 
reduce the memory load on the individual, they reduce the number of steps 
needed to be performed internally, and they reduce the chance of mistakes being 
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made (1994: 514). Pressing the button to rotate the shape in Tetris alters the 
world in such a way that it is usually much easier and faster to determine the 
socket into which the shape should be placed. Epistemic actions are a means to 
better perform the task at hand, or a means to perform the task at all.  
Such epistemic actions, argue Clark and Chalmers, demand “spread of 
epistemic credit” (1998: 10). There appears to be no reason, on this account, to 
rule out any process as being part of a larger cognitive process based solely on 
the fact that it occurs outside of the head. If this sub-process were internal and 
considered, unproblematically, part of a larger cognitive process, then this sub-
process ought to be considered part of a larger cognitive process regardless of its 
actual location. To claim otherwise is to assume that the internal/external divide 
is significant, but without independent justification, this assumption is 
groundless. The onus is then on the internalist to explain why internal processes 
ought to be given greater weight, or a distinct ontological status. 
Clark and Chalmers make a further qualification of what ought to be 
considered part of any cognitive processes based on a distinction between what 
they term passive and active externalism. They identify the kind of externalism 
developed by Putnam (1975) as an example of passive externalism, which stands 
in contrast to their own active externalism. Passive externalism, they argue, only 
requires that features of the world play a role in cognition as part of some long 
causal chain, beginning with that feature of the world and eventually ending in 
the aspects of cognition of interest. They utilise Putnam's twin earth example to 
make their point. We are asked to imagine a twin earth which in all its details 
resembles earth, with the one exception of the fluid that fills its seas and rivers 
and so on. Rather than this stuff being composed of H2O, it is composed of a 
different compound, XYZ. Inhabitants of this planet call it “water,” and it is 
indistinguishable from our water at the macro-level. My twin-earth counterpart 
and myself will both utter the phrase “I believe water is wet,” but Putnam argues 
that the same belief is not expressed in both instances. My belief that water is wet 
is the product of a long history of engagement with H2O and so, when I utter this 
phrase on twin-earth, I am referring to H2O. My twin-earth counterpart, on the 
other hand, is referring to XYZ when she utters this phrase. What explains the 
difference between our beliefs is the difference in our respective histories and 
environments. Thus, the argument goes, what it is that makes my belief different 
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from my twin's cannot be adequately accounted for with reference only to states 
of affairs internal to brains. Instead, explaining something like belief requires an 
externalist explanation, in this case, one involving a world with H2O, and another 
with XYZ. This sort of externalism is “what”-externalism, or content 
externalism, as opposed to the “how”- or vehicle externalism I have discussed so 
far. However, this difference does not bear on the point Clark and Chalmers are 
trying to make here. 
Clark and Chalmers argue that this sort of externalism is passive. This is 
because if we imagine, unbeknownst to me, I was transported to twin earth and 
was asked if water is wet by a twin earth inhabitant, I would continue to express 
the belief that water is wet and I would continue (for a while at least) to refer to 
H2O, not XYZ when I expressed the belief that water is wet. The change in my 
environment would not have any immediate effect on my beliefs concerning 
water. The relationship between those aspects of the environment that must 
feature in any explanation of mental content are, according to Clark and 
Chalmers, “distal and historical, at the other end of a lengthy causal chain... 
Because of their distal nature, they play no role in driving the cognitive process 
in the here-and-now” (1998: 10). It is a historical relationship between H2O and 
myself that explains why I refer to H2O when I state that water is wet and a 
change in my current environment does not alter that historical relationship. 
The active/passive distinction also need not align with the internal/external 
distinction. Internal and external states of affairs may play a role in the causal 
history of a given cognitive process or state, but only at the end of a long causal 
chain. It may be possible, for instance, to understand certain processes essential 
for normal cognitive development largely by reference to internal states of 
affairs, and if so, these processes will be causally related to other cognitive 
processes available in adulthood. Nonetheless, these early developmental 
processes may be passive features of cognition by adulthood. It may no longer 
matter whether they continue to operate, and indeed, they may have only 
occurred for a short period of time during development.  
Active features, on the other hand, play a crucial role in the performance of 
any cognitive task such that, if they were removed, this would affect the 
performance of this task, often for the worse. For example, it may be easier to 
sum large numbers with a pen and paper than without. The extended cognition 
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hypothesis suggests that the activity of writing in this situation constitutes an 
epistemic action, and that the pen, paper, and writing are all constituents of the 
cognitive process. The ability to perform complex calculations arises out of the 
interaction between the mathematician, the pen and the paper. This cognitive 
ability can only be explained by crossing the internal/external boundary. If either 
the pen or paper was removed, or I was impeded in some way from writing, it 
would immediately impact my ability to perform the calculation. The action of 
writing, the pen, and the paper all play active roles: “the relevant parts of the 
world are in the loop, not dangling at the end of a long causal chain... The 
external features here are just as causally relevant as typical internal features of 
the brain” (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 11).  
So, the two criteria Clark and Chalmers lay out for external constituents of 
cognition are that, first, any actions that are to count as constituents of cognition 
must be epistemic actions. Second, any aspects of the environment (and, 
presumably, any epistemic actions) that are to count as constituents of cognition 
must be causally involved in cognition in real time, such that their removal 
would have an immediate impact on cognition.  
 
2.2 Objections  
 
2.2.1 Clark and Chalmers' Objections 
Clark and Chalmers anticipate some objections to their argument. Unlike brains, 
features of the environment are often transient. There are many instances in 
which I may have to perform some calculation without pen and paper; they will 
not always be available. On the other hand, the imagined objection goes, 
wherever we go we always have the full range of our internal resources available 
to us. Clark and Chalmers offer two sorts of response to this objection. The first 
is to argue that while pen and paper may count as contingent aspects of the 
environment, it is not difficult to imagine a technological innovation that enabled 
devices to become permanently fixed to our bodies. It is also the case, though 
Clark and Chalmers do not raise this point explicitly in the context of this 
objection, that at least some aspects of our environment that may feature as 
constituents of our cognitive processes and states are not contingent in this way. 
For instance, our own fingers seem quite robustly available to us if we should 
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want to count on them. A second line to take is to argue against the assumption 
that our internal cognitive resources are as reliably accessible to us as this 
objection implies. In the extreme case, brain injury can impact our ability to 
perform cognitive tasks. More run of the mill scenarios involve sleep and 
intoxication, both scenarios cutting off or impeding cognitive processes. This 
suggests that the criterion that a constituent of a cognitive process ought to be 
constantly available to us is too demanding. The occasional unavailability of an 
external feature of the world, or its susceptibility to damage, does not, on its own, 
rule out the possibility that the feature may act as a constituent of a cognitive 
process. Rather, a constituent of cognition ought, at best, to be reliably present. 
Clark and Chalmers conclude that this sort of objection to the extended mind 
hypothesis will not work. 
A further point that can be made here is that while pen and paper may not 
always be available to us, neither is the ability to perform complex calculations. 
That is, with a sufficiently complex calculation, it will not be possible to 
complete it without the pen and paper. The ability to perform complex 
calculations may depend on these external items. Our brains may be more 
available to us than pen and paper, but the abilities we are trying to explain may 
not be. If the ability is not always present, then there seems to be no justification 
for a demand that the resources that underpin the ability to always be present. At 
the very least, the onus is on the internalist to provide some justification for the 
claim that what is to count as a cognitive resource ought to be more reliably 
present than the cognitive process the resource is supposed to constitute. 
 
2.2.2 The Internalist Understanding of Tetris 
Clark and Chalmers argue that, of the three scenarios outlined in the Tetris 
example, no one case is somehow less cognitive than any other. This stands in 
contrast to an internalist reading of the situation. Very broadly, the internalist 
maintains that these three different scenarios involve different amounts of 
cognitive effort. Mentally rotating the shape involves the greatest amount of 
cognitive work. Pressing the button to rotate the shape on screen only requires 
cognition to decide to press the button, and to make decisions based on the visual 
inputs received from the screen. If part of the task is completed by processes 
occurring beyond the skin (pressing a button to rotate a shape on a screen), the 
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cognitive workload has been reduced, thus there is less cognition involved. Work 
has been done beyond the skin in order that this problem is solved, but that work 
is not aptly titled “cognitive” according to the internalist.  
Clark and Chalmers agree with the internalist that offloading onto the 
environment in this manner may reduce the brain‟s workload, but deny that this 
makes the process any less cognitive. That is, the subject's internal processes 
may not have to deal with as large a workload. Instead of the burden falling 
entirely on internal processes, it is spread out between internal and external 
processes. The workload is distributed across the entire extended process. And 
contrary to the claims of the internalist, the extended processes that compensate 
for the reduced load on internal processes are to be considered just as cognitive 
as the internal processes they replace.  
Not all extended cognitive processes will reduce the workload on internal 
processes. Where a cognitive task is faced that cannot be completed except by 
utilising external features, there is no equivalent of the first scenario in the Tetris 
example (mentally rotating the shape). The only options available are to fail to 
complete the task, or to complete it using an extended cognitive system. In such a 
situation, there is no internal workload to reduce by utilising the environment in 
this way.   
Further, some instances of extended cognitive processes may not 
necessarily reduce the workload if by using extended cognitive processes the 
cognitive task is transformed. An entirely internal approach to dealing with the 
cognitive task may require quite different processes than the internal sub-
processes of an extended process. Take the example of Otto's notebook again. 
The internal processes underpinning Inga's ability to recall the location of the 
museum may be quite different to the internal processes Otto calls upon to use 
his notebook. Although Inga must carry the heavier workload in terms of 
biological memory storage, it is difficult to adjudicate whether it is Inga or Otto 
who is required to carry the heavier workload in terms of the internal cognitive 
processes that underpin their respective abilities to recall the location of the 
museum; Inga must access biological memory, while Otto must process 
perceptual information, and so on. It may be reasonable to assume that allowing 
features of the environment to enable cognition will in fact reduce the workload 
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on internal resources, but this need not necessarily be the case. I will discuss this 
point in more depth below. 
 
2.2.3 The Causal-Constitution Fallacy 
No one, presumably, would deny that performing calculations with pen and 
paper plays some role in the ability to deal with cognitive tasks. However, an 
internalist might argue that while writing, the pen, and the paper all causally 
contribute to cognitive processes, they do not constitute them; this is the line 
taken by Adams and Aizawa (2001), for instance. Just because A depends on B, 
this does not entail that A is identical with B, nor does it entail that B is a part of 
A. To claim that because cognition causally depends on aspects of the 
environment entails cognition is (in part) constituted by those aspects of the 
environment is to make a mistake: “a process P may actively interact with its 
environment, but this does not mean that P extends into its environment” (Adams 
& Aizawa 2001: 56). Adams and Aizawa use the following example to make this 
case: The process of blood filtration occurs in the kidneys. This process is 
causally related to the process of pumping blood in the heart, the size of the 
blood vessels, and so on. The causal dependence of the process in the kidneys on 
the processes in the heart “does not even make a prima facie case for the view 
filtration occurs throughout the circulatory system, rather than the kidney alone” 
(Adams & Aizawa 2001: 56). In the same way, their argument runs, Clark and 
Chalmers have conflated the causes of cognition with those things that constitute 
cognition. The pen, paper and activity of writing are causally related to cognitive 
processes, but this does not mean that they are constituents of cognitive 
processes. 
The issue here then is to decide what should count as merely a cause of 
cognition and what should count as a constituent of cognition. What is at stake is 
how we demarcate cognition. The internalist accuses the extended mind theorist 
of conflating causation with constitution, and so committing a casual-constitution 
fallacy (Adams & Aizawa 2001). There are two versions of this argument against 
the extended mind hypothesis. The weaker version just claims that the extended 
mind hypothesis conflates constitutive role with causal role, but offers no 
grounds on which to judge the difference between constitutive and causal role 
beyond the assumption that the causal/constitutive distinction aligns with the 
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external/internal distinction. Such a criticism merely begs the question; whether 
the external/internal distinction marks any significant boundary in terms of 
cognition is the very issue at stake.
78
 The stronger version of this criticism, the 
one developed by Aizawa and Adams (2001), offers grounds from which to 
adjudicate on the causal/constitutive distinction based on their definition of 
cognition which is independent of the internal/external divide.  
Adams and Aizawa believe that the sorts of cases highlighted by Clark and 
Chalmers as examples of extended cognitive processes are not in fact cognitive. 
This is not because they cross the internal/external boundary, but because they 
lack “the mark of the cognitive” (2001: 46). The mark of the cognitive, according 
to Adams and Aizawa, is non-derived content. Words on a page only acquire 
their meaning because, according to Adams and Aizawa, we imbue them with 
this meaning. The content these words contain is derived from us as readers. On 
the other hand, our mental states are thought to have meaning that is not derived 
in this way; meaning originates in these mental states: 
 
... the cognitive states in normal cognitive agents do not derive their 
meanings from conventions or social practices... it is not by anyone's 
convention that a state in a human brain is part of a person's thought that 
the cat is on the mat. (Adams & Aiwaza 2001: 48) 
 
Only where we find non-derived content do we find genuine cognition: 
 
... this means that the skull does not constitute a theoretically significant 
boundary for cognitive science. More specifically, it means that being 
inside the brain cannot be the mark of the cognitive. This seems to be 
true and obvious. The bounds of cognition must be found by finding the 
mark of the cognitive, then seeing what sorts of processes in the world 
have that mark. Following this method, we see that, as a matter of 
contingent fact, the cognitive processes we find in the real world all 
                                                 
78
 A similar objection might be made regarding DST – that is conflates the dependence of the 
developmental system on features of the environment with constitution of the developmental 
system by these features of the environment. As with the extended mind hypothesis, to avoid 
begging the question, the onus is on the critic to explain why the skin boundary should be 
considered to align with the causal/constitution distinction. 
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happen to be brain bound. It appears to be just a contingent empirical 
fact that cognitive processes are not transcorporeal processes. (Adams & 
Aiwaza 2001: 46) 
  
There are a number of problems with this approach. The first is that this 
analysis appears to apply to cognitive states rather than cognitive processes. 
Elsewhere Adams and Aizawa state that their view is that “at least some 
components of cognitive states require some intrinsic content, where states in 
Otto's notebook, video games, and most mundane tools do not” (2008: 50). To 
return to Adams and Aizawa's example of blood filtration in the kidneys, the 
process of blood filtration does not have all the same properties as blood, in 
either its filtered or non-filtered state. It is an operation or transformation of 
blood from its non-filtered to its filtered state. Similarly, cognitive processes do 
not have all of the same properties as the cognitive states they operate on or 
produce. Cognitive states are semantically evaluable, but the processes that 
enable such states are not. Thus the derived/non-derived distinction is not 
applicable to cognitive processes.  
Even if we allow that there is some derived/non-derived distinction that 
differentiates Otto's case from Inga's, we need not admit that this undermines the 
claim that cognition is occurring in Otto's case. Adams and Aizawa are not 
applying a fair comparison when they compare words on a page and mental 
states. They compare mental states with wholly underived content (Inga‟s 
memories) with a state whose content is wholly derived (Otto‟s notebook). But 
what the externalist is concerned with is not just the writing in the notebook, but 
the entire process involving Otto and his notebook. For Otto to have the belief 
about the museum's location, his own internal capacities are also put to use. It is 
the pairing of Otto and the notebook that constitute the cognitive process, and not 
the notebook alone. If non-derived content can only be generated by minds, then 
there is certainly a mind involved. The issue concerns what constitutes the mind 
– Otto's brain or the pairing of Otto and the notebook? However meaning is 
generated, we cannot refute the extended mind hypothesis by assuming it is 
generated internally as this is to beg the question. Perhaps it is the case that the 
notebook cannot contain non-derived meaning alone, but perhaps non-derived 
meaning can be realised in the pairing of Otto and his notebook. The cognitive 
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process that generated Otto's belief would not have existed without the notebook 
and Otto. And recall that Adams and Aizawa only require that “some 
components of cognitive states require some intrinsic content” (2008: 50). Even 
if we grant them that intrinsic or non-derived content can only be generated 
internally, this does not seem to offer a principled reason to doubt that the Otto-
notebook system is a cognitive one. Some components of this system will be 
internal ones, capable of generating non-derived content, and this is all Adams 
and Aizawa ask for. 
Further, as Hurley notes, there is no uncontroversial definition of 
cognition: “criteria of the mental or cognitive vary widely (if not wildly) across 
theorists; it isn't even clear what agreed work such criteria should do” (Hurley 
forthcoming). She suggests that instead of beginning with a definition of 
cognition and then using this to decide whether aspects of the external 
environment should feature as causal or constitutive factors in explanations of 
how cognitive tasks are performed, we ought to see if good explanations for the 
performance of cognitive tasks can include just the internal, or whether better 
explanations can be found by including the external: 
 
The issues between internalism and externalism should be solved 
bottom up by good scientific practice, not by advance metaphysics: by 
seeing whether any good psychological explanations are externalist, not 
by deciding on a criterion of the mental and using it to sort explanations 
as constitutive or not. (Hurley forthcoming) 
 
Hurley understands the internalist/externalist debate in the philosophy of mind to 
be one primarily concerned with explanation. The internalist argues that good 
explanations in psychology will be generated by assuming an internalist model of 
cognition. The externalist, on the other hand, argues that good explanations in 
psychology will, at least some of the time, assume an externalist model of the 
mind. Indeed, Clark and Chalmers suggest that not only is an externalist 
approach to the completion of a mathematical calculation using pen and paper 
more adequately explained with their active externalist approach, but that it is 
also a more simple explanation:  
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... one could always try to explain my actions in terms of internal 
processes and a long series of “inputs” and “actions”, but this 
explanation would be needlessly complex. If an isomorphic process 
were going on in my head, we would feel no urge to characterize it in 
this cumbersome way. (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 12) 
 
If good explanation is what motivates this debate, then it perhaps ought to 
proceed by seeing what explanations can be generated on both the internalist and 
externalist approach and deciding which among them is best, be they internalist 
or externalist explanations. 
Cognitive processes rely on structures and mechanisms that can be located 
in the brain, body and environment of the agent. It is only in the interaction of 
these structures and mechanisms that certain cognitive processes are possible 
(e.g. Otto and his notebook). In other situations, the interactions between internal 
features of the brain and external features of the world create alternative 
cognitive processes to entirely internal processes (e.g. the various Tetris 
scenarios). This much is uncontroversial. Where the externalist differs from the 
internalist is to claim that some cognitive processes are constituted by the 
interaction of these various internal and external components. Various criteria 
need to be met before any feature of the world should be considered a component 
of cognition. It ought to be relatively reliably available to the agent. If action is to 
be considered a constituent, it ought to be an epistemic rather than pragmatic 
action. Any epistemic action or external feature of the world ought to be 
implicated in the performance of the cognitive ability to such an extent that 
removing this feature of the environment will result in an immediate impairment 
or removal of the cognitive ability. If these criteria are met, then a parity of 
reasoning suggests we ought to consider these actions or external features 
components of cognition.  
 
3. The Evolution of Extended Cognitive Processes 
Rowlands (1999) and Menary (2007) both offer evolutionary justifications for 
the idea that cognition might be extended into the world. Rowlands' argument is 
in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, while Menary adopts Dawkins' extended 
phenotype hypothesis to provide an evolutionary justification for his 
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“manipulation hypothesis.” I will first outline Rowlands' account and examine 
some potential objections to this view. Rowlands' argument faces a number of 
problems, only some of which are surmountable, but others that are not. 
Rowlands' cost-benefit approach will be shown to only provide grounds for the 
evolution of extended cognitive processes in a very narrow set of circumstances, 
narrower than he anticipates. I will outline other circumstances in which we 
might expect natural selection to favour extended processes. Thus, I will provide 
a stronger evolutionary justification for extended cognitive processes.  
I will then outline Menary's account and examine what work the extended 
phenotype hypothesis does for it. Both Rowlands' and Menary's accounts rely on 
the “manipulation hypothesis,” and this accords well with the extended 
phenotype hypothesis. However, I will argue that neither the extended phenotype 
hypothesis nor the manipulation thesis is an appropriate tool for understanding 
extended cognition. 
 
3.1 The Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Rowlands argues that extended cognitive processes are likely to be selectively 
favoured over highly internalised processes, based on a cost-benefit analysis. 
This stems from his more general point that any offloading an organism can do 
onto the environment will tend to increase that organism‟s relative fitness 
because it reduces the overall energy expenditure of the skin-bound organism.  
Any trait can cost the organism energy resources in two ways. The first is 
in the energy it takes to develop a structure, mechanism or behaviour – the 
implementation cost.
79
 The second is in the energy it takes to maintain and use a 
structure, mechanism or behaviour – the performance cost. These two energy 
sinks combine to give the total amount of energy expended by the organism in 
virtue of possessing a given traits. The amount of energy an organism can 
acquire is dependent on two factors; the first concerns the amount of energy 
available in the environment, while the second concerns the upper limit on the 
organism‟s rate of absorption of this energy. Thus there will always be a finite 
amount of energy available for the organism to use. What energy is acquired by 
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 Ascertaining the implementation cost of any trait will present a technical difficulty for 
Rowlands‟ cost-benefit analysis. 
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the organism must then be used to supply the different energy sinks – the various 
structures, mechanisms and behaviours – that comprise the organism's system. 
Given the upper limit placed on energy coming into the system, the various 
energy sinks must compete for limited resources. The less energy required by a 
given structure, mechanism or behaviour, the greater the amount of energy 
available for the rest of the organism's system. 
Rowlands maintains that offloading onto the environment will tend to 
reduce the amount of energy required for a given extended process when 
compared to an internal process and this will result in an increase in the fitness of 
the organism relying on the extended process. An extended process will rely on 
features of the environment which will not incur any implementation or 
performance costs for the organism. An organism which relies on an extended 
process will only incur the costs of those internal structures or mechanisms 
which couple with external features of the world. We can imagine two 
organisms, the first of which performs a given task by relying on an extended 
process, while the second relies solely on an internal process. In all other respects 
these organisms are identical. They assimilate the same amount of energy from 
their environment, and the same amount of competition occurs internally for 
these energy resources. The organism which does not have to incur the 
implementation and performance costs of those external constituents of the 
process will tend to expend less of its overall energy, thus having more energy to 
apportion to the rest of its system. The organism which must incur the 
implementation and performance costs associated with all the constituents of the 
internal process will tend to have less energy to make available to the rest of its 
system. This means that the organism which utilises extended processes will 
have more energy resources than the organism that utilises solely internal 
processes. Thus, the organism which relies on extended processes for the 
performance of some task will tend to be fitter than an organism which relies 
only on internal processes. Such considerations lead Rowlands to his “barking 
dog principle”: 
 
If it is necessary for an organism to be able to perform a given adaptive 
task T, then it is differentially selectively disadvantageous for that 
organism to develop internal mechanisms sufficient for the performance 
225 
 
of T when it is possible for the organism to perform T by way of a 
combination of internal mechanisms and manipulation of the external 
environment. (1999: 80, italics in original)
80
 
 
Given this, we should expect there will tend to be selection for extended 
processes over exclusively internal processes. 
Rowlands anticipates several objections to his argument. Two in particular 
I will deal with here involve what Rowland terms “hidden costs” and “hidden 
benefits.” Rowlands responds to both arguments, but I will identify stronger 
versions of these objections that Rowlands has not considered. I will ultimately 
argue that although these stronger arguments pose problems for Rowlands' 
account, they do not undermine the attempt to talk about extended cognitive 
processes in evolutionary terms. Further, in considering these issues, we can 
identify a wider set of circumstances in which extended cognitive processes 
might arise than presumed in Rowlands' account. 
 
3.1.1 The Hidden Costs Argument 
Rowlands‟ imagined critic suggests that although it may look as though extended 
processes incur fewer costs in terms of energy use, there may be costs we have 
not considered. Rowlands offers the following example. Hooking my car up to a 
neighbour's car ensures a free ride; however, there will be implementation costs 
involved in this. I might have to persuade the neighbour to allow me to do this, or 
return the favour (or perform a bigger favour) for my neighbour at some later 
point. I may not come out of this deal any better off than if I had just driven my 
own car, and I might even come off worse. Extended processes may incur hidden 
costs and thus, the argument goes, we cannot presume extended processes are 
less energy-hungry than internal processes. 
As Rowlands points out, this argument cuts both ways. It may be the case 
that there are hidden costs involved in external processes, but this may also be 
true of internal processes. If we can say anything about the energy costs involved 
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 Rowlands bases the name for this principle on an inversion of the adage why keep a dog if 
you are going to bark yourself?: “... if you do have a dog, then you do not have to bark yourself. 
And getting your dog to do your barking for you will save you considerable investment of 
resources (i.e. energy)” (1999: 79). 
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in internal processes, we should be able to do the same about extended processes. 
The task is to establish the costs involved in both internal and extended processes 
as best as possible: “the possibility of hidden costs cannot be allowed to function 
as a sort of general and nebulous methodological angst” (Rowlands 1999: 93).  
 
3.1.2 The Hidden Benefits Argument 
The hidden benefits argument suggests that while there might be some short term 
benefit in relying on an extended rather than an internal cognitive process 
(perhaps in terms of energy savings), in the long term the entirely internal 
approach may have some extra benefits which ultimately make it a better option. 
That is, the pay off associated with an internal process is at least enough to 
compensate for any extra implementation and performance costs. Given this, we 
should expect entirely internal approaches to have been selected over extended 
approaches. Rowlands offers an example of this line of thought. Suppose we 
were faced with the task of having to lift a weight. The extended process might 
involve asking someone else to lift it, while the internal process might involve 
developing strong enough muscles to be able to lift the weight without 
assistance. Let's assume that there are less implementation and performance costs 
involved in persuading someone else to lift the weight (though such an 
assumption is not unproblematic). Nonetheless, being able to lift the weight 
unaided might be more selectively advantageous because there will be a bigger 
pay off in the long run: you may be able to lift other things, you may be able to 
fight off predators as a result, and so on. That is, if more adaptive problems can 
be solved by the internal process, it may actually be more cost effective. If the 
energy gained compensates for the energy lost in implementation and 
performance, then the internal solution – developing stronger muscles – will be 
selectively advantageous.  
Rowlands identifies two problems with this line of argument. First, just as 
with the hidden costs argument, the argument that there may be hidden benefits 
associated with an internal process is just as applicable to an extended process. 
Being able to persuade someone to lift a weight is a skill that could generalise to 
many other tasks, just as being able to lift heavy objects might. Second, 
Rowlands suggests that this sort of argument misunderstands the nature of 
natural selection: 
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Evolution crosses each bridge as it comes to it, and has no conception of 
the possibility of further bridges. Now, while it might be a good thing 
for an organism to develop internal structures to perform a given task 
since these structures might give it the capacity to perform other 
important tasks also, the fact that it is a good thing cannot possibly be 
recognized by evolution. (Rowlands 1999: 94) 
 
It is certainly the case that natural selection cannot anticipate solutions to 
problems organisms might face in the future. In this sense, Rowlands is right to 
object to hidden benefits arguments where it is assumed the hidden benefits will 
arise out of situations that are not yet realised in the organism's life and have not 
typically occurred in that lineage. Natural selection, for instance, could not have 
equipped a lineage with an adaptation for coping with industrialised cities prior 
to the development of such cities. However, given the weight-lifting example 
outlined by Rowlands above, it is not clear this sort of scenario is all he is 
limiting his claim to. The “hidden benefits” associated with developing the 
muscle strength to lift the weight unaided do not seem of the same sort to the 
“hidden benefits” associated with being equipped to deal with crossing busy 
roads. That is, there are many obvious situations where increased muscle strength 
would be useful within that organism‟s lifetime. It is not clear that the ability to 
deal with busy roads would be useful to an organism in the absence of busy 
roads. It is only future generations of this population that would benefit from 
such an adaptation. But while natural selection cannot equip organisms with 
adaptations for scenarios that have not yet occurred, it can certainly favour a trait 
that causes a short term disadvantage to the organism if it ultimately increases its 
chances of survival and reproduction over its life time. But both internal and 
extended processes can deliver a short-term disadvantage but a long-term 
advantage to the organism. That there might be hidden benefits associated with 
an internal process equally applies to extended processes. 
The hidden benefits argument, like the hidden costs argument, seems to 
come down to an argument about methodology. It suggests that we might 
overlook certain benefits associated with an internal process because we are 
focussed only on the role of that process in a given task. Should that process also 
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play a role in other tasks, our cost-benefit analysis will be too narrowly focussed 
and so not reflect the actual benefits associated with this process. It is possible 
for natural selection to select for a trait with a higher implementation and 
performance cost but which ultimately offers a bigger pay off for the organism 
because that trait has a wider range of uses.
81
 If it should turn out that developing 
stronger muscles confers a greater long-term survival and reproductive advantage 
to a person than the ability to persuade someone to lift the weight then this is the 
sort of thing natural selection can act on. Equally, persuading someone to lift the 
weight may be selected for even if (as is more likely) it requires a greater 
implementation and maintenance cost if it confers a greater long-term survival 
and reproductive advantage. 
Of course, as with the hidden costs arguments, we ought not to allow this 
hidden benefits argument to undermine the entire project. If we are to adopt a 
cost-benefit analysis, we must do our best to identify all costs and benefits over 
the lifespan of the organism. That we may miss some cost or benefit is always a 
possibility, but it applies to both internal and extended processes. There is 
nothing in the methodology of this approach that makes this inevitable, and there 
is no systematic bias towards either internal or extended processes that will mean 
our results are hopelessly skewed. Missing something in this way is merely the 
risk we take with any attempt to find out about the world. The possibility of 
getting it wrong is not enough to undermine such an endeavour.  
 
3.1.3 The Strong Hidden Benefits Argument 
While the weak hidden benefits argument seems to be concerned with an internal 
process allowing for greater generalisability, and thus conferring more benefits in 
virtue of allowing the organism to solve more adaptive problems, the strong 
hidden benefits argument makes a slightly different point. A less costly external 
process may be selectively advantageous in the short term, but if the 
environmental feature that acts as a constituent of this process is not reliably 
available, then selection may eventually favour an internal process in virtue of 
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 This is possible, but there is an upper limit. If the implementation and performance costs, 
say, are so great at some early point in life that the organism is vulnerable and thus is likely to fail 
to reproduce, then the long-term benefits need to be very high for such a strategy to be selected 
for. At some point, the risks will outweigh the benefits. 
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the fact that it allows the organism to solve the adaptive problem with greater 
regularity. The selective advantage will be most strongly felt by the internal 
process, according to this objection, if the adaptive problem is particularly 
pressing, or if the environmental feature is likely to be absent for periods of time 
greater than the life span of the individual organism.  
Certain conditions would still have to be met for this to happen. In 
particular, the implementation and performance costs associated with the internal 
processes would have to cause less of a disadvantage to the organism than the 
disadvantage felt if the task could not be completed. An internal process would 
also have to be a possibility (more on this below). But for the moment let's 
assume that the disadvantage felt by the organism in not being able to solve a 
particular problem is greater than the costs of developing and maintaining an 
internal process which allows the problem to be solved.  
In such circumstances, and assuming an internal process is 
developmentally possible and the required variation exists in the population, we 
should expect the internal process to be selected for, and the extended process to 
be selected against and even eliminated if the problem to be solved is of enough 
urgency. So, if beavers had historically spent enough time in environments with 
no rivers to dam, or only sporadic access to rivers, we might expect selection for 
alternative ways to solve the problem of avoiding predators and transporting 
food. And some of these alternatives might rely on structures, and mechanisms 
that could be characterised as internal. Thus, the argument goes, where 
environments have fluctuated such that the relevant feature has been absent, we 
should expect selection to have favoured internal processes.  
The strong hidden benefits argument need not be a problem for the idea of 
extended cognitive processes, or for building an evolutionary account of the 
emergence of such phenomena. I want to argue here not so much that Rowlands‟ 
account is wrong, but that his account does not go far enough. He has set out 
some of the conditions for the possible evolution of extended cognitive 
processes, but these are just a small set of the conditions that would allow such 
processes to evolve. Even if the strong hidden benefits argument might suggest 
that extended processes are more vulnerable in virtue of their reliance on 
contingent environmental features (and we can contest even this, see below), and 
as a result, such processes might not emerge as frequently as Rowlands assumes, 
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there are far more conditions in which such processes could emerge, and thus we 
need not assume that extended cognitive processes will be atypical.
82
 A more 
pressing concern for Rowlands' project of providing an evolutionary justification 
for the existence of extended cognitive processes will then be explored. I will 
argue that Lewontin's niche construction approach to evolution suggests that the 
cost-benefit analysis employed by Rowlands is inappropriate for considering 
organism-environment interactions and their evolutionary consequences. 
 
3.1.4 Changing Environments 
One worry that might be raised here is that extended processes will be more 
vulnerable than internal processes in virtue of their reliance on features of a 
transient environment. If internal processes have been even fractionally more 
reliably available then, the thought goes, we should expect selection to favour 
internal processes. In the earlier discussion of Clark and Chalmers (1998), I 
discussed a version of this concern. Neural circuitry might be thought to be 
reliably available, whereas aspects of the environment might be considered more 
transient, and this might somehow motivate a distinction between the internal 
(constituents of cognitive processes) and the external (inputs for cognitive 
processes). Clark and Chalmers' responded to this objection by demonstrating 
that internal processes are not necessarily as reliable as we might tend to think. 
Intoxication and sleep were both used as examples to demonstrate that even 
entirely internal cognitive processes are not always available to us. And a 
condition of external features of the world counting as constituents of such 
extended cognitive processes was that they were very reliably available to us.  
Over evolutionary time, however, the worry might be that even very slight 
differences in the reliability of an internal process over an extended process 
might be sufficient for the selection of the internal process over the extended one. 
However, this need not be the case. Stabilising selection can allow a variety of 
traits to co-exist within a population. Let's imagine a population comprised of 
two types of organism. One relies on a fully internal but costly process, while the 
other relies on an extended and cheap process. When the aspect of the 
environment relevant to the extended process is present, the organism which 
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 Though note that externalists only need establish that some aspects of cognition are 
extended to defeat strong internalist arguments. 
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relies on the extended process is favoured by selection. When this feature of the 
environment is absent, the organism which relies on the internal process is 
favoured. Assuming the adaptive problem these processes allow the organism to 
solve are not so pressing that the organism that cannot solve it is almost certain 
to die or fail to reproduce (and similarly assuming the costs of the internal 
process are not so great that the organism that relies on such a process is almost 
certain to die or fail to reproduce), selection will switch between favouring the 
extended and internal process such that organisms that rely on the extended 
process and organisms that rely on the internal process both exist in the 
population. That is, there would be two distinct adaptations in the population for 
solving the given adaptive task.  
The sort of objection to extended processes that concerns the transience of 
environmental features assumes that only one external solution is available. 
There is no justification for such an assumption; at any time, there may be a 
variety of extended processes (and a variety of internal processes) on offer. 
Natural selection cannot favour an internal process over an extended one if an 
internal process is not available. It will also not opt for an internal over an 
extended process if there is another less costly external process on offer. So if an 
environmental feature that partly comprises an extended process is unreliably 
present, another more reliable aspect of the environment may end up partially 
constituting a different extended process. And if this new extended process is 
less costly than whatever internal processes exist in the population, then we 
should expect selection to favour this new extended process instead. The choice 
is never between internal and extended processes in general, but between actual 
instantiations of both types of processes where they should happen to appear.  
Let's grant for the moment that external processes, because they depend on 
transient features of the environment, are less likely to be favoured by selection 
than internal processes. This alone need not undermine the idea that we should 
expect such extended processes to exist, or to have played a role in evolution. In 
chapter three I discussed West-Eberhard's account of the evolutionary 
importance of adaptive plasticity and genetic accommodation. In her account, 
highly internalised traits are parasitic on traits that depend strongly on the 
environment. The idea here was that traits that initially depend heavily on the 
environment can, after a sufficient amount of time and with the right variation in 
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the population, develop independently of the relevant aspect of the environment. 
A form of behaviour, for instance, may start out in a population by being learnt. 
Some general plastic response of the organism, itself perhaps the product of 
natural selection, will be responsible for this.  Variation in the population may 
mean that some organisms can acquire this behaviour with less exposure to the 
stimuli than most of their conspecifics and these individuals will be favoured by 
selection (again, assuming whatever variation is involved does not drain 
resources such that its cost is greater than the benefit felt by acquiring the 
behaviour more quickly). Further phenotypic variants may arise whereby even 
less learning is required, and again, with the usual provisos, selection will favour 
them. This can continue until the trait no longer needs to be learnt, or only needs 
the minimum of exposure to the right kind of situation. The initially entirely 
learnt behaviour in the population can often create the right sort of selective 
environment for the subsequent variants to be favoured. Take this hypothetical 
scenario. Some birds learn to remove the tops from bottles of milk in order to 
drink the milk inside. Now let's imagine that such birds move from a diet that 
had primarily been based on insects to one which, through learning this 
behaviour, now becomes one based primarily on milk. The ability to catch 
insects no longer matters, and perhaps such skills atrophy. In such a situation, 
there is a far greater selection pressure for variants that can open bottle tops with 
greater ease than there was when insects formed the main component of the diet. 
The learnt behaviour changes the selective landscape.  
The usual way plastic responses are described is in terms of an internal 
adaptation that receives the correct sort of input from the environment thus 
triggering an adaptive response. This is the sort of picture that chapter four on 
developmental systems theory, as well as the earlier part of this chapter on 
extended cognitive processes attempted to undermine. Rather than understanding 
plastic responses as internal adaptations that produce the correct output for a 
given input, we can understand at least some such plastic responses as extended 
processes that are constituted by those features of the environment we have been 
characterising as “inputs.”  
The point of all this is as follows: Even if we could establish that internal 
processes were generally favoured by natural selection over extended ones (so, 
for instance, if we accepted as the example above presumes, that internal 
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solutions will be quicker and more effective), this would not entail that there 
would be no extended processes. Internal processes might only come about 
because of extended processes and, given this, extended processes would play an 
important role in driving cognitive evolution. Given how recent, in evolutionary 
terms, many of what appear to be uniquely human cognitive abilities are, there 
are good grounds for thinking that many of them may rely on extended 
processes.  
 
3.1.5 Plasticity 
We have assumed so far that the transience of environmental features is a 
difficulty to be overcome. However, this need not be the case. Where different 
adaptive problems are faced in different environments, reliance on cyclically 
fluctuating environmental features can be an advantage. For example, depending 
on when the meadow vole Microtus pennsylanicus is born, its coat will either be 
thick or sparse. If the pup is born at the later stages of the summer, it will have a 
thicker coat, thus providing it with some protection during the winter. If the pup 
is born in the spring, it will not need such a thick coat to see it through the 
summer and so can devote resources to other aspects of development. The coat 
thickness of the vole pup at birth is influenced by the amount of melatonin the 
pup is exposed to, which is produced by the mother in response to day length 
(Gluckman et al. 2005). Day length is a variable feature of the environment, but 
far from this being a problem to be overcome, is in fact very useful. The vole pup 
does not need to waste energy developing a thicker coat when such a coat is not 
required. The high amounts of melatonin received from its mother in utero by a 
vole pup born later in the summer provides the right resources for a thick coat to 
develop. Extended processes of any kind may rely on features of the environment 
that fluctuate – in the vole‟s case, melatonin produced by its mother – but in 
some situations, the extended processes may only be required when that feature 
is present in the environment. As an example, the ability to solve complex 
mathematical problems may be more pressing in literate, industrialised societies. 
In other societies, for instance those of our stone age ancestors, the nuances of 
differential calculus may not only be less pressing, but a distraction from more 
important concerns. Societies in which one might need to perform some complex 
calculation are also environments in which one is most likely to find pen and 
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paper – or the equivalents thereof – in order to enable the completion of such a 
task.
83
 Not all extended processes may have this feature of only being required in 
the same environments as the requisite resources are to be found, but some may. 
In such circumstances, the changing environment does not pose a problem for 
extended processes. Rather, extended processes may be more adaptive in 
changeable environments than internal processes. The implementation and 
performance costs for a suitable internal process for any given environment may 
even be less than the implementation and performance costs for a plastic, 
extended process. However, the organism must provide a number of different 
internal processes to deal with the different states of the environment, even 
though some such states will not be instantiated in a given organism's lifetime; 
the organism will incur unnecessary implementation costs, as well as costs 
associated with maintenance. These will form another sort of hidden cost. Thus, 
the fact that certain features of the environment may not be reliably present, far 
from threatening the idea of extended processes, actually provides us with some 
support for the idea that extended processes may be selectively advantageous. 
Later I will look at arguments from developmental systems theory concerning 
extended inheritance that will also allow us to question whether we need to 
consider all aspects of the environment transient. 
  
3.1.6 Development 
Even in situations where some posited internal process might be more selectively 
advantageous this does not entail such a process will be selected. Evolution can 
only work with what actually arises. Should the requisite variation not occur in 
the population, there can be no selection for it. Phenotypic variation will not just 
require the right sort of genetic variation, or even the right sort of variation in 
developmental resources, but also that the developmental pathway of the 
organism is such that a new structure or mechanism can develop without 
disrupting other aspects of the developing system. Related to this, an extended 
                                                 
83
 Of course, it is perfectly possible – even likely – that the ability to solve complex 
mathematical problems is not the outcome of natural selection at all. This example is only 
designed to point out that the importance of cognitive skills (and skills more generally) are very 
much context-dependent, and this very context might provide the resources required to enable 
these skills. This is not a necessary relationship. Rather it only needs, as a contingent fact, to have 
been the case for selection to have favoured a skill based on such an extended process. 
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and internal process may also differ in the timing of their development. An 
extended and an internal process may demand the same amount of energy for 
implementation. However, it may be that such implementation energy is more 
easily spared at different points in development. If the internal processes require 
this energy at a point where the developing system cannot provide it, then the 
structures that underpin the process cannot develop. Of course, this point applies 
equally to the internal aspects of extended processes; the requisite resources may 
not be available for the development of these processes when they are required 
either. We have, of course, no reason to assume that there would be only one 
internal process that could handle the task, and so just because one process is 
ruled out by such developmental considerations does not entail all internal 
processes will be. However, this does raise a problem for Rowlands' strategy of 
cost-benefit analysis. The straight-forward comparison of implementation and 
performance costs for extended and internal processes does not take into account 
developmental considerations such as timing and so cannot provide enough 
information to decide which of two proposed processes will be favoured by 
natural selection. 
There are further problems for Rowlands' cost-benefit analysis. Recall his 
barking dog principle: 
 
If it is necessary for an organism to be able to perform a given adaptive 
task T, then it is differentially selectively disadvantageous for that 
organism to develop internal mechanisms sufficient for the performance 
of T when it is possible for the organism to perform T by way of a 
combination of internal mechanisms and manipulation of the external 
environment. (1999: 80, italics in original) 
 
This principle suggests extended processes will always, or generally, be favoured 
by selection over internal processes. This is based on Rowlands' argument that 
extended processes will usually be less costly for the organism than internal 
processes. However, can we assume that this will in fact usually be the case? 
Where we can expect this assumption to be warranted is in the following case. 
Consider two organisms, one of which relies on an entirely internal process, the 
other on an extended process. There is overlap between the internal and extended 
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processes such that all the internal components of the extended process are also 
components of the internal process. The extended process involves the common 
internal sub-processes plus some external sub-processes, while the internal 
process involves the common internal sub-processes plus some other internal 
sub-processes. The organism that relies on the fully internal process then has to 
find implementation and performance energy for the common set of sub-
processes, plus an extra set of sub-processes. The organism with the extended 
process only needs to find implementation and performance energy for the types 
of sub-processes the two organisms share in common. Thus, the organism that 
relies on the extended process incurs fewer energy costs. So, if internal and 
extended processes differed from one another in this way, we might be justified 
in assuming, along with Rowlands, that extended processes would be favoured 
by natural selection on the grounds of demanding fewer implementation and 
performance costs. 
However, we have no reason to assume that an extended process will differ 
from an internal process in just this way. The internal components of the 
extended process may have little in common with any of the components of the 
purely internal process. Rowlands adds another principle – the principle of the 
non-obvious character of evolved internal mechanisms: 
 
For the performance of a given task T, and for any internal mechanism 
M which has evolved in organism O and which, when combined with 
suitable environmental manipulation on the part of O, allows O to 
perform T, the nature of M is not always obvious on the basis of T. 
(1999: 81) 
 
When an organism completes a task by relying on external features of the world, 
those internal processes involved will only form sub-processes of that larger 
extended process. Given there is no requirement to assume that the sub-processes 
must share all or many of the same properties as the larger processes, the sub-
processes may look quite different to the larger process. If we identify a task that 
an organism is required to complete, we may be able to identify the solution to 
the task when we see it. For example, if an organism has natural predators, a 
solution to this problem might involve sharp claws to fight off predators. There 
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are many specific strategies to avoid predation (and a combination of such 
strategies is both possible and common), but we can be fairly sure, according to 
Rowlands, that we can identify such solutions, or at least make educated guesses 
about these strategies, where they arise by merely looking at the organism if such 
strategies are entirely internal. We cannot say the same about the sub-process or 
components of a solution. They may look quite different to the actual solution. A 
cog from a tin-opener does not appear an obvious component of a solution to the 
problem of opening tinned goods. Rowlands highlights this point with the 
example of the beaver. The beaver's dam solves, or helps solve, the problem of 
transporting food and avoiding predators. The dam is difficult for predators to 
negotiate. The beavers' lodge built in its centre can only be accessed from 
beneath the water, and the structure is very strong. The beaver's main source of 
food is tree bark and substances surrounding it. Beavers forage for food, and 
transport it back to their lodge to consume, in part at least to avoid predation. 
Because they create lakes behind their dams, they create a long shoreline from 
which they can forage without spending too much time exposed to predators. 
Further, when they have found food, they can transport it on the deeper water 
created by the dam back to the lodge. The dam helps the beaver avoid predators 
and transport food. The dam can be considered a component of the beaver's 
extended processes of catching food and avoiding predators. Essential to the 
beaver's ability to build a dam is their long flat teeth. This serves as a nice 
example of the non-obvious character of evolved internal mechanisms. The long, 
flat shape of the beaver‟s teeth is not an obvious solution to the problem of 
avoiding predators. We should not expect the internal aspects of extended 
solutions to be the obvious solutions to the task at hand; we should not expect 
this because they are not solutions to the task, they are merely components of the 
solution, and there is no necessity for components to have properties similar to 
the properties of the larger system. Of course, once we take a step back and look 
at the organism in its environment, we may find a something that “looks” like a 
solution to a given adaptive problem. 
Consider Clark and Chalmers' Tetris example again. The scenario in which 
the player pressed a button to rotate the shape on the screen involved internal 
sub-processes such as those involved in deciding to press the button, and those 
involved in moving the players' arm and fingers. In considering what a solution 
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to the problem of fitting shapes into sockets might look like, following 
Rowlands' principle of the non-obvious character of evolved internal 
mechanisms, these internal processes do not look like obvious candidates. At 
least, they do not look like obvious solutions when considered in isolation. When 
we look at the bigger picture, at the entire extended process, how such sub-
processes allow the player to complete the task becomes clearer. The sorts of 
internal processes at work in this example of extended cognitive process seem, 
by and large, quite different to the sorts of processes that need to be employed in 
the case where the player rotates the shape mentally.  
If extended processes rely on quite different sub-processes to those utilised 
by fully internal processes, we cannot make this assumption underlying 
Rowlands' barking dog principle; we are not comparing like with like. We can 
accept that if the same (or very similar) sort of process was to be extended, this 
will reduce energy costs for the organism, but we cannot do so if the internal 
components of the extended process are not of the same (or of a very similar) 
sort to some of the components of the entirely internal process. And it is not, I 
take it, unreasonable to assume that extended processes will often, if not usually, 
involve set of components that have little overlap with the components that 
comprise entirely internal processes (see below for a more detailed discussion on 
this point). Rowlands' barking dog principle appears to be at odds with his 
principle of the non-obvious character of evolved internal mechanisms. In cases 
where the entirely internal processes are markedly different than the internal 
components of extended processes, we cannot make any assumptions about 
which process will be the most energy hungry. We can establish this fact on a 
case by case basis, as each process is actually realised in the world, but we 
cannot a priori take extended processes to be cheaper solutions to internal 
processes. 
In summary, Rowlands' cost-benefit analysis may not provide good grounds for expecting 
the evolution of extended processes, but that does not mean we cannot expect extended processes 
to have evolved. Indeed, there may be a wider range of circumstances in which extended 
processes have evolved than those Rowlands' analysis suggests. His account points to extended 
processes being favoured when they are cheaper, but this need not be the case. It may be that a 
given extended process required greater implementation energy, but that it required this energy at 
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a time the organism could spare it, while the internal process required its implementation energy 
at a point in development when the organism could not spare it. Concerns about the transience of 
the environment and thus the selective disadvantage to organisms relying on extended processes 
fail to undermine the case for the evolution of extended processes on three grounds. First, the 
choice need not be between one internal and one extended process. There may be multiple 
extended (or internal) processes instantiated in the population. Just because one extended process 
fails due to environmental changeability does not mean another extended process will not be 
favoured instead, especially if it is cheaper than any of the internal options. Second, even if an 
internal process is preferable in a given scenario, this process may only have become selectively 
advantageous because of the pre-existence of the extended process. Natural selection may only 
come to favour internal processes because extended processes altered the selective landscape in 
some way. This would suggest that, at least in some cases, extended processes are primary as 
drivers of cognitive evolution. Third, there is no reason to assume internal processes will always 
be favoured when the relevant aspects of the environment are transient. Stabilising selection 
could allow at least two adaptations, relying on either an entirely internal or extended process to 
exist in the population. The transience of certain aspects of the environment may even work to 
the advantage of extended processes, as the discussion of adaptive plasticity demonstrated. All of 
which is to say that, in considering the circumstances in which extended processes could have 
come about through evolution, there are more issues to bear in mind than just those that pertain 
to a straightforward cost-benefit analysis. So even if we cannot always assume that extended 
processes will be cheaper in the manner of Rowlands, we can consider a far wider range of 
circumstances in which extended processes might be selected for, and thus we have good 
grounds to expect some extended processes to arise as a result of natural selection. 
  
3.2 The Manipulation Thesis and the Extended Phenotype Hypothesis 
Menary (2007) develops a version of “how”-externalism called “cognitive 
integration” that, he argues, avoids the pitfalls of Clark and Chalmers' extended 
mind hypothesis as well as providing more detail of the ways in which cognitive 
processes can be understood as being constituted by aspects of the environment. 
In particular, he describes and extends what he calls the manipulation thesis, also 
evident in Rowlands (1999) and Clark and Chalmers‟ (1998) work. This 
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manipulation thesis, argues Menary, can be given an evolutionary justification by 
incorporating Dawkins' extended phenotype hypothesis. I will argue here that in 
adopting the manipulation thesis, Menary (and, by extension, Rowlands) have 
fallen foul of the very problem Menary identifies with Clark and Chalmers' 
account of extended cognition. Further, this demonstrates the unsuitability of 
attempting to understand the evolution of extended cognitive processes in terms 
of the extended phenotype hypothesis. 
 
3.2.1 The Parity Principle 
Menary's criticisms of Clark and Chalmers' account of extended cognition 
centres around what has come to be known as their “parity principle”: 
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world 
is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 
8) 
 
Menary (2007: 55-59) notes that critics have taken this to imply that extended 
processes are of the same or very similar type as internal processes. Menary 
quotes Adams and Aizawa as stating that Clark and Chalmers “contend that the 
active causal processes that extend into the environment are just like the ones 
found in intracranial cognition” (Menary 2007: 56; Adams and Aizawa 2001: 
56). Menary suggests that such a reading of the parity principle is ultimately 
damaging to the idea of extended cognition
84
:  
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 It is not always clear what Menary's position on the parity principle is. On the one hand, he 
suggests Adams and Aiwaza (2001) have misinterpreted the principle. Nonetheless, a good deal 
of his argument relies on rejecting the parity principle and replacing it with the manipulation 
thesis. Indeed, he states: “a major difference between extended mind style arguments and 
cognitive integration is that the latter does not depend upon the parity principle” (2007: 57). But 
this would only appear to be correct if by parity principle we mean Adams and Aiwaza's 
misinterpreted version of the parity principle. Menary's cognitive integration seems entirely to 
accord with, even presume, the parity principle. Menary's suggestion that cognitive integration 
does not depend on the parity principle appears to implicitly endorse Adams & Aiwaza‟s 
misreading of the principle. 
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... this version of the parity principle is fatally flawed because it assumes 
the very position it is meant to displace. The “extended mind” and the 
parity principle encourage us to think of an internal cognitive system 
that is extended outwards into the world. Hence it implicitly endorses a 
picture of a discrete cognitive agent, some of whose cognitive processes 
get extended out into the world. (2007: 56) 
 
Menary worries, along with Adams and Aizawa, that the parity principle implies 
that extended cognitive processes count as cognitive processes only in virtue of 
their resemblance (in terms of structures and mechanisms) to internal processes. 
Such an approach to extended processes would ultimately be self-defeating for 
two reasons. First, there are unlikely to be very many extended processes which 
do share this degree of resemblance to internal processes. Second, even if such 
extended processes were found to exist, they would be considered cognitive only 
in virtue of their resemblance to internal cognitive processes. Thus we would be 
prioritising internal cognitive processes by allowing internal processes to define, 
in Adams and Aizawa's terms, the “mark of the cognitive.” The idea that 
extended cognitive processes can only be understood after we have come to 
understand internal cognitive processes seems to fundamentally undermine the 
various forms of externalism about cognition which seek to undermine accounts 
which, a priori, privilege the internal. Given this, Menary argues that the parity 
principle ought to be abandoned. 
As discussed above, it is unlikely that there are many extended processes 
that share much in common with internal processes that achieve the same goal 
(solve the appropriate cognitive task). Rather, extended processes are likely to 
differ in a great many respects. If Clark and Chalmers' argument hung on this 
point, then their case for extended cognition would be a very weak one. 
However, it is not the case that their argument relies on this claim. Taking just 
the two examples Clark and Chalmers use to highlight their case, Tetris and 
Otto's notebook, it is very clear that they are suggesting that the extended and 
internal processes are quite different in their detail. The player that rotates the 
shapes in the Tetris game mentally is doing something quite different than the 
player that rotates the shape using the button. These processes differ considerably 
in the structures and mechanisms that comprise them. Similarly, Otto in 
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consulting his notebook is relying on structures, mechanisms and actions quite 
differ to Inga when she uses her biological memory. There can be no suspicion 
that Clark and Chalmers were suggesting internal and external processes were of 
the same sort in terms of the structures and mechanisms that comprised them:  
 
...our claim is not that the processes in Otto and Inga are identical, or 
even similar, in terms of their detailed implementation. It is simply that, 
in respect of the role that the long-term encodings play in guiding 
current response, both modes of storage can be seen to be supporting 
dispositional beliefs. (Clark 2008) 
 
Cognitive processes are, on this account, functionally specified. Where an 
internal and an external process can underpin an ability to solve a cognitive task, 
though they do this in quite different ways, we can consider them to be of the 
same (functionally-specified) sort. This is a much weaker commitment than the 
sort implied by Adams and Aizawa (2001) which suggested a much closer form 
of similarity between internal and external processes. This criticism, then, does 
no harm to the extended mind hypothesis.  
The “parity principle” might better be named the “parity of reasoning about 
cognitive processes principle.” Clark and Chalmers are not asking us to think of 
internal and extended processes as the same sort of thing (in terms of their 
components, though they can be considered to be of the same sort when 
functionally defined). What Clark and Chalmers are asking us to do is to apply 
the same reasoning about cognition to a wider variety of cases than perhaps we 
are used to. There are similarities here with the parity of reasoning called for by 
developmental systems theorists. This does not amount to the claim that all 
developmental resources play exactly the same role in development. Rather, it is 
the claim that we should not, in general, privilege any resource for development 
over others (though, of course, any particular resource may play a greater or 
lesser role in a particular developmental process and outcome). We should not 
assume, in advance, that one set of resources are more important, or 
fundamental, than any other. Clark and Chalmers are making a similar point. If 
the only reason to discount a process as cognitive is that some of the components 
for the processes were located beyond the skin, then we would be a priori 
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privileging a certain sort of cognitive resource (internal processes) over others 
(extended processes). If the task were completed by means of some internal 
process and, without knowing the details of this process, we were nonetheless 
happy to term that process cognitive, there seems to be little grounds, in general, 
to imagine that extended processes that allow us to complete the same task could 
not be termed cognitive too. I say “in general” here, because specific conditions 
will have to be met concerning reliable availability and so on, as detailed earlier. 
But there appear to be no a priori grounds to exclude extended processes as 
cognitive in virtue of the fact that they are extended.  
Menary also criticises the sense of functional similarity employed by Clark 
and Chalmers: 
 
Otto and his notebook do not really function in the same kind of way 
that Inga does when she has immediate recall from biological memory. 
There are genuine and important differences in the way that memories 
are stored internally and externally and these differences matter to how 
the memories are processed. (2007: 59) 
 
This is undoubtedly correct.
85
 But it misses Clark and Chalmers' objective in 
stating this parity principle. Functional similarity at the level Clark and Chalmers 
are working on may be less useful in explaining cognitive processes, but 
functional similarity at this level is important for establishing their point that 
there are no a priori grounds to rule out a process as cognitive just because some 
of the components of the process happen to be external to the organism. Again, 
the parity they are calling for is a parity of reasoning, not a claim that we must 
treat all internal and external processes as of the same sort in their particular 
details. 
In fact, Adams and Aizawa's (2001) and Menary's (2007) reading of the 
parity principle is exactly what Clark wanted to avoid: 
 
... far from requiring any deep similarity between inner and outer 
processes, the parity claim was specifically meant to undermine any 
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 Clark and Chalmers (1998) appear to accept this point too given they discuss the 
differences in the details of Otto's and Inga's cognitive performances. 
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tendency to think that the shape of the present-day, human inner 
processes sets some bar... on what should count as part of a genuinely 
cognitive process. (Clark 2008: 114) 
 
It may be the case that others have (mis)understood the parity principle in 
the way Adams and Aizawa (2001) appear to. Rowlands' cost-benefit analysis, 
for instance, worked best only when we assumed that the extended processes 
were structurally very similar to internal processes. However, to ditch the parity 
principle on the grounds that it has been misinterpreted would be to throw the 
baby out with the bath water. Ultimately, the parity principle makes a fairly small 
claim (albeit one with potentially large consequences): do not allow the location 
of the components of a process to factor into decisions about the cognitive status 
of that process. This claim is one that Menary ultimately endorses in his own 
work. 
 
3.2.2 Privileging the Internal 
The extended mind hypothesis involves a commitment to a parity of reasoning 
about what might constitute a resource for a cognitive process. This position 
rejects attempts to privilege the brain over bodily actions and environmental 
structures in cognition. However, I want to argue here that there are two related 
ways in which an implicit privileging of the internal can creep into extended 
mind accounts. The first is in terms of the manipulation thesis, and the second is 
in terms of the adoption of Dawkins‟ (1999a) extended phenotype hypothesis. 
Clark and Chalmers (1998), Rowlands (1999), and Menary (2007) all make use 
of the notion of “manipulation,” but it is only Menary that explores the extended 
phenotype hypothesis. Given this, it is Menary‟s account I will focus on here. 
Menary takes Rowlands‟ articulation of the manipulation thesis as a 
starting point for his own analysis: 
 
... cognitive processes are not located exclusively inside the skin of the 
cognizing organisms because such processes are, in part, made up of 
physical or bodily manipulation of structures in the environments of 
such organisms. (Rowlands 1999: 23, quoted in Menary 2007: 83, italics 
in original) 
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Cognitive processes can include manipulations of the environment. I might press 
a button to rotate a shape in Tetris, or manipulate a pen to solve a maths problem. 
Menary notes that manipulation of an environmental structure is not enough to 
identify cognitive processes (2007: 84). In chapters two and four, for example, I 
discussed ways in which organisms were reciprocally coupled to their 
environments, but none of these cases are appropriately described as cognitive. 
Such cases of non-cognitive reciprocal couplings are termed “biological 
couplings” by Menary. At a minimum, to count as a cognitive reciprocal 
coupling, manipulations would have to meet the criteria for epistemic actions. 
That is, they would have to alter the world as a means to the end of solving a 
cognitive task.
86
  
Note that my pressing a button or manipulating a pen will not fully 
describe the external aspects of the cognitive processes here. In the Tetris game, 
the shape must move in response to my pressing the button, and I must be able to 
see this. And of course, internal sub-processes will also be involved throughout. 
That is, my pressing the button is only one part of a cognitive process, and 
beyond that, only one part of the extended aspect of this particular cognitive 
process. Many acts of manipulation will require feedback from that which is 
being manipulated in order to guide future action. However, while there may be a 
reciprocal causal coupling involved in any manipulation, there is something that 
manipulates (controls, guides) something else. The manipulation thesis does not 
suggest that both environmental structure and agent manipulate one another. It is 
the agent that manipulates the environmental structure, not vice versa. Although 
manipulation may require a causal symmetry, there is nonetheless an asymmetry 
in terms of control. Both internal processes and external processes causally affect 
one another, but there is an ontological difference between the internal and 
external. The internal manipulates, while the external is manipulated. This is 
reminiscent of the privileging of the gene in neo-Darwinian evolutionary 
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 As well as epistemic actions, Menary offers two other classes of reciprocal couplings that 
can be considered cognitive. The first is “self-correcting action” which involves “the use of 
language and exogenous props to direct and structure practical actions in completing tasks. The 
second is “cognitive practice” which involves “manipulations of external representational and 
notational systems regulated by cognitive norms” (Menary 2007: 84). 
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biology. Although all manner of developmental resources, located beneath and 
beyond the skin, are thought to causally affect phenotypes, non-genetic resources 
are thought to merely causally affect phenotypes, while genes also exert some 
degree of control over phenotypes in virtue of their informational role in 
development. The manipulation thesis too suggests that both internal and 
external structures can play a causal role in the cognitive outcome, but it is the 
internal that is privileged over the external in terms of control. Because 
manipulation focuses on an agent who does something to the world, it supports 
an important boundary between a skin-bound organism and the relevant aspects 
of the world. What this results in is a tendency to neglect or downgrade the role 
of external structures. But the point of the extended mind hypothesis is that these 
aspects of the world are part of cognitive processes and we risk generating 
inadequate explanations while we neglect external components of cognitive 
processes.  
Privileging the internal makes it easier to neglect the contribution made by 
external structures. This neglect can be seen in Menary‟s adoption of Dawkins‟ 
(1999a) extended phenotype hypothesis. Menary suggests that the extended 
phenotype hypothesis provides an evolutionary justification for viewing 
cognition as extending beyond the brain. Recall from chapter two that the 
extended phenotype hypothesis is concerned with explaining the close 
relationship between organisms and aspects of the world. The idea is this: If the 
phenotype is what genes create and use to ensure their own replication, then a 
beaver's dam seems to fit this picture. A beaver that builds a better dam than its 
conspecifics may be favoured by natural selection. And genes may influence, on 
this account, the building of the dam, just as they might influence the 
development of the beaver's strong, flat front teeth. Just as two beavers can differ 
in the effectiveness of their teeth as a result of possessing different alleles, so two 
dams might differ due to the beavers possessing different alleles. If this is the 
case, goes this line of thought, why can't we also think of the dam itself, rather 
than just the dam building behaviour, as another effect of the genes?  
 
... it is clear that the phenotypic effects of genes extend beyond the body 
of the organism housing the gene, incorporating aspects of the 
environmental niche into the organismic system as extended 
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phenotypes. (Menary 2007: 110) 
 
The point raised in chapter two about the extended phenotype was that, even 
accepting for the moment the strong gene-centric approach it relies on, it only 
describes one half of a more complex causal interaction. That is, it describes how 
the environment, via natural selection, can mould the organism such that aspects 
of the environment become part of its extended phenotype. What it fails to 
describe is how, in interacting with, and altering, its environment, the organism 
alters the selection pressures it will be exposed to. That is, the extended 
phenotype account fails to adequately incorporate reciprocal coupling.  
In part, this is because the extended phenotype hypothesis, as with other 
gene-centric accounts, places genes in control of development, behaviour and 
even the extended phenotype. Phenotypes, extended or otherwise, do not emerge 
from the interactions of the many resources involved in development; rather they 
are created by genes to enable their own replication. This view encourages a 
neglect of other causal relations. Just as development is conceived as a black box 
from which emerges the phenotype, the gene-centric approach may result in a 
similar picture for the extended phenotype. This time the black box incorporates 
everything up to the adaptation that emerges from it – the beaver's dam for 
example. This approach does not deny that some two-way interaction between 
aspects of the environment forming the extended phenotype and the traditional 
organism is possible. However given the presumption of genes as the source of 
control, there will tend to be a systematic neglect of other causal relations due in 
part to their presumed irrelevance, to evolution by natural selection. If the 
environment is viewed as autonomous when thinking in terms of natural 
selection, and when genes are considered the only unit of selection, two-way 
interactions between organisms and their environments will seem unimportant, at 
least from an evolutionary point of view (see chapter two for a more detailed 
discussion of these points). 
Similarly, by focussing on manipulation in extended cognitive processes, 
rather than avoiding the underlying prioritising of the internal supposed by a 
misreading of Clark and Chalmers' parity principle, Menary falls foul of this very 
error. Menary states that “if we accept the picture of a cognitive agent as 
implementing a discrete cognitive system, before they ever encounter an external 
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vehicle, then we will have accepted the very picture of cognition we set out to 
reject” (2007: 63). Yet the manipulation thesis assumes a discrete cognitive 
system prior to an extended process, and thus runs counter to Menary‟s larger 
point. Menary‟s manipulation thesis, when viewed in isolation, works well with 
the extended phenotype hypothesis, but neither is appropriate for an account of 
extended cognitive processes that seeks to avoid either an explicit or implicit 
internalist bias.  
 
3.3 Developmental Systems Theory 
Developmental systems theory provides an evolutionary account of the close, 
reciprocal coupling an organism can have with aspects of its environment that is 
neglected by taking an extended phenotype view. Within developmental systems, 
outcomes emerge from the interactions of component parts. Control of these 
outcomes is located at the level of the system as a whole, rather than in any of its 
components. Cognitive processes, as understood from within the extended mind 
approach, appear to share similar properties. Indeed, if the developmental 
systems view is right, it should be no surprise that cognitive processes operate in 
a similar manner. If brains and cognition can be considered to be, at least in part, 
the products of evolution, then it should come as no surprise that some aspects of 
cognitive systems mirror other aspects of the biological system. And if other 
parts of the developing system seem to be composed of processes and resources 
both internal and external to the skin of the organism, this is even more likely to 
be true in the case of cognition. There is a wide consensus that humans display a 
high degree of plasticity and environmental responsiveness when it comes to 
cognition; evolutionary psychologists spend a good deal of time trying to explain 
this fact (evoked and epidemiological culture are supposed to help here – see 
chapter five for a full discussion of this). If we accept that other aspects of 
biological systems can be constituted by resources located in the environment, 
the case for extended cognition seems all the stronger.  
Developmental systems theory can add more support to the extended mind 
hypothesis by allowing us to further ameliorate concerns about the transience of 
environmental features for such an account. Recall that a potential concern for 
the extended mind hypothesis arose because environmental features were thought 
to be less reliable than internal ones, and that this would result in selection 
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favouring those organisms that relied on entirely internal resources over those 
that also relied on external resources to solve a given problem. Developmental 
systems theory allows us to challenge the assumption that environmental 
structures will always be more transient than internal developmental resources.  
The expanded notion of inheritance that forms a key commitment of 
developmental systems theory suggests that we can expect aspects of the 
environment to be robust and reliably present for each generation. Offspring do 
not inherit naked DNA, nor do they inherit just a cell. Rather, they can inherit a 
wide range of developmental resources from DNA, to cell membranes, gut 
bacteria, food preferences, nests, dams, linguistic communities, cultural practices 
and social structures and institutions. The environmental structures need not be 
viewed as entirely autonomous parts of the world that organisms can latch on to 
but not create or sustain. Those aspects of our environments that constitute 
cognitive processes may continue to do so not through sheer luck, but because 
one generation passes the necessary resources to the next generation, and this 
allows them to recreate or sustain the required environmental structures. These 
environmental structures may form part of our inheritance, just as genes do.  
Some of our cognitive processes will be far too modern to have been 
selected for, particularly those aspects that rely on cultural artefacts such as 
computers (as in the Tetris example). These sorts of features of the environment 
that partly constitute cognitive processes cannot be considered part of the 
evolutionary developmental system (though they may still be considered part of 
the developmental system – see chapter four). Nonetheless, even if such 
structures are too recent for any significant selection to have occurred, this does 
not undermine the idea that they may be inherited. However, other aspects of our 
environment may have been around for long enough, and been involved in our 
ancestors' lives, to such an extent that we may consider them part of the 
evolutionary developmental system.  
External representations may fall into this category. Donald (1991) charts 
the cognitive evolution of modern humans through the different types of 
representational system characteristic of Homo sapiens at different times. Indeed, 
on this account, each representation system makes possible the next step in 
cognitive evolution, and so plays an important role in driving cognitive 
evolution.  
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Donald argues that the first step in the evolution of modern human 
cognitive abilities came from moving away from the purely episodic mind that 
characterises the rest of the primates to mimetic culture.
87
 Episodic culture is 
characterised by the highest form of memory representation available; that is, 
episodic memory. Episodic memory is “memory for specific episodes in life, that 
is, events with a specific time-space locus... The important feature of this type of 
memory is its concrete, perceptual nature and its retention of specific episodic 
details” (Donald 1991: 150). Donald contrasts this with procedural memory – a 
more archaic form of memory – where what is remembered is only the 
generalities. Both procedural and episodic memory are common in many 
different animals, and apes appear to have the most developed episodic memories 
in non-human animals. This allows them to discern discrete events, even when 
such events are quite complex. However, where modern and older human 
cultures really differ from other primates is in their ability to utilise 
representations. What Donald terms mimetic culture is supposed to signal the 
break from the purely procedural and episodic memory of the non-human 
primates to something beginning to resemble modern human culture. Mimetic 
culture is so-called because mimesis becomes “the dominant or governing mode 
of representation” (Donald 1991: 162). This is a culture that is non-linguistic yet 
heavily reliant on intentional representational acts. Mimesis does not refer to 
reflexive, automatic acts – the kinds of gestures that occur when modern humans 
speak – nor to acts of imitation or mimicry. It also does not include mimicry, 
which aims at an exact copy of the original behaviour, while imitation involves a 
close, but not exact, copy of the original behaviour. What makes mimesis 
different to both of these cases is that mimesis does not require very close 
resemblances between the act of mimesis and the original act or event and, 
further, mimesis is fundamentally concerned with representation. Mimicry and 
imitation are not trying to represent some action or event, they are attempts to 
actually replicate the act or event (or almost replicate it in the case of imitation): 
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 Donald (1991) discusses a total of three key transitions that he argues led to modern human 
cognitive abilities. After the appearance of mimetic culture came mythic culture. This 
corresponds to the appearance of spoken language. After this came what Donald terms external 
symbolic storage and the theoretic culture it enabled. This corresponds to the appearance of early 
forms of writing, and Donald's account on this third stage shares much in common with accounts 
of extended cognition that focus on cultural artefacts as constituents of cognitive processes.  
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Mimesis adds a representational dimension to imitation. It usually 
incorporates both mimicry and imitation to a higher end, that of re-
enacting and re-presenting an event or relationship... mimesis is 
fundamentally different from imitation and mimicry in that it involves 
the invention of intentional representations. When there is an audience 
to interpret the action, mimesis also serves the purpose of social 
communication. However, mimesis may simply represent the event to 
oneself, for the purpose of rehearsing and refining a skill: the act itself 
may be analyzed, re-enacted and re-analyzed, that is, represented to 
oneself. (Donald 1991: 169) 
 
Mimesis, argues Donald, played a vital role in the culture of early hominids. As 
well as allowing the rehearsing and finessing of a skill, it enabled social 
communication, reciprocal mimetic games, social conformity and coordination, 
group mimetic acts and pedagogy. Donald offers ritual dance as an example of 
reciprocal mimetic games. If one individual mimetically represents an event or 
act, others may decide to reproduce these acts too. This can lead to some kind of 
conformity. The ritual dance arises out of a sense of how the dance should be 
done. Such rituals could easily extend beyond dance and characterise a good 
many other aspects of such a culture. Hunting, as Donald notes, requires a good 
deal of coordination – from making tools, to catching and killing prey, and 
finally butchering the animal: “it is likely that mimesis was the basis, if not the 
formative element, behind this new cooperative, specialized social organization... 
it would have enabled purposive signalling” (Donald 1991: 175). 
The mimetic representational system transformed early hominid culture. 
Mimetic representations, although they can be used purely for one's own benefit, 
if Donald is right, appear also to have played a role as an external feature of the 
environment for the audience in helping to structure and coordinate complex 
activities. If mimesis can lead to coordinated activities such as ritual dances and 
hunting, the vehicles of these external representations may, in some instances, 
count as constituents of cognitive processes. And if this is the case, this indicates 
that a coupling between our ancestors and the vehicles of such representations is 
a long one.  
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Being born into such a culture, one inherits the system of representations 
that characterise it. Mimesis continues to play an important role in modern 
societies; for example, it appears in opera, theatre, and in children's play. 
Humans have had a long history of engaging with vehicles of mimetic 
representations and, if cognitive processes can have such vehicles as 
components, mimetic representational systems might then feature as resources 
for evolutionary developmental systems. 
Regardless of whether we can in fact say that any particular extended 
cognitive process is a product of natural selection, we can still acknowledge that 
parents actively pass on structures in the environment to their offspring, thus 
ensuring features external to the organism's skin are not as transient as might be 
supposed. We are born into highly structured environments that can provide 
resources for the initial development of cognitive abilities (Clark and Chalmers 
might call these features of the environment passive features of extended 
cognition), as well as constituents of cognitive processes. Further, offspring 
reconstruct or maintain structures both beneath and beyond their skin in each 
generation such that resources for development can persist for potentially 
evolutionarily significant periods of time.  
Clark lays out the aims of the extended mind approach: 
 
We do indeed seek to carve nature at the most causally relevant joints, a 
task not accomplished by elevating anatomic or metabolic boundaries 
into make-or-break cognitive ones… As philosophers and cognitive 
scientists we can (and should) practice the art of flipping between… 
different perspectives, treating each as a lens apt to draw attention to 
certain features, regularities, and contributions while making it harder to 
spot others, or to give them their problem-solving due. (2007: 191-192) 
 
Developmental systems theory also builds in a parity of reasoning about what 
may be causally relevant. Further, it encourages “flipping” between perspectives 
when viewing a problem. We might first hold all but one constituent of a system 
still, but DST encourages us to look again at those parts of the system that 
formed the background conditions and assess their causal role too. Thus, the 
developmental systems perspective provides an account of evolution and 
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development that is consistent with both the methodology and the model of 
cognition of the extended mind approach. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In my introduction I stated that I wanted to explicate the role of development in 
evolutionary considerations. I have argued that development is misconstrued and 
neglected in neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology. The developmental processes 
of an individual organism tend to be viewed as the output of the evolutionary 
process rather than as something that may contribute to a lineage‟s evolutionary 
trajectory. This view results in a commitment to the gene as the sole unit of 
inheritance and the only entity capable of having a history of selection. Genes 
with a history of selection are understood to embody information about 
phenotypes in a way that marks them out as distinct from all other developmental 
resources. The informational gene then removes the need to investigate 
development in order to understand evolution; development is just the realisation 
of the instructions encoded in the genes. Where development is not outright 
neglected, its role is misconstrued. This occurs when facts about development are 
thought to account only for constraints on evolution by natural selection. This 
model, one shared with process structuralism, is built on a false dichotomy 
between development and natural selection. However, I argued that, because 
natural selection can act to conserve traits and developmental processes can help 
explain evolution by natural selection, that this model was inadequate. 
Evolutionary developmental biology also views the gene as a 
fundamentally different sort of developmental resource, but it rejects the false 
dichotomy between development and natural selection. Evolutionary 
developmental biologists argue that it is developmental processes that enable 
evolutionary innovation and that it is these processes that must be understood if 
we are to provide adequate evolutionary explanations. Development is construed 
in this approach as involving more than the realisation of a genetic programme 
and is characterised by emergent phenomena at various levels of biological 
organisation. While the neo-Darwinist might grant that such emergent 
phenomena may be a feature of development, evolutionary developmental 
biologists go further by claiming these phenomena are evolutionarily significant 
and thus worthy of investigation. Evo-devo makes a strong case for the 
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importance of development in evolutionary considerations but faces a 
fundamental problem. Mainstream or synthetic evo-devo continues to treat the 
gene as the sole unit of hereditary transmission, despite its recognition that more 
than genes are inherited, and thus evo-devo privileges the gene in development. 
This, I have argued, is based on a circular argument. The gene is thought to play 
an instructional, not merely causal, role because it is considered to be the unit of 
hereditary transmission, and it is the unit of hereditary transmission because it is 
thought to play this directive, not merely causal, role in development.  
DST also brings development to the fore in its approach to understanding 
evolution. Unlike evo-devo, DST rejects the idea that the gene is the unit of 
hereditary transmission and instead argues for a much broader understanding of 
what might bring about heritable similarity. Offspring can inherit entities found 
within the zygote such as DNA methylation patterns and cytoplasmic polarities, 
but also extra-cellular entities such as gut bacteria, nests, and social groups. This 
allows the role of the environment in development to be incorporated into an 
account of evolution. Further, it is not only discrete entities that are inherited but 
also the interactions between them. This amounts to a rejection of the notion that 
first there is hereditary transmission, and only then does the phenotype emerge as 
a result of development; hereditary “transmission” does not precede 
development. This expanded notion of inheritance offers no justification for 
viewing the gene as ontologically distinct from other developmental resources 
and, as a result, preformationism is eschewed. Development is instead 
characterised as the product of the interactions between developmental resources 
such that none of the individual resources controls development and instead 
control is distributed throughout the system.  
The developmental systems perspective rejects moves to a priori privilege 
genes over other developmental resources or, in more general terms, to privilege 
the internal over the external. This is not the unworkable holism feared by critics; 
DST allows us to acknowledge the distinct contributions of different 
developmental resources and acknowledges that not all resources that constitute 
the developmental system will be particularly important in any given 
developmental outcome. The details of the role cell membranes play in 
development will differ in many ways from the details of the role a linguistic 
community may play in development. But by beginning with the assumption that 
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there is no ontological distinction between developmental resources, DST 
ensures the role played by developmental resources is a matter for investigation. 
Rather than being black boxed, development becomes an important part of the 
explanandum.  
The developmental systems approach avoids two problems faced by the 
evolutionary developmental biologist. First, it does not fall prey to the circularity 
inherent in the evo-devo position that recognises more than genes are inherited, 
but which nonetheless maintains an ontologically distinct role for genes. Second, 
it is able to integrate the role of the environment in development into 
evolutionary considerations. Evo-devo has tended to focus on processes internal 
to the skin-bound organism and has not yet incorporated the role of the 
environment in development into broader evolutionary considerations, a state of 
affairs lamented by some evolutionary developmental biologists (Gilbert & 
Bolker 2003). DST provides a framework to evaluate the full role of the 
environment in development and the evolutionary consequences of this. The 
developmental systems approach rejects the idea that an organism‟s environment 
is largely autonomous – an idea implicit in much of the adaptationist programme 
– and acknowledges that the skin-bound organism constructs and maintains its 
relationships with structures in the environment. But DST can be improved by 
taking on board some of the work of evolutionary developmental biologists. For 
instance, the hierarchical model of selection can be extended to include selection 
working at the level of the different modules identified by evolutionary 
developmental biologists. 
Taking a developmental systems perspective results in a very different 
account of the evolution of culture and cognition. I examined a number of other 
approaches to these issues which, to a greater or lesser degree, relied on the neo-
Darwinian model of development and evolution, as well as an internalist model 
of cognition, and argued that these approaches faced serious problems. The 
combination of neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology and an internalist model of 
the mind leads Evolutionary Psychologists to argue that we possess “stone age 
minds.” However, the basic tension that arises from the alleged mismatch 
between the evolved cognitive capacities of Evolutionary Psychology and the 
modern world renders unfeasible attempts to explain culture as the product of 
cognitive capacities evolved to suit the EEA. The kind of gene-culture co-
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evolution account offered by Richerson and Boyd (2005) does not suggest that 
culture is tightly constrained by evolved cognitive capacities and it may allow us 
to track evolutionary changes at the cultural level; however, it faces two 
difficulties. First, in adopting a gene-culture co-evolutionary model, they endorse 
an account of evolution which continues to exclude any significant role for 
development. Genetic evolution and cultural evolution represent two distinct 
realms, though they can influence one another, while all other developmental 
resources and the interactions between them are overlooked. Second, it relies on 
cognitive modules that resemble the kind of modules favoured by Evolutionary 
Psychologists. Against both of these internalist accounts, I argued that we can 
offer a more adequate account of the evolution of cognition by adopting the 
extended mind hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that our cognitive capacities 
are best understood as being constituted by resources both beneath our skin and 
in the environment. The implication of this model of cognition is that, to the 
extent that we inhabit environments that differ from our Pleistocene ancestors, 
our cognitive processes will differ from those of our ancestors.  
A fundamental problem remains, however, for the study of the evolution of 
cognition and culture. Because human kinds differ from natural kinds in that they 
can result in looping effects such that these kinds are unstable, studying the 
evolution of human cognition and culture will differ from studying the evolution 
of non-human organisms. Human kinds, as presented by Hacking, have tended to 
focus on the change brought about in the behaviour of the individuals so classed; 
I looked at the case of the obese to demonstrate how the developmental system 
more broadly can be affected in this way. When we study humans, what we are 
trying to explain may change as a result of our research, and this change will 
often be in ways we cannot predict. This places a limitation on how well we can 
come to understand modern culture and cognition in its specifics. However, the 
developmental systems approach combined with the extended mind hypothesis 
can at least help us understand why human kinds differ from natural kinds in this 
way. 
Combining DST with the extended mind hypothesis changes our view of 
the relationship between biology, psychology and culture. Evolutionary 
Psychologists view culture primarily as the output of psychological modules 
evolved to suit our EEA, while gene-culture evolutionary accounts tend to view 
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biology and culture as distinct though interacting. In both instances, cognitive 
modules are taken as given; culture may then act as an input to these modules. 
The developmental systems perspective, on the other hand, rejects the claim that 
such modules are given prior to any interaction with culture and the environment 
more generally. Rather, features of the cultural and non-cultural environment 
may act as resources for development. Further, the extended mind hypothesis 
suggests that structures in the environment might not only partly constitute 
developmental processes, but may also partly constitute the cognitive processes 
themselves. Taken together, the developmental systems approach and the 
extended mind hypothesis change the explanandum for the study of the evolution 
of cognition, and in doing so, may provide a more productive and coherent 
framework in which to conduct research. 
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